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ABSTRACT
Image of God or Image by Man
by
Kevin Emerson Lageer
Throughout history, the Holy Bible and the Judeo-Chris-
tian definitions developed from it, formed the basis of
human identity for most of the civilized world. Until
recent centuries, this identification and differentiation
from all other creation was seldom questioned. There is an
obvious inherent difficulty here arising from human fini-
tude. Due to our inability to change ourselves, it is
difficult to envision a human being as anything other than
what a human being has been in this creation. Prior to the
present point in time, human beings and the intrinsic pro
cesses connected with them have been virtually unalterable.
Genesis 1:26-28, whether explicitly or implicitly,
provides us with our basic understanding of what humankind
is and is supposed to do in terms of duties. The defini
tions of humanity which have been given in the Bible were
sufficient knowledge for the operation of life until only a
few decades ago. Any differences were accepted as givens;
something beyond that which humanity could control. What
was created as male and female was seldom if ever ques
tioned. It was not until the time of the Enlightenment and
the thinking of John Locke and David Hume, that especially
far-reaching theories of human nature began to develop. But
these too, as with all previous attempts at delineating the
contents of human nature, have been subjective and conjec
tural. However, the progress of genetic science in the
early 1900 's was about to change this pattern.
It was in the early years of the twentieth century that
Francis Crick and James Watson discovered what have come to
be known in lay terms as the "building blocks of life".
Deoxyribonucleic acid is a coded protein found within every
cell of every biological organism on earth, including human
beings. The codes that are found within this protein chain
are the inner identifying sources of the exterior manifes
tations and operations of both that particular cell, but
ultimately the entire organism. It is the relationship
between the possibilities of genetic science and the Judeo-
Christian definitions of the nature of humanity that are the
focus of this thesis.
The first chapter will consist of an exegetical and
historico-theological examination of the Biblical understan
ding of the term "image" as used in Genesis 1:26 and else
where. Chapter 2 will consist of an examination of two
creational commands which have the most bearing on the main
issue in focus and which provide some parameters to both
this study as well as the fulfilling of the rDNA task.
Chapter 3 is a scrutiny of the structures and the way
in which we think about several different infrastructures of
human society, with special emphasis being given to the
child and the family. Ultimately, the question under review
is, "What is the correlation between the Biblical concept of
the image of God in mankind and recombinant DNA technology,
and perhaps more importantly, does this technology possess
the ability to alter the image of God in human beings?"
Chapter 4 forms the convergence of the theological and the
scientific/technical aspects of the study.
Some conclusions will be drawn regarding acceptable
research and technology in light of the Biblical understand
ings. As well, some areas of further study will be high
lighted.
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1PART 1
CHAPTER 1
The Foundations of "Imago Dei" in Genesis
Introduction
One of the most basic questions that mankind has ever
asked is, "Who am I?" While the importance of the question
and the influence of the answers varies from period to
period through the course of history, nothing seems to get
closer to the heart of any individual than questioning one's
own ultimate identity-
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance
of the doctrine of man. It has, of course,
always been true that one of the most impor
tant questions to which the philosopher ad
dresses himself is. What is man? . . . Vari
ous thinkers have given various answers to
the question "What is man?", each one with
far-reaching implications for thought and
life.'
For the Christian, this issue is equally important, if not
more important than for the non-Christian, but it is often
phrased differently. One of the most common phrases in
Christian jargon is, "the Image of God".
What differentiates Adam and Eve from the
rest of creation is that they were created in
the image of God. For twentieth-century man
this phrase, the image of God, is as impor
tant as anything in Scripture, because men
today can no longer answer that crucial ques
tion, "Who am I?" In his own naturalistic
theories, with the uniformity of cause and
effect in a closed system, with an evolution
ary concept of a mechanical, chance parade
from the atom to man, man has lost his unique
identity. As he looks out upon the world, as
he faces the machine, he cannot tell himself
^ Anthony A. Hoekema, Created in God's Image (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 1.
2from what he faces. He cannot distinguish
himself from other things.^
For individuals in our day, this question will most often
arise in relation to some medical or health related issue,
either on behalf of themselves or someone they are closely
associated with.
While current society's concern over the image of God
in man^ is open for debate,* for the Christian, it never
loses its primary importance. It is the fundamental question
of all theological and anthropological study.
^
Indeed for
John Wesley, before he can address the question of the new
^
Francis A. Schaeffer, The Complete Works of Francis
A. Schaeffer: A Christian Worldview Volume Two: A Christian
View of the Bible as Truth (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books,
1982), 31.
^
Throughout this thesis, there will be much discussion
concerning humanity at large. In view of the central topic
of this thesis, it will be very difficult to completely
eliminate 'sexist' language. In many languages with the
exception of English, there are specific words which refer
to humanity at large without male or female references. I
would greatly desire to be fluent in German, and be able to
properly use the much more encompassing term 'mensch' , which
we can only translate man, but which in the German has no
male or female connotations. As much effort as possible
will be made in this thesis to avoid the use of "man" in
reference to the human race, however, justification for the
use of "man" is based upon the fact that the foundational
discussion of this thesis is centered on the creation of man
as a species before the differentiation between the male and
female as groupings within the species.
* There are large sections of most societies in the
world who would be just as happy if the subject never arose,
but for the average North American, the question of "Who am
I?" has risen to new levels of importance over the past ten
years, as opposed to the previous question of importance,
"What is ultimate reality?" Cf . Schaeffer, Complete Works,
Vol. 2.
^ In the anthropology section of most theology text
books, the Imago Dei is the first major subject, or the
second if creation as a whole is dealt with.
3birth, he must first address the question of the origin and
image of man/
The verses of primary interest for this first chapter
are found in Genesis 1:26,27, It will be the aim of this
chapter to arrive at some type of definition to aid in our
understanding of the phrase "image of God" in man. The
first step in formulating a definition will be to examine
the two most important terms found in Gen, 1:26, "?'^'Y" and
"ni/j":". From here, a cursory study of the use of these
words in other verses will be executed. Subsequent to the
exegetical analyses, it will be necessary to examine the
current theories of the origins of the Primal History in an
effort to determine if a difference of theory viewpoint
changes the basic interpretations of the central text. In
order to broaden the study, it is prudent and necessary to
examine some theological definitions of the "image" includ
ing the views of both Brunner and Barth. In conclusion, a
list of principles will be gleaned from the chapter.
' John Wesley, The Works of John Wesley, 14 vols., 3rd
ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986, reprinted 1872),
6:66, 269; 9:291, 292.
gxeqetical Analysis: Genesis 1:26
The first phase of the exegetical examination will
focus on the initial occurrence of the concept of image in
the Bible. Subsequent references will be used to both
broaden and focus the resulting definition.
Our central passage is as follows.
And God said. Let us make man in our image,
after our likeness: and let them have domin
ion over the fish of the sea, and over the
fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and
over all the earth, and over every creeping
thing that creepeth upon the earth. (Genesis
1:26)
So God created man in his [own] image, in
the image of God created he him; male and
female created he them. (Genesis 1:27)^
In some senses, it is a very simple passage, while in other
senses, it is most profound and even cryptic. The two
Hebrew terms are D^Y, and HIQI. Many of the earlier commen
taries and discussions on this particular passage spend a
good deal of time on the opening cohortative of 1:26.*
This discussion will follow the lead of the more recent
commentaries and forego the investigation of the meaning of
the cohortative without limiting a complete understanding of
the central interest.'
^
All Biblical references taken from The Online Bible,
Version 5.0 (Elmira, ON: Woodside Bible Fellowship, 1990).
^ C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Commentary on the Old
Testament in Ten Volumes. Volume 1: The Pentateuch (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983) .
' Charles W. Carter, "Anthropology: Man, the Crown of
Divine Creation," in Charles W. Carter, General Editor, A
Contemporary Weslevan Theology, Two Volumes (Grand Rapids,
MI: Francis Asbury Press, 1983) 204. Millard J. Erickson,
Christian Theology, Three Volumes (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1984). Anthony A. Hoekema, Created in God's
Image (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986).
5The first term, ?'^Y, seems to be the more basic and
foundational of the two terms. The root and cognates of
this term are used 16 times throughout the Old Testament.
Five times it is used of man as created in the image of God.
The word basically refers to a representation or a likeness.
Often in actual practice, this term would be used in refer
ence to the image made a ruler of him/her self and placed in
the farthest reaches of his kingdom as a reminder to his
subjects of his continued rulership in spite of his physical
absence. Although it is not stated specifically, it is
assumed by many scholars that the Hebrew children were faced
with a D'^Y in Daniel 3:1. Several different words are used
in the Old Testament to refer to idols, some of which refer
to size, while others are most likely simply derogatory
terms, but this term is the most common and encompassing.
l'^Y refers to the image as a representation of the deity.
'�
It is important to note here that not all sculpture was
forbidden, only that which was to be used in an idolatrous
manner .
The second term of interest is the word illQI. It has
the following root meanings, "in the likeness of", or "like
as", but is also translated "is like", "similitude", or
"fashion". This word is used 22 times in the Old Testament,
with thirteen occurrences in Ezekiel (1:5,10,13,16,22,26,28;
8:2; 10:1,10,21,22; 23:15). It is important to note that
nowhere else in the Old Testament, outside the book of
Genesis, do these two terms appear in parallel or are in any
way connected with each other.
Exegetical Analysis: Genesis 5:3
Genesis 5:3 is the next most important reference con
taining one of these terms. "And Adam lived an hundred and
'� R. Laird Harris, Editor. Gleason L. Archer, Jr. and
Bruce K. Waltke, Associate Editors. Theological Wordbook of
j-he Old Testament (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 2:767.
6thirty years, and begat [a son] in his own likeness, after
his image; and called his name Seth:" (Genesis 5:3). Moses
here uses the same type of phrasing in reference to Adam and
Eve's procreation of a son as he used of God's creation of
man in the first instance. (It is interesting to note that
the reference only speaks of Adam begetting the son, with no
reference to Eve.) This indicates man's creative ability
patterned after God, although his creative capabilities are
tempered by mortality, and are not ex nihilo. The most
important point of this reference, however, is the fact that
whatever it was that God gave to U~]K in creating him, he was
able to pass on to his own offspring. While this hereditary
factor does not encompass the whole of the image, it is a
vital factor. This point is further highlighted in the next
reference of importance in this study.
Exegetical Analysis: Genesis 9:6
By the time one arrives at the ninth chapter of Gene
sis, rules for living in society are being set up by God.
The rule that is of most importance for our purpose is found
in Genesis 9:6, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall
his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man."
(Genesis 9:6) It is important that the only reason given by
the author as a warning against killing any man is that man
was made in the image of God. It is the image in himself
that makes man worthy of the possession of life. "And this
much we may fairly infer from hence, that 'the image of
God,' wherein 'man was' at first 'created,' whereinsoever it
consisted, was not utterly effaced in the time of Noah.
Yea, so much of it will always remain in all men, as will
justify the punishing murderers with death."" It is noth
ing less than the image of God, bestowed upon man at cre
ation and reproduced from generation to generation, that is
to protect man from death by the hand of his fellow man.
" Wesley, Works, 9:291.
7Historical Theological Analysis
of Imago Dei
Documentary Hypothesis Vs. Unitary Reading
For the last three quarters of a century, the documen
tary hypothesis has been the predominant view of the majori
ty of theologians regarding the Old Testament. This seems
to be an outgrowth of the presumed correctness of the
Darwinian theory. A fundamental presupposition this theory
is that the latest version of any process is the best.
This fundamental presupposition has infused many other
aspects of modern life and thinking. This presumption has
been propounded in all areas of science, medicine, agricul
ture, and it has even subtly invaded our views of animate
life including humans themselves. It has also entered the
realm of religion and biblical studies. The fundamental
belief of this advancement theory (which became known as the
documentary hypothesis as labelled by Wellhausen, one of its
foremost proponents) is that the original authors of the
Primal History could only combine theories, stories and
myths in an editorial fashion. The main task was blending
them together into a coherent, readable and hopefully be
lievable whole. According to the proponents of this theory,
the original story was not considered complete enough in
some manner, and it was felt that other details and editori
al comments were needed. While they will concede that the
breaks are not always obvious, in most instances, differenc
es in style can be discerned.
Because it would be going against the fundamental
presupposition of the Documentary Hypothesis (that newer is
always better), the following proposition (after the rise of
the Documentary Hypothesis) was seldom allowed to be stated:
that the original autographs could have been written by one
author; a consummate artist at telling stories and blending
details. In the overbearing din of documentary hypothesis
research, we must ask, "Was the still small voice of unitary
reading ever given a hearing?" However, for the purpose of
this discussion, does a decision between the documentary
hypothesis versus a unitary reading make any substantial
difference to the interpretation of the central verses that
form the heart of the doctrine of the Imago Dei? And such
will be the focus of the balance of the chapter.
Due to the overwhelming amount of research in the
tradition of the documentary hypothesis, this investigation
will be limited to the writings of Gerhard von Rad and
Martin Noth, and the commentary work of Westermann. The
majority of their writings are centered around studies in
Genesis and Old Testament theologies. The first endeavour
will be to gain a fuller understanding of their conceptions
of the Imago Dei. The latter portion of this section will
then be concerned with determining an understanding of the
Imago Dei from a unitary reading interpretation in an effor
to ascertain any differences between the two approaches.
Documentary Hypothesis Reading of Imago Dei
Martin Noth summarizes his overall approach in the
opening chapter of Pentateuchal Traditions. The following
lengthy quote, will serve well to lead us into the thinking
and understanding of one immersed in the documentary hypoth
esis .
The growth and formation of the large body of
traditions now found in the extensive and
complicated literary structure of the Penta
teuch was a long process, nourished by many
roots and influenced by manifold interests
and tendencies. In the course of this devel
opment, traditions which doubtless were cir
culated and transmitted orally at first were
probably written down in time, for reasons
that are no longer known to us and to an
extent that can no longer be determined with
certainty- In any event, later on they were
brought together in large literary works and
these in turn, through the purely literary
labors of so-called redactors, were finally
compiled into the large corpus of the trans
mitted Pentateuch. It is the task of a "his-
9tory of Pentateuchal traditions" to investi
gate this whole process from beginning to
end. . . . Beyond this, however- -and here is
the essential point--the decisive steps on
the way to the formation of the Pentateuch
were taken during the preliterary stage, and
the literary fixations only gave final form
to material which in its essentials was al
ready given. Therefore, to understand prop
erly the structure and content of the Penta
teuch as a whole and in its details, one must
attempt to penetrate into the early stages of
the history of its traditions.'^
Certain literary devices are used as aids in coming to
an understanding of the message of the Pentateuch. They
have become signposts serving as signals to the reader of
changes in direction or ideas. The first of these Noth
refers to as
~
bracketings ' . Noth perceives five independent
themes forming the backbone of the Pentateuchal traditions.
These themes are "guidance out of Egypt", "guidance into the
Arable Land", "promise to the Patriarchs", "guidance in the
Wilderness", and "revelation at Sinai". While we don't have
the time or space here to elaborate on either the outline or
the substance, a cursory reading of Noth's understanding of
this process would quickly alert one to the fact that there
is a very complicated "cutting and pasting" of the stories
and perceived traditions as given in the Canon. von Rad
gives us some sense of this understanding when he states.
It is to the undying credit of H. Gunkel that
in his great commentary on Genesis he sepa
rated the original narrative units from the
larger whole and analyzed them with a dis
tinctive aesthetic charisma. These individu
al traditions were of very different kinds. .
. . But that these very old traditions are
for the most part sagas is a fact, the back
ground of which we can investigate no fur
ther. What does this fact, which today is
Martin Noth, A History of Pentateuchal Traditions,
Translated with an Introduction by Bernhard W. Anderson
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 1-2.
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neither new nor scientifically disputed, and
yet concerning which so much lack of clarity
still prevails, mean for the exegete?"
What it has meant is a century of scholarly work based on a
theory. Thus while we have a basic understanding of von
Rad's view of the Old Testament canon, he does make this
further clarification, "It is certainly misleading if we
apply it [saga J to the present forms of the Old Testament
traditions, for from a literary point of view we have here
narratives which have reached a high degree of artistry and
which venture to depict God's ways in sacred history by
means of constantly new pictures."'* Westermann too is
convinced of the refined over- lays that he perceives make up
the Primal History of the Old Testament. He states, "Sepa
rately from the Patriarchal History, the Primal History
(chs.1-11) was also formed out of individual stories that
were once transmitted independently, as several parallels
between the stories demonstrate convincingly."" Each of
these scholars sees the development of the Primal History as
happening in successive stages, none of which could be
clearly distinguished or delineated. They are assured that
the development was a process of generations of oral tradi
tions being refined to the point where actual writing took
place. This writing however was still not the words which
we have in front of us. Indeed the writing itself pro
gressed through many generations and revisions before there
developed what we possess and use as the Old Testament
canon. With this as background, we will in turn, examine
" Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (Philadel
phia: The Westminster Press, 1972), 31-32.
'*
von Rad, Genesis, 37.
'' Claus Westermann, Genesis: A Practical Commentary
(David E. Green, trans. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), xiii.
11
von Rad's and Westermann ' s interpretations of the Genesis
1:26 passage.
von Rad opens his commentary with the following.
Anyone who expounds Gen., ch. 1, must under
stand one thing: this chapter is Priestly
doctrine--indeed, it contains the essence of
Priestly knowledge in a most concentrated
form. It was not "written" once upon a time;
but , rather, it is doctrine that has been
carefully enriched over centuries by very
slow growth. . . . What is said here is in
tended to hold true entirely and exactly as
it stands."
In spite of von Rad's views on the sources of the Primal
History, he maintains an orthodox view of the image of God
in man. He notes that the image "is not to be limited to
any part of man"; that it is to be found "in the totality of
his being."" In reference to the physical versus the
spiritual, he states, "Therefore, one will do well to split
the physical from the spiritual as little as possible: the
whole man is created in God's image."'� As von Rad moves
to the reality of the creation of man in God's image, he
assumes a functional definition in reference to the image in
man .
When, however, one has traced in a general
way the distribution of weight in the Priest
ly account of man's creation, one will admit
that the text speaks less of the nature of
God's image than of its purpose. There is
less said about the gift itself than about
the task. This then is sketched most explic
itly: domination in the world, especially
over the animals. This commission to rule is
not considered as belonging to the definition
of God's image; but it is its consequence,
i.e., that for which man is capable because
of it. . . . The decisive thing about man's
" Rad, Genesis, 47.
" Rad, Genesis, 59.
Rad, Genesis, 58.
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similarity to God, therefore, is his function
in the non-human world.''
He also notes that the idea of man refers not simply to the
male alone, but rather to the male and female; there is a
sexual distinction that is evident in the image.
In trying to determine the meaning of "image",
Westermann says that.
It does not mean a particular human quality;
it is not an isolated assertion about human
beings, but rather concerns the purpose of
their creation. The Creator wants to create
a being analogous to himself, to whom he can
speak, who will listen and speak to him.
This remains true despite all human differ
ences; every person is created in the image
of God.'�
After explaining the simple meaning of the verb in the
command of the next verse, Westermann concludes, "His rule
serves the well-being of his subjects. This is what is
meant here by humanity's rule over the rest of creation."^'
The logical implication for Westermann here is that, "When
this is exemplified by rule over the animals (cf. Ps. 8:6),
then it is because the personal element in humanity is most
involved here; humanity can remain most fully human through
ruling animals, as we see in passages describing the shep
herd (Ps. 23; John 10)."^^ Thus, in addition to ruling
over animals, existence as male and female and procreation
are added as conditions to fill out the picture of what it
means to be fully human. However, if the foregoing is
true, then one could conclude that sheep-herding and lion-
'' Rad, Genesis, 59.
^� Westermann, Genesis, 10.
^' Westermann, Genesis, 11.
Westermann, Genesis, 11.
Westermann, Genesis, 11.
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taming make one more human than does baking, welding, or
playing golf.
Unitary Reading of Imago Dei
For the past couple of decades, there has been a
growing voice of dissention in a scattered few departments
of Biblical studies against the documentary hypothesis.
Those who have raised their voices in suspicion of the
documentary hypothesis, have done so at the risk of ridicule
from peers and loss of stature in the exegetical world. Two
of those who have done just this and in a most polite but
forceful way are Isaac Kikawada and Arthur Quinn, in a co-
authored work entitled Before Abraham Was.^* They have
very artfully constructed the picture that would result from
a unitary reading of Genesis 1-11. Commentators that have
followed this pattern of thinking, from different tradi
tions, would include Umberto Cassuto, Victor P. Hamilton,
and Robert Alter." In light of the fact that this is not
a survey of the interpretation of Gen. 1:26, nor a defini
tive determination of authorship or composition,^^ it will
Isaac M. Kikawada and Arthur Quinn, Before Abraham
Was: The Unity of Genesis 1-11 CNashville, TN: Abingdon
Press. 1985), 74-82. While Kikawada resides in the Bibli
cal studies department, Quinn does not. Rather his special
ty is English and Rhetoric.
" Umberto Cassuto, The Documentary Hypothesis and the
Composition of the Pentateuch, trans I. Abrahams (Jerusalem:
Magnes, 1961); idem, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis, 2
Vols, trans I. Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961-1964).
Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990). Two others would include
J, orr. The Problem of the Old Testament (New York: Charles
Scribner's P^^^. iQnfi); r. K. Harrison. Introduction to the
Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969), 542-65-
"In a book that is patently anonymous, and where all
original texts have long since disappeared, it is most
likely that a project to determine Genesis' authorship and
mode of composition is doomed from the start." Hamilton, The
Rook of Genesis, 37 .
14
suffice to overview Hamilton and Umberto Cassuto for actual
interpretations .
In relation to our specific interest, Hamilton general
ly follows the most popular interpretations. He notes that
in neighbouring societies, quite often the king was referred
to in written and spoken language as "the image of God", but
such a designation would be withheld from the common labour
er. Such may be the case in Gen. 1:26. The author of
Genesis is simply referring to mankind by using royal lan
guage, indicating that, "In God's eyes all of mankind is
royal." And further than this, "All of humanity is related
to God, not just the king. Specifically, the Bible democra
tizes the royalist and exclusivist concepts of the nations
that surrounded Israel."^'
Hamilton goes on to note the obvious fact that this
verse is not intended to define the image of God in man,
rather it states such as a fact. "Gen. 1:26 is simply
saying that to be human is to bear the image of God. This
understanding emphasizes man as a unity. No part of man, no
function of man is subordinated to some other, higher part
or activity. "^^ This stated fact serves no more than to
establish the relationship between the creature and the
Creator .
The balance of the verse establishes the intended rela
tionship between the remainder of creation and man. Again
the author seems careful to use royal language. The intend
ed meaning of nil in this instance is "to rule" rather than
"to tread down" (as in Joel 4:13 and Ezek 34:4). When it is
used in relation to a human king and his rule, the normal
nuance of the verb is ruling with compassion and the best
interests of those being ruled in mind. "The master is not
Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 135.
Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 137.
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to rule over his servants with harshness. . . . What is
expected of the king is responsible care over that which he
rules. . . . Man is created to rule. But this rule is to be
compassionate and not exploitative. Even in the garden of
Eden he who would be lord of all must be servant of all."^'
Cassuto 's interpretation of the passage can be summed
up in the following.
There is no doubt that the original signi
fication of this expression in the Canaanite
tongue was, judging by Babylonian usage,
corporeal, in accordance with the anthropo
morphic conception of the Godhead among the
peoples of the ancient east. Nevertheless,
when we use it in modern Hebrew, and say, for
instance, 'all that has been created in the
Divine image', we certainly do not associate
any material idea with it, but give it a
purely spiritual connotation, to wit, that
man, although he resembles the creatures in
his physical structure, approaches God in his
thought and in his conscience. It is clear,
therefore, that the meaning of the phrase
changed in the course of time; it was corpo
real to begin with but subsequently it became
spiritual. . . . When we consider the lofty
conception of God that is reflected in our
section, we are compelled to conclude that
the change referred to antedated its composi
tion, and that the expression is used here in
a sense similar to (if not actually identical
with) that which it has in Hebrew today.
^�
As can be readily seen from the foregoing, Cassuto too,
tends to see the image as residing in the spiritual aspects
of mankind, thus making the assumption that mankind's spiri-
Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 138. Several of late
have placed blamed for the current pillaging of the environ
ment directly on Gen. 1:26, but this is only possible as a
result of misinterpreting the verb being used; interpreting
"radah" to mean "tread/trample under foot" rather than "rule
with concern/compassion". Cf . Hamilton, 138, fn. 19 for
examples of proper exegesis and discussion of ecology.
^� Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis
tr. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, The
Magnes Press, 1961), 56.
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tual qualities are his/her most "God-oriented" qualities.
His interpretation is another example locating the image in
one particular aspect or action of mankind.
Theological Interpretations
Attention must now be focused on the somewhat more
difficult aspect of this study. It is the technical inter
pretation of this phrasing that becomes very broad.
Throughout history the interpretations of the phrasing in
Gen. 1:26 have fallen into five different categories:^'
1) Roman Catholic theology maintains a distinction
between the two terms, one referring to structure, the other
referring to function or the moral image that, unlike the
first, was damaged in the fall.
2) The more important word is "image", but to avoid the
implication that man is a precise copy, the less specific
and more abstract "likeness" was added.
3) There is no distinction, and the words are inter
changeable; the two words are so intertwined that nothing is
lost by the use of both or the omission of either word.
4) "Likeness" is more important and is defined and
limited by the use of "image".
5) The word likeness rather than diminishing the word
image, actually amplifies it and specifies its meaning. Man
is not just an image, but rather a likeness- image. He is
not simply representative but representational. Likeness
guarantees that man is an adequate and faithful representa
tive of God on earth.
Calvin, Luther, Wesley
It seems evident from the foregoing that no one way of
interpreting the phrase has prevailed through time. In line
with the Catholic thinking of the first point above, Calvin
says the following:
" Harris, T.W.O.T. , 1:192.
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...although some obscure lineaments of that
image are found remaining in us; yet are they
so vitiated and maimed, that they may truly
be said to be destroyed. For besides the
deformity which everywhere appears unsightly,
this evil also is added, that no part is free
from the infection of sin.^^
And again we find the same sort of mindset from Luther,
Therefore that image of God was something
most excellent, in which were included eter
nal life, everlasting freedom from fear, and
everything that is good. However, through
sin this image was so obscured and corrupted
that we cannot grasp it even with our intel
lect. Although we utter the words, who is
there who could understand what it means to
be in a life free from fear, without terrors
and dangers, and to be wise, upright, good,
and free from all disasters, spiritual as
well as physical?"
As can be attested by one more quote, it appears that most
of the older commentators believed that the image of God in
man was, at the least, badly damaged at the Fall.
The Reformed and the Lutherans agree, against
the Roman Catholic (and medieval scholastic)
idea of a donum superadditum (q.v.), that the
imago divina was not superadded to human
nature, but was a donum, or gift, belonging
to the original human constitution and in
trinsic to it, a donum concreatum (q.v.).
They also agree as to its nearly complete
loss and the present inability of man to
regain any of the lost gift by his own ef
forts. They disagree, however, as to the
precise identification of the Imago.
John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses
called Genesis (Grand Rapids: Baker, n.d.), 95.
" Martin Luther, Luther's Works: Lectures on Genesis,
Chapters 1-5, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia,
1958), 65.
^* Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek
Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scho
lastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985), 143-146.
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The final statement here has become the more central concern
of the more recent commentators, the issue being the under
lying meaning of the image. However, this too tends to fall
into historical categories.
The position that commentators and theologians very
often take seems to be defined in relation to either the
rest of creation as a whole, or to the animals as a part of
that same creation. This later developed into the structur
al and functional aspects of the Imago Dei. Aquinas devel
oped the position that saw the image of God in man being en
tirely located in man's ability to reason. Man's ability to
even ask "Who am I?" set him apart from the rest of cre
ation. In reaction to this type of thinking, Orr defines it
differently again.
Negatively, it is plain that the image [of
man] does not lie essentially in material
form. . . .
Positively, therefore, this image, or
resemblance to God, must be supposed to lie
primarily in man's nature, and secondarily,
in the relation which through that nature he
sustains to the lower creation, and to the
world as a whole. It must be looked for,
therefore, in that higher constitution of his
being which makes him spiritual. It is in
the powers and activities of man as personal
spirit that we are to seek his affinity to
God and resemblance to Him. The image of God
intended in Scripture, in other words, is a
mental and moral image. It is to be sought
for in the fact that man is a person� a spir
itual, self-conscious being; and in the at
tributes of that personality�his rationality
and capacity for moral life, including in the
latter knowledge of moral law, self-deter
mining freedom, and social affections; high
est of all, in his capacity for fellowship
with God.""
Throughout history the most popular interpretation at
any given time vacillated between the structure of man, that
Orr, God's Image in Man, 54-57.
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is, how God actually created him, and the function of man,
or the activities that man could accomplish that made him
different from the rest of creation, but supremacy has never
been gained by either position.
Man is the image of God by virtue of his
spiritual nature, of the breath of God by
which the being, formed from the dust of the
earth, became a living soul. The image of
God consists, therefore, in the spiritual
personality of man, though not merely in
unity of self -consciousness and self-determi
nation, or in the fact that man was created a
consciously free Ego; for personality is
merely the basis and form of the divine like
ness, not its real essence. This consists
rather in the fact that the man endowed with
free self-conscious personality possesses, in
his spiritual as well as corporeal nature, a
creaturely copy of the holiness and blessed
ness of the divine life.^^
John Wesley also picks sides in his evaluation of the
Imago. He states that God created man
not barely in his natural image, a picture of
his own immortality; a spiritual being, en
dued with understanding, freedom of will, and
various af fections ; --nor merely in his polit
ical image, the governor of his lower world,
having "dominion over the fishes of the sea,
and over all the earth;"�but chiefly in his
moral image; which according to the Apostle,
is "righteousness and true holiness" (Eph.
4:24.) In this image of God was man made.^^
There are problems with both positions when taken
separately. If the structural position is believed to be
the most correct position, difficulties arise both in the
areas of follow-up as well as interpretation. An accusation
made against the structural position in the area of inter
pretation is that if man possesses the image of God without
Keil & Delitzsch, Vol. 1, 63-64.
Wesley, Works, 6:66.
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any relational responsibilities, he is not much different
from God.
James Orr, cited above was a strong proponent of the
structural posture. In his classic work entitled God ' s
Image in Man, he very neatly erects a Biblical structuralist
pose in objection to monistic, materialistic, evolution-
istic, and other views of the nature of mankind. Orr finds
the image to exist in the rational constitution, the domin
ion and the moral resemblance to God which has been marred
by sin, realized in Christ and restored in redemption.
While he attempts to cover all of the bases that constitute
the image of God in mankind, either it doesn't occur to him
or he is uncomfortable to directly declare that the image of
God simply is man.
Barth and Brunner
The theologians of the early twentieth century take a
different approach. Barth and Brunner developed what came
to be referred to as a dynamic model of the image which in
essence, is also a functional model. For both of them, the
image of God in man is only fully accomplished and fulfilled
when mankind is in relation to someone else. The task of
being fully human can only be executed by being in contact
with other beings.
However, it is unjust to group both Barth and Brunner
into exactly the same category. It will be helpful to note
at this point that both Brunner and Barth deny the historic
ity of Adam and the fall of man into sin." Because of
their wide-ranging effect on modern theology, prudence
dictates an examination in detail of the views of both Barth
and Brunner on the image of God in man, beginning with
Barth.
" However, this is not to say that they deny the
present sinfulness of mankind. To give up the idea of 'a
Fall' would be to abandon the Biblical faith as a whole.
Hoekema, Image of God, 52.
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Barth disagrees strongly with all attempts to locate
the image of God in man in any of the areas historically
deemed as correct. He does not believe that the image is
found in man's ability to reason, nor is it defined in terms
of structure, disposition, capacities, etc. Barth looks for
the image in a different location. After citing Gen. 1:27
he says, "Could anything be more obvious than to conclude
from this clear indication that the image and likeness of
the being created by God signifies existence in confron
tation, i.e., in this confrontation, in the juxtaposition
and conjunction of man and man which is that of male and
female. . .?""
For Barth, the fact that mankind was created male and
female envelops the image of God in man. Not only is man to
find confrontation between man and woman but also between
man and man. This type of relationship between man and man
is the same type of relationship that is found between God
and man and is therefore to be labelled as the image. The
relationship between God and man is covenantal fellowship
and the relationship between man and man is fellowship.
"That real man is determined by God for life with God has
its inviolable correspondence in the fact that his crea
turely being is in a being in encounter--between I and Thou,
man and woman. It is human in this encounter, and in this
humanity it is a likeness of the being of its Creator."*"
Because Barth did not believe in the historical fall of
man, neither did he believe anything is lost by man, includ
ing the image of God in man. "Further, Barth holds that the
capacity for I-thou fellowship between God and man and
" Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume Three. The
Doctrine of Creation, Part Two, Ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F.
Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), 195..
*� Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111/2:203.
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between man and man is an essential and unlosable aspect of
human existence."*' And further.
Since his constitution derives from this God,
from Him who is faithful and does not repent
of His goodness, it is therefore unshakable.
It can, of course, be disturbed and perverted
by human sin, but it cannot be destroyed or
rendered nugatory- Hence man remains man
even in his deepest fall, even in the last
judgment of death; and even in death he is
still man within the hand and power of
God. "*'
While Barth does use some vague sentences to explain a
type of subjective change or transformation within an indi
vidual by the Holy Spirit, it must be concluded, on the
basis of his own definition of the image of God,
that the image of God is not really capable
of renewal. For the image is defined in
purely formal terms: the ability to exist in
confrontation with God and others; the capac
ity of hearing God as a thou and responding
to him as an I, and the capacity of doing the
same with fellow human beings. But if this
capacity is an ineradicable aspect of man,
and if it is understood as a mere capacity or
ability as such, regardless of how it is
used, one fails to see how it can be subject
to improvement, renewal, or transforma
tion."*'
We can here commend Barth for an interesting corrective or
at least a different approach to the formal view of the
image. It was stated at the outset that Barth 's view was
dynamic. While it is a functional view based on the idea of
covenantal fellowship, it is also a structural view based on
the fact that the image in man could not have been violated
in a non-existent fall, and thus has no requirement of being
improved or perfected.
*' Hoekema, Created in God's Image, 50-
*^ Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111/2:347.
*' Hoekema, 51.
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While the similarities abound, there are variations
between Earth's views on the image of God in mankind and the
views of Brunner, Remembering that the historicity of both
Adam and the Fall of man are rejected by Brunner as well, he
is still able to label mankind as sinful. While Brunner,
like Barth also rejects the image of God in man as being
located in his/her ability to reason, he does allow the use
of reason as "the means whereby man is able to fulfill his
true function: that of having loving fellowship with
God."^* Herein do we find the heart of Brunner ' s doctrine
of the image, but the purpose of God's creation of man
provides the initiative. "God, who wills to glorify Himself
and to impart Himself, wills man to be a creature who re
sponds to His call of love with a grateful, responsive
love."*^ Humans are created the way they are and possess
what they do in order that they might be in loving fellow
ship with God. "Love, therefore, is at the heart of
Brunner ' s understanding of man and of the purpose for his
existence: God loves us and desires us to love him. God
does not wish from man the response of an automaton or of an
animal; he desires the response of a free person, since only
such a person can truly love him.
"*^
As originally created, mankind possessed the freedom
(in the proper. Biblical sense of freedom within Divine
principles) to love God. Loving God was mankind's responsi
bility. Men and women, as responsible, free individuals,
possess the responsibility to give an answer back to God.
They may deny their responsibility to God, but they can not
escape it. This constitutes the formal image of God in man
** Hoekema, Created in God's Image, 53.
Emil Brunner, The Doctrine of Creation and Redemp
tion, tr Olive Wyon, (New York: Scribner, 1939), 102.
*^ Hoekema, Created in God's Image, 53.
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according to Brunner, but it is not an abstract concept.
Brunner uses this label of "formal image" to refer to the
impossibility of an individual human to escape out of his/
her own humanity. "A rose is a rose by any other name."
The humanness of the human can not be changed. The formal
image possesses real content such as freedom, reason, con
science and language, and as in Barth, this aspect of the
image can not be lost; it is not abolished by man's sin.
The material aspect of the image is the story of the
New Testament. It tells of mankind seeking the glorifica
tion of self rather than of God, and it is this self-glori
fication or the providing of the wrong answer to God that
has resulted in man's loss of the material image of God.
This is the part of the image that was affected by the Fall.
The supreme story of the New Testament is the restoration of
the image through the life and work of Jesus Christ. He is
the example of the right answer.
Jesus Christ is the true Imago Dei, which man
regains when through faith he is "in Jesus
Christ." Faith in Jesus is therefore the
restauratio imaginis [restoration of the
image], because he restores to us that exis
tence in the Word of God which we had lost
through sin. When man enters into the love
of God revealed in Christ he becomes truly
human. True human existence is existence in
the love of God.*'
Consequently, the recreation or redemption of the Imago in
the material sense presupposes the retention of the Imago in
the formal sense.
Brunner 's view of the image exposes some very valuable
points. First, it is another dynamic view which sees man
kind's existence in relation to God. Second, love forms the
central focus of the Imago rather than reason or intellect.
Third, he readily acknowledges the extremely damaging ef
fects of sin on the image. Fourth, he makes a very good
*'
Brunner, Doctrine of Creation, 58.
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effort to retain both aspects of the image. And fifth, he
insists that in a very real sense, fallen man still possess
es the image of God."
Evaluation of Interpretations
However, difficulties still lie in the presuppositions
which both Brunner and Barth accept. The greatest difficul
ty lies in their inability to accept the historicity of Adam
and the Fall of mankind. The entire focus of Paul in Romans
5 is the juxtaposition of the first Adam and the second
Adam; how the one (and all mankind in relation) can be both
condemned and justified on the basis of another individual's
actions. A second difficulty exists in their definition of
sin and mankind's sinfulness. If there was no historical
fall which is mankind's rebellion toward God, then the
questions of when, where, and how mankind became sinful,
must be asked. A third difficulty arises when Brunner
insists that the one aspect of the image has not been af
fected by sin. The basic question has to do with the perva
siveness of sin. Is it possible that there is something in
mankind which was not touched by sin? By logical implica
tion, Brunner 's definition of the image must allow for some
aspect of the image in man to be in a perfect state.
It is evident from the foregoing that both Barth and
Brunner made conscious attempts at combining both the struc
tural and functional aspects of the Image in their theolo
gies of humanity- In some ways they have succeeded, howev
er, their presuppositions create difficulties in both the
structural and functional interpretations of the image of
God in man.
In order to better evaluate their arguments, a critical
examination of the functional position itself needs to be
undertaken. If the functional position is assumed to be the
correct position, then there are certain aspects of the
Hoekema, Created in God's Image, 57.
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textual evidence that appear to be ignored, as in the fol
lowing words of von Rad. "The statement about the image of
God in man contains no direct explanation about the form
which specially constitutes it; its real point is rather in
the purpose for which the image is given to man."*'
Perhaps the most important of the textual evidences has
to do with the positioning and order of the narrative. A
careful examination of Gen. 1:26,27 will reveal that the
image of God in the creation of man was the primary idea
revealed in the narrative. The functions and relationships
of mankind have not yet been established or defined. First,
God issues the command to create a being in their image,
then the function of that particular creation is delineated.
Even before a man or a woman does anything or relates to
anyone, indeed, even before birth, he/she possesses the
image of God. While Hoekema establishes the foregoing
critique, he too decides that the functional aspect of the
image is of primary importance.
The image of God in man must therefore be
seen as involving both the structure of man
(his fits, capacities, and endowments) and
the functioning of man (his actions, his
relationships to God and to others, and the
way he uses his gifts). To stress either of
these at the expense of the other is to be
one-sided. We must see both, but we need to
see the structure of man as secondary and his
functioning as primary. God has created us
in his image so that we may carry out a task,
fulfill a mission, pursue a calling. To
enable us to perform that task, God has en
dowed us with many gifts--gifts that reflect
something of his greatness and glory- To see
man as the image of God is to see both the
task and the gifts. But the task is primary;
the gifts are secondary. The gifts are the
means for fulfilling the task.^"
*' Von Rad, Old Testament Theology.- 144.
^� Hoekema, Created in God's Image, 73.
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While the task (God's task?) is obviously primary in God's
sight and mind, God was first concerned with giving mankind
the gifts that would enable him to fulfill the task. "H.
Orton Wiley writes convincingly that since there was a
declaration of the divine purpose in humanity before even
the creative fiat was executed, this image must belong to
his inmost creaturely constitution."^' Thus in the cre
ation of mankind, the gifts are primary; however, in the
functioning of mankind the task is primary. It is important
not to lose the emphasis of the first half of the quote
however. Both aspects of mankind need to be kept in equal
balance. An over-emphasis of the functional aspect of man
results in other difficulties that will become more apparent
latter in this discussion.
An earlier critique of the structuralist position
implied an assumption of divinity within creation. This
needs to be examined more closely. This critique can only
arise from an improper conception of structure. Many have
stated that the image in man includes all of the attributes
of God (with the exception of those attributes which are
sometimes referred to as the absolute attributes) only in a
finite form. For an illustration, consider the several
places around the country where there are recreation parks
recreating in miniature much larger edifices and world
renowned land marks. While these miniature models may
faithfully recreate the real-life object in every detail,
they will not fulfill in every degree the function of the
original; the steps will not hold the weight, the wings will
not create the proper draft, nor will the motors create
combustion to move the model. While humans as creatures may
possess many of the actual attributes of the original Cre
ator, they possess them with limits.
" Charles Carter, A Contemporary Wesleyan Theology,
vol. 1, (Kansas City: Nazarene, 1941), 205.
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However, if both positions (structural and functional)
are given equal standing, some previous difficulties are
resolved. First, if the image is as strongly located in the
structure of the individual as in the function, we avoid the
difficulty of having to re-label (and most often mislabel)
individuals who have difficulties or find it impossible to
relate to other individuals, e.g. encephalic children,
senile elderly, and the fetus. With the use of a stronger
emphasis on the structural image of the individual, society
can better avoid the declassification of these individuals
that often leads to a diminishing of personal identity and
personal rights, usually leaving them with an inferior
status in society. While it is true that they may have
diminished functional capabilities at societal and interper
sonal levels, this is not a guarantee that they possess a
diminished image.
Secondly, if the structural aspect of the image of God
in man is given a measured increase of emphasis, there would
tend to be less limiting of the individual's abilities.
More opportunities would be allowed to any individual to
attempt and accomplish their own tasks as a result of a more
conscious understanding of the fulfilling of the image
through relationships. "The Christian, therefore, has a
sociological base which is extremely strong. As humanists
are fighting today against prejudice, they have little
philosophical base for their battle. But as a Christian I
do: no matter who I look at, no matter where he is, every
man is created in the image of God as much as I am."^^
Erickson summarizes these two points in a convincing manner.
Because all are in the image of God, nothing
should be done which would encroach upon
another's legitimate exercise of dominion.
Freedom must not be taken from a human who
has not forfeited this right by abusing it
" Schaeffer, Complete Works. 2:35.
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(the list of those who have abused their
freedom would include murderers, thieves,
etc. ) . . . Beyond that, however, it means
that depriving someone of freedom through
illegal means, manipulation, or intimidation
is improper. Everyone has a right to exer
cise dominion, a right which ends only at the
point of encroaching upon another's right
to exercise dominion.^'
In these regards, Hoekema quotes Herman Bavinck quite
extensively and with good reason. Bavinck has a very clear
and concise concept of what the image of God in man should
mean .
Man does not simply bear or have the image of
God; his is the image of God.
From the doctrine that man has been creat
ed in the image of God flows the clear impli
cation that that image extends to man in his
entirety- Nothing in man is excluded from
the image of God. . . . And he is that image
totally, in soul and body, in all faculties
and powers, in all conditions and relation
ships. Man is the image of God because and
insofar as he is true man, and he is man,
true and real man, because and insofar as he
is the image of God.^*
Hoekema goes on to quote Bavinck in explaining what he
actually means by
~
in his entirety':
Herman Bavinck, however, clearly affirmed
that man's body is included in the image:
Man's body also belongs to the image of God.
. . . The body is not a tomb but a wondrous
masterpiece of God, constituting the essence
of man as fully as the soul. ... it belongs
so essentially to man that, though through
sin it is violently torn away from the soul
Erickson, Christian Theology. Vol. 2, 517.
Hoekema, Created in God's Image. [ Bavinck,
Dogmatiek, tr Hoekema, 2:595-96], 65.
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[in death], it is nevertheless again united
with the soul in the resurrection."
"When we think of man in connection with the various rela
tionships in which he functions, we are confirmed in the
conclusion that the image of God in man does not concern
only a part of him (the 'soul' or the 'spiritual' aspect)
but the entire person.
"^^
Conclusions and Principles
The following points can be made from our study.
First, from the words themselves, "Q^Y" or "fllQI", we can
tell that mankind was created as a copy or mirror image of
God. This is the highest honor that could have been awarded
to any of God's creation; to be an image of the Creator; a
revelation of what God himself is like. This is the founda
tion of the prohibition which we find in Ex. 20:4ff. Human
ity's position of imaging God on the earth may be a possible
reason for God's forbidding humankind from making other
images for use in worshipping God. For humanity to create
such idols or images would be an abdication of the role
assigned to humans to be images of God in the creation. A
further commentary on this prohibition is found in the
Gospels,
...although the expression "image of God"
does not appear, it is crucial to a full
understanding of Mark 12:13-17. The issue
was whether to pay taxes to Caesar. Having
been brought a coin, Jesus asked whose image
(GiKWv) appeared on it. When the Pharisees
and Herodians correctly answered, "Caesar's,"
Jesus responded, "Render to Caesar the things
that are Caesar's, and to God the things that
are God's." What are "the things that are
God's"? Presumably, whatever bears the image
of God. Jesus then was saying, "Give your
money to Caesar; it has his image on it, and
" Hoekema, Image of God in Man, [Bavinck, Dogmatiek,
tr Hoekema, 2:601] 53.
" Hoekema, Created in God's Image, 68.
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thus it belongs to him. But give yourselves
to God. You bear his image, and you belong
to him." Commitment, devotion, love, loyal
ty, service to God--all of these are proper
responses for those who bear the image of
God. ""
We also noted the representational character of man
kind. Mankind is to represent God in the manner of an
ambassador from a foreign country, or as a representative of
the king in the furthest reaches of his own country.
From our three references (Gen. 1:26,27; 5:3; 9:6) and
from the analysis of several theologians of various doctrin
al persuasions, we can safely establish the following three
points. First, the Imago Dei resides within man, although
it is not tied to any one aspect of man. That is, it is not
solely and completely tied to the existence or condition of
the body; it is not solely related to one's actions, rela
tionships, or vocation. Second, the Imago Dei is resident
in all of mankind regardless of sex, race, nationality.
intellect or abilities. Third, the Imago Dei is present in
all mankind, regardless of individual acknowledgement of
God.
In a biblical theology. Gen. 1:26-28 may
therefore stress certain features of the
biblical view of man:
1) Man in his entirety is the viceroy of
the earth. He is to be to the earth what
Yahweh is to the entire universe. His life
is to be a microcosm of the macrocosm of
divine life.
2) As such man is the 'son' of the Great
King (cf. Lk. 3:28). Man is made for filial
fellowship with the divine and intended to
express the fami ly-1 ikeness in righteousness,
holiness and integrity.
3) All men and women (not only kings, or
occasionally also priests) are thus created.
The doctrine of the image of God is the foun
dation for human dignity and for the biblical
" Erickson, Christian Theology, 515.
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ethic (cf. Calvin's use of this idea. Insti
tutes III .vii .6)
As a consequence of the foregoing, it can be said that
although the image of God does not reside in any one partic
ular aspect or attribute of mankind, neither does the image
of God reside in any arbitrary combination of attributes.
From the text itself, as well as from the theologians who
have been examined, it is possible to determine, rather,
that the image of God is not in man, but rather IS man; that
mankind, in its entirety, is the image of God. This is not
to say, as do some, that the image of God can only be found
in mankind corporately, for this would deny the individuali
ty of the image of God in each individual. Nor is this to
say that the image of God can be completely identified from
only one individual. "We could even put it this way: what
ever is in God--his virtues, his wisdom, his perfections--
-finds its analogy and likeness in man, though in a finite
and limited form. "^' The end of all of this is that "we
must not look down upon the contributions of different
groups of people from various nationalities and races.
"^�
A proper appreciation of the doctrine of the
image of God, therefore, should rule out all
racism--all denigration of races other than
our own, as if they were inferior to us. God
made all human beings in his image, and all
of them can enlighten and enrich us. "The
idea of man as made in the image of God de
mands . . . today a deliberate transcending
of national and class barriers."^'
Sinclair B. Ferguson and David F. Wright, New
Dictionary of Theology, J.I. Packer, Consulting Editor,
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, The Master Reference
Collection, 1988), 329.
^' Hoekema, Created in God's Image, 100.
*� Hoekema, Created in God's Image, 100.
" Hoekema, 100. From Jurgen Moltmann, Man, trans.
John Sturdy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 111.
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One of the logical implications of the preceding is
that the individual human body also bears the image of God.
If mankind, in both its corporate and individual entirety is
the image of God, the individual body can not be ruled out
as also containing some part of the image of God. This is
one aspect of the image that has often been ignored, or
worse, denied, by many theologians of days both past and
present. James Montgomery Boice in his excellent commentary
on Genesis finds the image of God identifiable with person
ality, morality (including here freedom and responsibility)
and spirituality. In none of these categories however does
he include the individual human body, and in fact even
delimits the human body as part of the image of God in man.
"Although man shares a body with such forms of life as
plants or flowers and a soul with animals, only he possesses
a spirit. It is on the level of the spirit that he is aware
of God and communes with Him. "" In sharp contrast and
more inclusive again is the view of Hermann Bavinck which
was quoted earlier, "The body is not a tomb but a wondrous
masterpiece of God, constituting the essence of man as fully
as the soul."" Hoekema states simply that "when we think
of man in connection with the various relationships in which
he functions, we are confirmed in the conclusion that the
image of God in man does not concern only a part of him (the
"soul" or the "spiritual" aspect) but the entire person."'*
It was noted earlier that an either/or position was
most often assumed by theologians when it came to discussion
of the image of God in humanity- However, it seems more
" James Montgomery Boice, Genesis: An Expositional
Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan: Ministry Resources
Library, 1982), 78.
" Hoekema, 68. From Bavinck, Dogmatiek, [trans, by
Hoekema] 2:601.
'* Hoekema, 68.
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plausible both from scriptural text and logic to stress both
function and structure equally. The fact is that neither
can exist in complete fulfillment without the other. If
structure is emphasized, the danger is that man exists as
the image of God, in and of him/her self, with an obvious
abdication of responsibilities. If on the other hand,
function is emphasized, it is only as men and women act and
relate to one another and to God that they really become
human, with the obvious danger of leaving men and women in
nothing more than a simple utilitarian existence unless they
are in relation, to another person, i.e., Barth.
Hoekema argues for the combination of both the struc
tural and functional, or broader and narrower aspects of the
image of God in man, but in the end still stresses function
over structure. While it must be acknowledged that the
purposes of God in the universe are obviously the ultimate
task, how can the task be approached or acknowledged by
mankind unless the gifts were not first acknowledged and
developed? In other words, the structure must be recognized
first in order for the task to become apparent and ad
dressed .
A condensed form of the fundamental principles which
could be harvested from this chapter are as follows:
1) God is the sole designer and creator of His own
image in the creation of mankind.
2) All individuals, regardless of race, color, or
abilities are created equal in terms of respect and opportu
nity by God because they possess the image of God.
3) The image of God is not located or identifiable with
any one aspect of any individual or corporate society.
Rather it is located in mankind in his/her entirety (includ
ing structural markers and functional activities) both as
individuals and corporately. Thus while no one individual
or even society can completely reveal the image of God in
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mankind, parts of his image are revealed in every individual
and in every society.
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CHAPTER 2
Creational Commands
A Creational Implication - Freedom: Genesis 1:27
The outcome from the foregoing discussion is that the
Image of God in man is man. As may be evident from the
previous chapter, there are alternative issues, various
emphases, and discussions ad infinitum that could more than
fill the rest of this thesis. However, in light of the
focus and purpose of this discussion, there are two issues
that demand attention. Neither of these issues have specif
ic parameters outlined in scripture. This will make the
discussion of these issues somewhat more subjective, but no
less mandatory. The first of the two issues to which I now
turn is that of freedom.
Freedom has been a very important concern through the
ages and is no less so in our day. Many differences of
opinion, some of which become legal battles, arise from
different understandings in relation to the concept of
freedom. The differences of interpretation and value of
rights and freedoms between groups and individuals could
account for many societal difficulties. Those who use this
and similar concepts, whether arguing law or social issues
very often assume that personal freedom is the un-obstructed
ability to carry out one's own wishes or desires. Inherent
in these arguments, whether conscious or subconscious is an
absence of the concept of limits (with the possible excep
tion of 'not hurting anyone else'). Everything from dictio
naries to common conceptions finds any notion of limits to
be foreign to a proper understanding of freedom.*^
" According to Funk and Waqnalls Standard Desk Dictio
nary (pub. Lippincott & Crowell, 1980) 255, among other
meanings are included the following, "... 5. Liberty to move
or act without outside interference, coercion, or restric
tion. 6. Liberty of personal choice, action, or thought.
7. Release or immunity from any stated thing or condi-
( continued. . . )
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Personal freedom has been one of the cornerstones of
American society, politics and law since the country's
inception. In case after case, it was the freedom of reli
gion clause in the original deed titles that caused many
Europeans to come to these shores in the first place.
Indeed, the perception is possible that personal and indi
vidual freedom is perilously close to being a religion in
its own right. We frequently talk of individualism as
having infiltrated the church to the point that it begins to
interfere with the fellowship and discipline of the church.
It is likely that this type of personal aggrandizement lies
at the root of Paul's condemnations found in 1 Corinthians
1:12. Freedom of time and freedom from responsibilities has
become the driving force behind much of western economics.
Many average working people "live for the weekend" when they
are free of authority and responsibility.
It is at this point that we find ourselves at odds with
the Biblical understandings, interpretations and assumptions
concerning the concept of freedom. More precisely, the
Hebrew understanding of freedom is quite different from our
own common perceptions. In a passage very closely related
to the one we examined earlier, we find God giving to the
first man, one of the most all -encompassing roles ever
possessed by a human.
Gen 1:26 And God said. Let us make man in our
image, after our likeness: and let them have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over
the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and
over all the earth, and over every creeping
thing that creepeth upon the earth.
( . , - continued)
tion:..." It must be acknowledged that a dictionary deals
more with particular words than concepts; however, the point
stands that any thought of limits is foreign to the modern
concept of freedom' .
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Gen 1:27 So God created man in his [own]
image, in the image of God created he him;
male and female created he them.
Gen 1:28 And God blessed them, and God said
unto them. Be fruitful, and multiply, and
replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over
the fowl of the air, and over every living
thing that moveth upon the earth.
Gen 1:29 And God said. Behold, I have given
you every herb bearing seed, which [is] upon
the face of all the earth, and every tree, in
which [is] the fruit of a tree yielding seed;
to you it shall be for meat.
Gen 1:30 And to every beast of the earth, and
to every fowl of the air, and to every thing
that creepeth upon the earth, wherein [there
is] life, [I have given] every green herb for
meat: and it was so.
From these verses alone, it would appear that man was given
limitless sanction to do as he wished in the newly created
world. However, as in the first chapter, there are differ
ences between the Biblical understanding of a word and
modern interpretations. Modern day connotations of "rule"
involve the idea of an authoritarian, hierarchical power
structure. The verb 'to rule' has been given the idea of
being able to impose one's will upon other people, posses
sions, and materials. Many ancient and modern novels and
plays deal with the concept of absolute power corrupting
absolutely. Many political and economic examples of this
could be examined, both historical and modern.
However, this is not the concept which we should impose
on the usage of the term in the Hebrew scriptures. The Old
Testament concept of 'to rule' has more to do with the
monarch ruling over the masses with their best interests and
well-being at heart than with present hierarchical power
concepts. It does not include the advancement of one's self
in either power or possessions at the cost of the well-being
of another person, regardless of the fact that they may or
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may not be one's political or economic subjects,** Conse
quently, in what would appear at first glance as a rulership
of absolute freedom for the first man, on further investiga
tion is revealed as a rulership of great responsibility with
limits ,
As we examine the Old Testament further in its overall
understanding of the term "freedom", we discover that there
are several terms connected with the idea of freedom. This
plethora of original terms increases the difficulty of
arriving at a good and proper English translation and under
standing of the Hebrew concept ,
There appears to be four different Hebrew roots used in
the Old Testament for the concept of freedom. The first
root (V'Qn) is used almost exclusively of freedom from slav
ery. Within Hebrew society, extensive laws were set by God
regarding the treatment and length of service that could be
required by a master of a slave.*'
Another root (Hp J) has more primary meanings of "being
poured out" as a libation in either a positive or negative
sense. However there is a more technical or forensic use of
the term meaning "freedom" or "exemption from obligations".
"The adjective "'pj and its variant K"'pJ refer to persons
declared innocent, free, or exempt from charges or obliga
tions, or to innocent blood (that is, shed blood of an
unoffending or innocent party), as well as 'clean hands,' a
figure for innocent behavior. (Cf. the familiar Ps 24:4)"*�
** Some may cite Solomon and other Old Testament
rulers as evidence of authoritarian rule, and this is not to
be denied. However, in many of these cases, there are other
pertinent circumstances, not the least of which is the
commandments of and obedience to God.
" Harris, T.W.O.T. , 1:312-13.
Harris, T.W.O.T, , 2:598.
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A third root (inQ) carries with it four different
meanings. Two of the four have to do with some aspect of
freedom. One is "to set free, let out" (Prov. 17:14) and
the other is "to set free/exempt from duty" (1 Chron. 9:33;
2 Chron. 23:8)
There are still other roots whose meanings are involved
or included with the concept of freedom. For the purposes
of this discussion, we can draw the following conclusions
regarding the Old Testament concept of freedom. The Hebrew
concept basically involves the idea of freedom from a par
ticular master or a specific set of obligations. By far the
largest number of uses of "freedom" and its cognates in the
Old Testament deals with a freedom from a usually bad situa
tion. However, inherent in the reality of freedom from a
specific situation is landing in another situation which
imposes it own set of limits and demands.
In the New Testament, the concept of freedom takes on a
decidedly narrower range of meanings. The main root
GAuBGpos accounts for more than half of the occurrences of
the English word "freedom" in the New Testament. It has
basic meanings of "free", "be free", "set free", "liberty",
and "freeman" in contrast to being a slave. There is also
another root that pertains to this idea. noA,ir6ia is used
in reference to the political freedom which a citizen may or
may not possess.'" Paul uses this sense of the concept
twice in his letters.
By the time of the New Testament authors, freedom had
become a much more debatable topic. During the age of the
New Testament, the concept of freedom had taken on some
" Harris, T.W.O.T. . 2:722.
'� Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament, tr and ed Geoffrey W.
Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, Paternoster Press, 1985),
907.
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different ideas. As the concept is used in the New Testa
ment, we find the meaning changing depending on the sense in
which it is being used. If the idea is contained in a civil
clause, it means "one who is not a slave, or one who ceases
to be a slave, freed."'' If the concept was being included
in a moral sense, it usually had reference to being "free
from the yoke of the Mosaic Law."" In generic usage, it
contained the ideas of "free, exempt, unrestrained, not
bound by an obligation.""
In the political realm, the concept of freedom was
freedom within the law of the land which in turn establishes
and secures it. "As an embodiment of the claim of the polit-
eia, law protects freedom against the caprice of the tyrant
or the mass. But freedom means alternation of government as
free people both rule and are subjects. Democracy achieves
this best by allowing the same rights to all citizens."^*
However, a more refined concept of freedom was devel
oped by the Stoics. Within the TioA-irGia, there was even
more than political freedom. There was also the freedom of
the individual under the law of nature. True freedom could
be found by retreating within; withdrawing from all external
and internal pressures including the dominant fear of death.
"Those who seek flight in inwardness enjoy the freedom of
impassibility and in so doing fulfil what they are as parts
of God, or children of God, or God himself.""
" On-Line Bible, Computer Bible, version 5.00.02
(Elmira: Woodside Bible Chapel, 1991), word definition
#1658.
" On-Line Bible, def #1658.
" On-Line Bible, def #1658.
'* Kittel and Friedrich, T.D.N.T. , 224.
" Kittel and Friedrich, T.D.N.T. , 225.
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It is against this thought background that the New
Testament writers had to contend.
The NT idea of freedom thus follows on from
the OT. The gift of freedom is bound to the
giver. "For all things are yours . . . and
you are Christ's and Christ is God's" (1 Cor.
3:21, 23). This subjection is at the same
time an alliance. Its realm even extends to
the supernatural power and rulers which are
robbed of their absolute authority, because
they have been conquered by Christ and can no
longer separate man from Christ (Rom. 8:38;
Gal. 4:3,9; 1 Cor. 15:24). The impenetrable
horizon becomes transparent in the light of
this freedom."
Without the acknowledgement of God as the center and origin
of the universe, we can only face a lost existence. The
only way we can face our own existence is to subject our own
will to that of another. We can only achieve self-control
by letting ourselves be controlled. "Concretely, EX^vQ^pi a
in the NT is freedom from sin (Rom. 6:18ff), the law (Rom.
7:3-4; Gal. 2:4), and death (Rom. 6:21-22; 8:21). It is
freedom from an existence that in sin leads through the law
to death."" It is only through the application of the
death of Christ that we can gain true freedom.
The liberation of man does not lie within the
realm of his own capacities. It does not
come about by man's reflection on himself, an
act of the will, or by any deed of this sort
or that. For this reason there is in the NT
no summons to contend for freedom. It is al
ready given in what Christ has done for us
(Gal. 5:1). . . . But for man it only becomes
a present reality, when he opens his life to
the call of the gospel (2 Cor. 5:20ff.). . .
. True freedom exists only where the Holy
Spirit works in a man, becoming the principle
of his life, and where man does not block his
" Colin Brown, The New International Dictionary of New
Testament Theology, Volume Two (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1976), 718.
Kittel and Friedrich, T.D.N.T. , 225-
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working (2 Cor. 3:17; Rom. 8: Iff.; Gal.
5:18) ."
What does all of the foregoing mean? Again, we can
return to Colin Brown, for he sums it up best by saying.
What does freedom mean? In contrast to the
secular Gk. mind, the NT sees man as basical
ly unfree (Rom. 6:20; 2 Pet. 2:19; Jn. 8:39).
It denies him all possibility of being able
to free himself and order his life, as if he
were not in bondage. Man's perennial efforts
to take himself in hand, however he attempts
it, lead to the greatest bondage in which man
misses what he was meant to be (Matt. 16:25;
Jn. 12:15). Man's true freedom does not
consist of the unfettered power to direct his
life, either in a political or in a Stoic
sense. It lies in life with God, lived as it
was originally intended by God for man (Rom.
6:22; Gal. 5:1,13; 1 Pet. 2:16). He only
gains this as he denies himself (Matt.
15:24). Paradoxically, the free man does
not belong to himself (1 Cor. 16:19; 9:19; 1
Pet. 2:16). He belongs to him who has set
him free (Rom. 6:18, 22; Gal. 5:1), "who for
their sake died and was raised" (2 Cor.
5:15)."
In Romans 6:15-23, Paul talks in a very detailed manner
regarding sin, righteousness, freedom and slavery. He is
very specific about the fact that commitment, or slavery to
either sin or righteousness is freedom from the other. If
one is enslaved to sin, then that one is free from the
practice of righteousness, or obedience to the Law. The
opposite is also true. The accusation could come back that
there is no difference in the end between enslavement to sin
and enslavement to righteousness. However, to finish off
the argument, Paul notes that the end result of enslavement
to sin is death while the result of enslavement to righ-
'
Brown, The New International Dictionary of New
Testament Theology, 1:719.
" Brown, The New International Dictionary of New
Testament Theology. 2:718.
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teousness is eternal life, the proof of which is the risen
Christ.
All of this should reveal to us that there is no such
thing as absolute freedom for the human. The end result is
that for every action or commitment there is an opposite
reaction or payment. Freedom in the modern sense of the
word is an illusion. It must be acknowledged that there may
be a state of complete freedom, but it can be such for no
more than a temporary period of time. Sooner or later,
there will be some type of consequences to pay. Much of
this has been proven in various ways, especially in the
sciences .
A Creational Command - Authority: Genesis 2:15
Two issues were spoken of at the beginning of this
chapter as requiring attention. The second of these issues
is the Creation commandment to "subdue". While the meaning
of this term has not changed significantly between its usage
in Genesis and the present day, there does appear to be a
difference in understanding regarding the relationship
between those doing the acting and that which is being acted
upon .
Gen 1:28 And God blessed them, and God said
unto them. Be fruitful, and multiply, and
replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have
dominion over the fish of the sea and over
the fowl of the air and over every living
thing that moveth upon the earth.
The verb "to subdue" comes from a primitive root (WDD)
having the following range of meanings: "subdue, bring into
bondage, keep under, force." There are at least six differ
ent Hebrew words used which are translated with the same
English term, "subdue". Quite often this family of terms
was used in reference to the overcoming of an enemy. The
Hebrew term is used a total of eighteen times in thirteen
references. When these references are displayed beside each
other, it becomes apparent that the meaning of the term
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became decidedly more focused towards the end of the Old
Testament .
In Gen 1:28, we find almost universal�" interpretation
of with the English term "subdue". The Akkadian meaning
of the related term is "to tread down," or "to knead, stamp,
press". The understanding given to the term during the time
of the Patriarchs and throughout the Old Testament is "to
make to serve, by force if necessary."�'
The reference in Genesis deals with bringing the whole
of creation into subjection. In 2 Chronicles 28:10, the
first reference to the subduing of people can be found, and
when the term is used in Micah 7:19, it has specific refer
ence to the subduing of sin. It is becomes more obvious
that the terms has more direct reference to the will of the
party being acted upon and less focus on the party doing the
acting. Herein is a subtle but primary requirement for a
proper. Biblical understanding of the Hebrew term WIO-
When the western world thinks of the actions and atti
tudes connected with the term, a concept of forced subjec
tion or domination is conjured up not unlike the Biblical
understanding. However, there is a elusive but important
difference in the understandings of the functioning of the
term. What is assumed in the modern use of the term is that
the will of the actor is supreme and unhindered. In certain
economic and socio-political views, the Genesis reference
quoted earlier is often accused of being the foundational
philosophy for western, free-market capitalism. The pillag
ing of the environment is seen by many economists and ecolo-
gists as the inevitable outcome of the command of this
verse, which would be true and the result if no other prin-
�
Eg. KJV, NKJV, NIV, NASB.
'
Harris, T.W.O.T. , 1:430.
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ciples were taken into account; like the principle of limit
ed freedom discussed earlier.
In some recent theological interpretations of both this
passage and the broader context, the implication is given
that subduing the creation is actually a programmatic devel
opment of the creation. Creation is waiting and eager to be
developed. The development of creation is actually a cul
tural mandate that will find its end in the building of the
city (the epitome of cultural development) which is de
scribed in Revelation 21:1 - 22:21.
In a book entitled The Transforming Vision�^, in which
the author's' primary purpose is to build a coherent Chris
tian worldview, the authors adopt such an interpretation of
Gen. 1:28. As they lay the foundation for their arguments,
they endeavour to look at many of the same issues that we
have thus far dealt with. At this present juncture, they
find the command to subdue the earth is really a command for
culture and continuous cultural development.
They begin by asking, "What does it mean to subdue the
earth?" They answer this by saying that "we are to culti
vate" the garden. In doing so, they make a direct correla
tion between Gen. 1:28 and Gen. 2:15 that may not necessari
ly be warranted. Such an interpretation of Gen 2:15 is not
nearly so clear and precise as the first reference. The
term used is my. It has a much broader range of meaning
which is evidenced by the numerous ways that it is translat
ed." In the Old Testament, 1DV and its derivatives occur
�^ Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton, The Trans
forming Vision: Shaping a Christian World View (Downers
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1984).
"
The translation and term used are as follows: KJV =
dress; NKJV = tend; NIV - work; NASB = cultivate; OnLine =
dress .
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in excess of twelve hundred times.�* "Work, serve" are
offered as possibilities for my itself. Derivative mean
ings include "slave, servant, work, labor, service, service
(household servants), servitude, bondage."�^ While the New
American Standard Bible has taken significant steps towards
a literal translation, it appears at this point (Gen. 2:15)
that this focus has been blurred. Walsh and Middleton
(through the use of the NASB) have translated lljy that has
elsewhere been translated as "work" or "till" with "culti
vate" .
The T.W.O.T. says this about these more recent transla
tion attempts of this verse.
Despite recent interpretations of Gen 1:28,
which have tried to make "subdue" mean a
responsibility for building up, it is obvious
from an over all study of the word's usage
that this is not so.... The use of the word
assumes that the party being subdued is hos
tile to the subduer, necessitating some sort
of coercion if the subduing is to take place.
Therefore, "subdue" in Gen. 1:28, implies
that creation will not do man's bidding glad
ly or easily and that man must now bring
creation into submission by main strength.
It is not to rule man. However, there is a
twistedness in humanity which causes us to
perform such a task with fierce and destruc
tive delight. Try as we might, we cannot
subdue this. But it can be subdued and this
is the promise of Mic. 7:10, "He will subdue
our iniquities."�*
Fundamental to an overall understanding of the term is
the idea of forced service. Walsh and Middleton presume
cultivate to be the primary sign of "being human" and that
cultivation is the building up of the garden and the world
�*
Harris, T.W.O.T. , 2:639-40.
�' OnLine Bible. Definitions adapted from Strong's
Analytical Concordance.
�*
Harris, T.W.O.T. , 1:430-
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into the Royal City/' However, this seems to bestow more
upon the general meaning of the term than is warranted. In
a strict, literal sense, the language of 2:15 would suggest
that man was placed in the garden to serve the garden. Adam
and Eve were to "till" and "dress" it, not to serve them
selves, but to maintain the creation of God, and thus to
serve him. Consequently, the use of the term cultivate in
Gen. 2:15 provides a more holistic commentary on how human
ity should act in the creation. It paints a picture that
highlights humanity's responsibility toward the rest of
creation. Humanity is to cultivate in creation using the
good of the creation as a whole as measurement.��
To conclude, there are many concepts that could be
examined as equally relevant which would serve to define the
context of this discussion in a fuller way. However, it is
these two issues of limited freedom and the consequent
freedom to subdue within limits that seems of paramount
importance for this present discussion. It is the Biblical
interrelatedness of these two concepts which could provide
some guidelines for the use of recombinant DNA research and
technology.
It is affirmed that we as human beings in the image of
God have been given freedoms, but they are not unlimited
freedoms. We have also been commanded to subdue the earth,
however, both of these issues should interact with one
another. We have been given limited freedoms to subdue the
�' Walsh and Middleton perceive the command to culti
vate as being the fundamental command to humans as they live
in the creation. Consequently, fulfilling the command to
cultivate is worked out in the actual building up and re
fining of the 'rough hewn' garden of Genesis 1 into the
purified city of Revelation 20-22.
�� Walsh and Middleton continue to develop this theme
by calling for a cultivation or salvation of the creation
equal to the salvation of the human soul. Cf . Walsh and
Middleton, The Transforming Vision, Part 4, 147-186.
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earth, but it is not "subduct ion" at any cost. The subduing
of the earth should avoid the infringement of other non-
human, created beings when possible and should not invade
the freedoms and/or welfare of another human being. Thus we
find the two Biblical principles of freedom within limits
and the command to subdue providing a partial barrier which
should help to define the role and aims of genetic research
and technology.
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PART 2
CHAPTER 3
Image OF God and rDNA Research
In the first section of this paper, the core of the
discussion revolved around a Biblical understanding of the
unique identity of humankind. We tried to gain a fuller
understanding of what both God and the Biblical writer had
in mind with the use of the phrase "image of God" in Gen.
1:26,27. Our major discovery was that no one attribute or
term can be used to properly and fully identify humanity.
It is a combination of actions, attributes and potentiali
ties that more closely identify humanity in sum total.
In the second section, we examined two key imperatives
and responsibilities that arise as a result of humanity's
position within the structure of the world. A Biblical
understanding of freedom as a resulting privilege and re
sponsibility in the creation was elaborated. Also in the
second part, the command to "subdue" the earth was surveyed.
It was noted in this connection that the modern understand
ing of idea of "subdue" is lacks an important part of the
Biblical concept.
With all of this as background, the most modern issue
of recombinant DNA (rDNA) research, techniques and resulting
issues needs to be examined. The most fundamental question
in this regard has to do with our ability to alter the make
up of the individual human. The following quote serves to
highlight the scope and divisiveness of the DNA issue.
All of this�both risks and benefits� is
conjecture; facts about recombinant DNA are
next to nonexistent. Yet after nuclear pow
er, and possibly the SST, recombinant DNA is
the most torrid science policy issue around,
rending academic departments, pitting Nobel
laureates against one another, and setting
scientists against their communities and
against the Congress of the United States.
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It is a nice irony that it was the scientists
who brought it up in the first place.�'
Obviously, this is a somewhat dated quotation, but the tone
of the debate hasn't changed much since 1977. While there
are more and better facts and documentation regarding recom
binant DNA, the issue is still as "torrid" as ever it was.
Alongside the intensity of the debate, there is also
the complexity of issues. It would appear that no one
genetic case is going to be like another in terms of techni
calities .
Once these theoretical questions are settled,
the questions of practice arise: Will science
ever be able to specify genes that make a
person more likely to be smart, ambitious,
emotionally stable, etc.? Here complexity
rears its ugly head. There are three billion
genes in the human genome, and they can in
teract in astoundingly diverse ways. To take
the simplest case: children of dwarves who
inherit one normal gene and one dwarf gene
turn out more normal than those who inherit
two dwarf genes. So a child who inherits
only one gene for Huntington's [19-20] dis
ease will be better off than one who inherits
two bad genes, right? Wrong. Each case is
different.'"
But alongside the technical difficulties of actually
performing rDNA, there are the differences of understandings
and attitudes of those involved, both the patient and the
healthcare worker.
Suggesting that someone lacks sufficient
knowledge or wisdom to engage in an activity
the person knows how to perform thus means
that the individual has insufficient knowl
edge of the consequences of that activity or
insufficient wisdom to cope with those conse
quences. But if this is the rational kernel
�' Tabitha M. Powledge, "You Shall Be As Gods," World-
view (Sept 1977): 45.
'" William Saletan, "Genes 'R' Us," The New Republic
July 17 & 24 (1989): 19-20.
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of the admonition against playing God, then
the use of gene splicing technology is not
claimed to be wrong as such but wrong because
of its potential consequences. Understood in
this way, the slogan that crossing species
barriers is playing God does not end the
debate, but it does make a point of fundamen
tal importance. It emphasizes that any real
istic assessment of the potential consequenc
es of the new technology must be founded upon
a sober recognition of human fallibility and
ignorance. At bottom, the warning not to
play God is closely related to the Socratic
injunction "know thyself": in this case,
acknowledge the limits of understanding and
prediction, rather than assuming that people
can foresee all the consequences of their
actions or plan adequately for every eventu
ality.
As with any new discovery, two things need to be ac
knowledge and constantly recalled. The first is that cau
tion in all manner of procedure and proclamation of findings
and/or expectations needs to permeate the process. Second,
time needs to be allowed for the majority of society to
"catch up" with the scientific world in relation to possi
bilities and findings. Forging ahead by the scientific
community without allowing adequate time for evaluation and
correction is a denial of the fallibility of humans, scien
tific enquiry notwithstanding.
The fundamental question being asked is the following,
"If deoxyribonucleic acid forms the building blocks of what
makes an individual human that particular human, and if we
possess the knowledge and techniques to alter, with calcu
lated precision, those building blocks (DNA), are we alter
ing the identity and maybe worse, the destiny of that par
ticular individual?" Such shall be the focus of the balance
of this inquiry.
"
Thomas A. Shannon, ed., Bioethics (Mahwah: Paulist,
1976), 404.
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I am indebted to Allen Verhey for the broad outline
which I have incorporated here. In an article entitled "The
Morality of Genetic Engineering"'', he notes some of the
difficulties which he has perceived in the public debate
over genetic engineering to date.
Some general notes can be made in regards to
the manner in which arguments are carried out
relating to bioethics. "First, the debaters
have often employed rhetoric which is morally
irresponsible and publicly unhelpful. . . .
Second, in the public discussion the
profound and ancient questions are seldom
candidly raised. The public debate has in
stead focused on two issues: freedom and
weighing risks versus benefits. . . .
Third, it is not accidental that the
public discussion has ignored more fundamen
tal questions and has focused instead on the
two issues of freedom and the calculation of
risks and benefits.""
He labels this directed argumentation as minimalist, or a
"thin theory of the good." In other words, the proponents
of rDNA technology are only raising questions which seem to
highlight the positive side and effects of rDNA research.
"The impartial principles of freedom and utility neither
raise nor countenance a reply to questions about the sort of
persons we would be and become or about the kind of society
we would be and become."'* In other words, freedom (in the
modern understanding) and utility do not provide adequate
questions or answers for the more formidable and important
questions of what is humanity and what will it become if the
process of rDNA is allowed to go on unhindered.
He goes on in the article to articulate some of the
ways in which this directed argumentation predisposes the
" Allen Verhey, "The Morality of Genetic Engineering,
Christian Scholar's Review 14, no. 2 (1985): 124-139.
93
Verhey, 126-27
'*
Verhey, 128.
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public to particular ways of thinking or not thinking when
it comes to rDNA technology.
We will achieve the moral power to limit
and guide this revolution only by owning some
more profound convictions about what it means
and what it takes for nature and human per
sons to flourish and then by living with
integrity, not just with impartial rationali
ty. .. .
Besides talking about freedom and utility,
we must begin to talk about more profound
moral questions, our disposition toward the
future, our disposition toward technology,
our disposition toward nature, our disposi
tion toward parenting, and our disposition
toward each other. "'^
It is from a portion of these final categories then that the
balance of this chapter will take its lead.
The Limits of "The Good"
One of the irritations to many people who are involved
with questioning DNA research has to do with the way in
which it is argued. Very often in the articles that are
published both for public consumption as well as in those
articles that are printed for use by academics and technolo
gists, there is little room left for critical inquiry. The
overwhelming majority of journal articles connected in any
way with rDNA technology and/or research, deal exclusively
with the good that humankind will accomplish with a thorough
understanding of DNA. This is not to say however, that
these good accomplishments are not without their difficul
ties in and of themselves. In each of the individual pro
cesses, such as rDNA and Huntington's disease or rDNA and
prenatal correction for disposition towards Tay-Sachs, there
are issue specific difficulties. However, there are more
fundamental issues about the whole of rDNA technology which
should be addressed first. "When recombinant DNA research
is proposed to the public, for example, the proponents make
'' Verhey, 128.
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considerable use of Bacon's links between knowledge and
power and benefit. The research leads to knowledge: knowl
edge leads to power; and power makes it possible to do all
sorts of good, . . . It is at this point in most jour
nal articles that either one specific or several genetically
related diseases are highlighted, showing the obvious poten
tial that rDNA possess for the cure of said disease(s).
The obvious next step in the academic/ journal istic
process is for opponents to critique such an optimistic
outlook on rDNA. "But when certain dangers are pointed out,
when risks are highlighted, then the advocates retreat to
the freedom of inquiry, the right to know, presuming that
right has no connection in the tradition with power or well-
being. ""
Since its inception, science has claimed to be a value-
neutral investigation of the material world. However, this
can no longer be the case with rDNA. The link between
curiosity or investigation, knowledge and power are imper
ceptible parts of the whole fabric of science. "Since
Bacon, these three�knowledge, power, and benefit�have
often been assumed to be one piece, of one fabric, but they
are distinguishable and it is important in the biological
revolution to raise the questions of knowledge, power, and
benefit separately.""
If the arguments of the proponents of rDNA are accept
ed, these three are inseparably linked.
"The research leads to knowledge: knowledge
leads to power; and power makes it possible
to do all sorts of good, to
' bacteriafacture '
insulin, to solve the energy shortage, to
clear up the environment, and so forth. But
when certain dangers are pointed out, when
'*
Verhey, 129-30.
''
Verhey, 130.
" Verhey, 129.
56
risks are highlighted, then the advocates
retreat to the freedom of inquiry, the right
to know, presuming that right has no connec
tion in the tradition with power or well-
being.
In his evaluation of the proponents line of reasoning,
Verhey states the following, "To engage in this research is
not simply to exercise a right to inquiry but to exercise a
freedom to create unprecedented forms of life."'"" Verhey
assumes that if a shift in public discourse is made from
freedom of inquiry to freedom to create new life forms, then
the burden of proof also shifts and falls upon those who
would create those life-forms, and indeed those who would
profit from the creation of those life forms.""
However, Verhey 's jump from a right of inquiry to a
right to exercise a freedom to create "unprecedented forms
of life" should be questioned. He jumps from the 'right of
knowledge and inquiry' to 'life forms' without affording
rDNA therapy and its possible benefits any place in his
argument. If it was possible to deal only with the polari
ties of the issue, then Verhey 's argument may stand. Howev
er, there are intermediate steps and discoveries such as the
"bacteriafacture" of insulin, not to mention the cures for
Tay-Sachs, Down syndrome, and leukemia to mention a few,
that must stand between the polarities for consideration. It
is difficult to perceive of any rDNA procedure designed to
alleviate some form of disease or ill health as the creation
of an unprecedented life form.
There have been several new abstractions introduced
which have served to boost the standing of "the good". In
an effort to justify the investment in rDNA, new rational-
''
Verhey, 130.
Verhey, 130.
Verhey, 130.
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izations are continually being introduced to put the popula
tion's collective mind at ease. One of these newer concepts
has to do with the right to a natural life span.
The competing rights which ground these op
posing arguments are the right to life and a
specific autonomy right of bodily privacy.
However, in the case of abortion for a genet
ic condition which is incurable and will
cause great suffering and an early death,
another right should be considered. This
is the right to a natural life span
free of preventable suffering. Just as
the right to life imposes a duty on others
not to take that life and the right to bodily
privacy imposes an obligation on others to
respect one's choices in this regard, this
additional right imposes a duty on others to
prevent suffering and a reduction in life
span when this is possible.'"'
The highlighted portion cannot be as abruptly assumed as it
is here. There needs to be more foundational argument in
order to make this stand. As a whole, if this argument is
accepted, its use must also be allowed for termination' of
the suffering, the terminal and the elderly.
If this argument is taken to its logical extension, it
will become impossible for the courts and/or the medical
system to draw a line beyond which life should not be taken.
It has been reported recently'" that "the average life
expectancy of a left-hander is 9 years less than a right
hander." In the logical extreme, this could mean that
parents have a "duty" to perform rDNA surgery if they dis
cover that their child is left-handed since this means a
reduction in lifespan.
Another large area where "the good" is becoming confus
ing is that having to do with the natural and health. The
'"' Candace C. Gauthier, "The Impact of Recombinant DNA
Technology on Genetic Screening," Public Affairs Ouarterlv
3:1 (Jan 1989): 31.
'"' "World News," Servant January/February (1992): 9.
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initial point of reference has been skewed by our constantly
changing ideas of what is natural and what constitutes good
health.
As a means of eradicating genetic diseases,
it would appear to be nothing more than an
extension of the general medical project of
curing diseases by removing their causes.
Moreover, the prospect of altering the genet
ic endowment to improve the range of human
capacities blends indiscernibly [sic] with
medicine's interest in ameliorating disabili
ties, pains, and deformities.'"*
The phrase " . . .improve the range of human capacities. . . "
needs to be held up for critique. Heretofore, medicine has
been solely concerned with moving a patient from ill health
or a lack of health back to a state without impairment, not
from a healthy state to a state of "super-health". At
present, it would appear that rDNA possesses the power to
move one from a state of ill health to health as well as
from a state of health to a state of "super health". This
distinction has not been sufficiently proclaimed in the
current media.
This illuminates the state of confusion which exists
over a proper definition of adequate health. What little is
known of the Human Genome has revealed that every individual
possesses seven to nine "deleterious" genes. These are
genes that are "weak" and could "predispose" one to that
given disease or illness. At the other end of the scale are
the infants who are born with severe genetic defects. If
"it is becoming more accepted legally that offspring may
seek a recovery for damages when they are born with a genet
ic defect that could have been avoided by abortion or by
contraception (Holder 1981) [and] conceiving a child or
allowing a pregnancy with known genetic defects to go to
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "Persons and Humans:
Refashioning Ourselves in a Better Image and Likeness,"
Zyqon 19. no. 3 (September 1984): 282.
59
term harms the future person who will be born, "'�^ where
will it be possible to draw a line? Engelhardt ' s suggestion
is that "those engaging in genetic engineering should not
employ their techniques unless it is likely that they will
produce offspring with fewer defects than those produced by
the uncontrolled endeavors of the usual cottage industry of
child production."""
How humans are to be treated, through the use of rDNA,
will be drastically affected by a proper understanding of
the inter-relatedness of true humanity and true freedom. As
a clearer vision of what true humanity really consists of as
well as the responsibilities of true freedom comes into
focus, so too will the proper uses of rDNA come into clearer
focus. While Engelhardt uses an adequate definition of
human, he does not possess an adequate definition of free
dom. In a section entitled "Being a Person and Being a
Hiiman", Engelhardt implies that one is variable, while the
other is not. He uses Yoda and Jabba the Hut of Stars Wars
fame as examples. While children and adults alike would
envision one as a good person and one as an evil person, no
one would call them humans. He continues
Genetic engineering makes this point in a
somewhat transformed fashion. Humans, since
they are persons, need not remain human. One
can imagine humans over time so transforming
their characteristics that one would wish to
advance new classif icatory taxa to replace
Homo sapiens�perhaps Homo fabricatus I, Homo
fabricatus II, and so on. . . . If one is
willing to entertain a sufficiently long-
range fantasy regarding the human future, it
is difficult to imagine that humans will not
in fact refashion themselves in major ways. .
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "Persons and Humans:
Refashioning Ourselves in a Better Image and Likeness,"
Zyqon 19, no. 3 (September 1984): 286.
Engelhardt, 286.
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These bodies are, as already noted, the
blind deliverances of random mutations and
selective pressures that have adapted to
environments in which our ancestors lived.
As persons, however, we can envisage what it
might be like for our bodies to be better
adapted to our current environment."'
The result of an anthropocentrical ly oriented humanity is
that it has only its own realm of operations to use as a
point of reference.
Another result of an anthropocentric or common view of
humanity is that there are only human attributes to govern
humanity's actions. "One is left with the canons of pru
dence and care, since there is nothing sacrosanct about the
particular deliverances of evolution, which we find current
ly in human nature. However, this itself is instructive.
It underscores the character of the creative task of per
sons, which remains indefinitely open."'"� This argument
recalls our second chapter.
Engelhardt assumes that the gift (and/or ability) of
creativity has unlimited bounds. He assumes that anything
is open for re-creation through the creative capabilities of
humankind. Engelhardt evidences his wholesale adoption of
Darwin's evolutionary principles when he states that "at
first glance, genetic engineering would appear to be quite
attractive. It offers the prospect, however futuristic, of
being able to refashion our bodies so as to avoid genetical
ly based diseases and perhaps in addition to make further
improvements over the blind deliverances of evolution."""
If one limits one's self to the material world only, then
the obvious assumption is that what now exists is the result
""
Engelhardt, 292.
'"
Engelhardt, 293.
""
Engelhardt, "Persons and Humans:," 282.
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of random genetic mutations. Engelhardt concludes his
article by saying that
there are no overbearing reasons to maintain
human nature as it is, uncontaminated by
manufactured genes or by genes from other
species. Human nature as a cluster of inher
ited capacities is no more inviolate than it
is secure from mutations. We as persons
cannot step outside of genetic constraints,
but we can change or alter those constraints.
Over the long run we are likely to do that
and in so doing revise human nature better to
meet the goals of persons. Then the issues
will not be simply moral, but aesthetic as
well. We will need to remember to do not
only what is good, but also what is beauti
ful.'""
There is another tendency that provides some severe
difficulties when "the good" of genetics is the only evalua
tive criteria. This tendency is a desire to allow for a
deistic creation according to humanity's sense of evolution
ary rules. Michael Ruse wonders, given the present fantasy
prospect of complete ability in genetic engineering, therapy
and design, "What, if anything, would be an improvement?
Suppose a genetic fairy godmother did appear, prepared to
wave her wand over any human feature and to grant any
change,""' what changes could we make (in terms of design)
that would make us better than we are? Ruse argues from an
evolutionary point of view, citing the fact that there have
always been mutations of genetic material in the genetic
make-up of humankind. The assumption is that evolutionary
"�
Engelhardt, "Persons and Humans:," 294. It is
interesting to note that Engelhardt assumes that any changes
which are made in the human genome will automatically be
better and that he feels that we are not only capable of
handling the moral decisions involved in such changes, but
we will also be capable of handling the aesthetic decisions
as well; but again the question must be asked, "According to
whose standards?"
'" Michael Ruse, "Genesis Revisited: Can We Do Better
than God?" Zyqon 19, no. 3 (Sept 1984): 305.
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mutations in the genetic realm are always good and that the
most recent mutation is "better" than the previous mutation.
Ruse has consumed the deistic evolutionary model to the
following extent.
Our notions of true and false and of right
and wrong have been caused by the natural
selection of random variations. This is not
to say that that which has evolved is that
which is true or right. It is to say that
the only sense of truth or right which we
have comes from evolution. Hence to ask that
we think or feel otherwise than we do is to
ask for that which cannot be conceived and
that which cannot be desired. In the long
run, our ideal of perfection has to be human,
because human ideals are all we have. Stated
theologically, the author of Genesis said we
are made in God's image. I really do not see
how else God could have made us.'''
It is a grand leap for a theologian to go from evolution in
the middle of the paragraph to theological, biblical truth
by the end of the paragraph."'
Others have picked up on this theme, and they are not
always from a religious background, per se.
Still, what is likely to begin soon as at
tempts to cure genetic disease by substitut
ing functioning genes for malfunctioning
ones--a laudable goal --will very probably
lead in the not-too-distant future to the
ability to direct the evolution of all living
things on this planet, our own included. We
"'
Ruse, 315.
'" Some have spoken of the human purpose in the world
as encompassing the role of co-creator alongside God. A
valid case can be made for a role of this type, however the
following two conditions need to be invoked in this employ
ment role. "1) we must have sufficient knowledge of the
natural processes and the technical skill to affect them
purposively; and 2) we must have sufficient awareness of the
Creator's purposes to bring our human purposes into harmony
with them." Ronald Cole-Turner, "Genetic Engineering: Our
Role in Creation," The New Faith-Science Debate, Ed. John M.
Mangum (Minneapolis: Augsburg-Fortress, 1989), 72.
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are fond--perhaps excessively fond--of at
tributing to ourselves godlike powers. But
control of evolution is surely the quintes
sence of deity, and it can hardly be too
early to start reflecting on what it might
mean to accept such a challenge. Or to bear
such a burden."*
While the quote is obviously dated, the tone of the message
still rings true. Powledge 's estimation of the possessed
power to manipulate DNA may sound grandiose, however, the
more science and technology have discovered in the field of
rDNA, the more prophetic her statement appears.
In light of all of the above, i.e., the new justifica
tions, the confusion over health, the improper understanding
of freedom, the resulting shifting reference points and the
attempt at forcing deistic actions into human ways of think
ing, genetics, and in turn, medicine in general will be set
adrift. Paul Ramsey in his book. Ethics at the Edges of
Life: Medical and Legal Intersections, argues that as a
tradition, medicine can not supply a proper moral base for
answering all of the difficult questions that rDNA is going
to place before society. Stanley Hauerwas in a review of
that same book states.
The tradition [of medicine] can only destroy
itself once it has qualified its commitment
to the sanctity of each human life. . . . The
twists and turns made to qualify the effects
of abandoning our tradition's basic commit
ment to each person only lands us in contra
dictory or unmanageable ethical positions.
He further argues that once we have opened
the gate to quality-of-life decisions to
determine the appropriate care of another, we
often end up giving the wrong reason for
doing the right thing.
"^
"* Tabitha M. Powledge, "You Shall Be As Gods,"
Worldview (Sept 1977): 47.
"^
Stanley Hauerwas, "Can Ethics Be Theological?" The
Hastings Center Report, 8, no. 5, (October, 1978): 48.
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Since the inception of the art of medicine, one of the
fundamental tenets has been to "Do no harm, " and conversely
to "Do good." In the actual words of the covenant, "I will
apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick accord
ing to my ability and judgement; I will keep them from harm
and injustice.""* In the early days, this meant prescrib
ing only such aids and treatments as would give comfort or
cure the obvious illness. There was seldom if ever any
thought given to the fact that what was prescribed for the
good of the patient could have bad side effects, but such is
the case on a very regular basis today.
Daniel Callahan notes that neither Paul Ramsey nor Leon
Kass have been able to mount "generally persuasive argu
ments" (which is different than a good argument) against
genetic engineering primarily due to their starting points
which no longer carry adequate cultural weight."' What he
is saying is that their arguments do not contain the kind of
emotive power to entice the public to act or not to act.
While the fault lies on both sides of authorship and reader
ship, the result is still the same. Callahan goes on to ask
the question, "Are there any moral premises in our society
that are generally persuasive?" Of special concern in this
division of the current chapter is his third premise.
The third principle is that it is always
better to attempt to do good than to try to
avoid harm. More than that, a failure to
pursue the good ("benefits") is taken to be a
form of doing harm, a sin of omission; hence
the principle "do no harm,
" contrary to its
original meaning, is not taken to be a posi
tive mandate to attempt to do good. This
"* John Arras and Nancy Rhoden, "The Hippocratic Oath,
"
Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 3rd ed. (Mountain View,
CA: Mayfield), 48.
"' Daniel Callahan, "The Moral Career of Genetic Engi
neering, " The Hastings Center Report, vol. 9, no. 2 (April,
1979): 9.
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principle has been a powerful impetus to
researchers both in the in vitro fertiliza
tion and the recombinant DNA debates."�
What Callahan is saying is that no longer is it simply good
enough to do something satisfactory on behalf of the pa
tient. The imperative to "do no harm" has come to mean do
everything positive that is possible, more commonly known as
extreme/extraordinary means. Both the medical community and
the public at large, have adopted this mindset to the extent
that malpractice suits can be won if it can be proven that
the attending health care professionals did not carry out
extraordinary means.
Science, medicine and technology have progressed to the
point that doing good can result in harm. The issue then
becomes one of the greater good outweighing the lesser harm.
A common example of such in this day would be chemotherapy
in an effort to heal from cancer. There is no question that
the radioactive nature of chemotherapy does good in routing
out cancerous cells, however, it also does marked damage to
the body as well. This issue becomes even more acute in the
field of genetics. Not only is it a question of the good
over the harm, but we have to question the good. Testing
now known as genetic probes are causing the difficulties.
There is currently little, if any, justifi
able application of DNA probes for rare un-
treatable metabolic or related disorders in
population screening�either for newborns or
mothers, since truly therapeutic interven
tions (unlike abortion) for newly targeted
genetic diseases are still remote and without
a family history of the disorder in question,
the chance of finding an at-risk couple are
inf initesimally low."'
"� Callahan, 9-
"' Marc Lappe, "The Limits of Genetic Inquiry", The
Hastings Center Report, vol. 17, no. 4 (August 1987): 10
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There is no question that being able to detect diseases
before they manifest themselves in obvious illness is half
the battle in curing the illness, however, why test for
something for which there is no "real" therapy? Many of the
diseases for which DNA probes are used have no known thera
py.
The obvious harms that can result from such testing are
myriad. The effects of the knowledge that one possesses a
deleterious gene are as yet quantitatively unmeasured. It
takes only a short period of observation to understand the
stress and anxiety that an individual is under who has just
recently witnessed the death process of a parent who has
suffered from Huntington's disease. The same is true of
those awaiting the results of a DNA test probe. Humaneness
towards fellow individuals would dictate both the speed and
the accuracy of DNA test probes. Current studies are at
tempting to evaluate the usefulness of DNA probes. "These
studies should address not only the accuracy of proposed
tests, but their clinical worth. ... If studies demon
strate that patients diagnosed by genetic testing fare worse
than those never identified, both marker and proposed thera
py are indicted."''" Marc Lappe makes two more very impor
tant addenda to the use of gene probes. First he notes in a
different way that they are not unlike looking at one pic
ture frame of an entire roll of movie film. Without looking
at the other frames, the knowledge of the one is virtually
useless. Secondly, he notes that the results of a gene
probe can in no way reveal how the gene will express itself.
"Nonetheless, because of a deep-seated need for certitude,
many persons are likely to perceive a positive gene probe
test as an indicator of biologic destiny. If this proves
"� Kathleen Nolan and Sara Swenson, "New Tools, New
Dilemmas: Genetic Frontiers," The Hastings Center Report,
vol. 18, no. 5 (Oct /Nov 1988): 45.
true, probes may acquire a misleading status in our medical
armamentarium as indicators of a new kind of biological
determinism.
While it is obvious that "do good" has it's obvious
meaning in trying to help a fellow human being, it is also
obvious that it is no longer so simple. It would do the
medical community and all those interested in the dilemmas
facing the medical world to heed Reinhold Neibuhr's general
societal principle as an equal warning for genetic discov
ery.
Every advance in the fulfillment of human
aspirations creates problems at an entirely
new level . An urgent example in the world of
medical ethics is the host of moral dilemmas
issuing from the new life-prolonging and
resuscitative devices. We are still novices
at resolving the legion of problems that
accompany these otherwise beneficent technologies.'
Marc Lappe, "The Limits of Genetic Inquiry", The
Hastings Center Report, vol. 17, no. 4 (August 1987): 10.
"' "A credo of medical care has been that the earliest
diagnosis of a condition is the most desirable. . . . Pre-
symptomatic diagnosis of Huntington disease and other highly
penetrant, devastating, late-onset diseases also seems
rightly to provoke research and trials of promising agents.
Early diagnosis has its dark side, however. The abili
ty to identify and treat many common conditions risks estab
lishing a populace of 'diseased' individuals and increasing
medical ization of daily life. Failure to adhere to a sug
gested therapeutic regimen may then result in individual
guilt and self -recrimination, or worse, a 'blaming of the
victim' by others through effects on insurance premiums or
more subtle forms of stigmatizat ion . . . . Conceivably, many
genes predisposing to 'undesirable' traits may also have as
yet undiscovered beneficial effects, like the protection
afforded by sickle cell trait against malaria." Kathleen
Nolan and Sara Swenson, "New Tools, New Dilemmas: Genetic
Frontiers," The Hastings Center Report, vol. 18, no. 5
(Oct/Nov 1988): 43.
C. Keith Boone, "Bad Axioms in Genetic Engineer
ing," The Hastings Center Report, vol. 18, no. 4 (Aug/Sept
1988): 13.
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The False Conrept of Risk/Benefit Analysis
In many of the discussions and articles concerning DNA
research, there is much time spent on a risk/benefit analy
sis of a given procedure. This is especially the case in
microethics, where the physician and patient (or surrogate)
are involved in weighing the benefits (often of some unprov-
en or untried procedure) over against the risk (very often a
limited quality of life�whatever that may mean�or possibly
death) . However, there are some fundamental problems with
this type of thinking.
The first task in this section should be to establish
some definitions in order to clarify the issue that is
center stage. In connection with this particular aspect of
medical ethics are such terms as beneficence and nonmalefic-
ence, risk and benefit. The first of these terms to be
defined is beneficence, which may seem quite straight for
ward in its meaning.
Obviously, health care services should act in
such a way as to benefit the person receiving
the service. . . . frequently health care
personnel are trapped in weighing probable
results. This principle states simply that
the total procedure should be one where the
benefit outweighs the nonbenefit. . . . Cer-
''*(... continued)
"Moreover, despite our advances a vast impenetrabil
ity cloaks almost all prognostication about human traits and
conditions. In fact, the language of "contingency' itself
reveals a wobble in the lofty trajectory of the new human
molecular genetics: for diseases of low or uncertain pene
trance or for which expression is determined in part by
other factors, genetic forecasts remain statistical, predic
tions not predeterminations. Peering into a given individ
ual's future to predict the development of some currently
undetectable condition represents a heretofore unheard-of
capability, but the power of probes to forecast the future
is forever limited by the power of genes to cause it."
Kathleen Nolan and Sara Swenson, "New Tools, New Dilemmas:
Genetic Frontiers," The Hastings Center Report 18, no. 5
(Oct/Nov 1988) : 45.
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tainly, with so little experience, genetic
engineering will face this issue for many
decades. The benefits may be obvious, but
the nonbenefits could be totally unknown.'"
An example may help to clarify the difficulty. Chemotherapy
has it obvious drawbacks made manifest by hair loss, nausea,
and so on. However, these negatives are outweighed by the
greater good that the drug performs in killing only cancer
ous cells within the body.
Another term for clarification is nonmalef icence . This
is simply the principle that damage may not
be done to the person receiving health care.
. . . After all, maleficence contradicts the
purpose of health care. . . . Experimental
types of procedures need to be measured
against the possibility of doing more evil
than good. And one is never sure how far to
extend the issue of nonmalef icence . That is,
what is good for the patient may not be good
for society or for the immediate family.'"
A case in point here would be what came to be known in
Canada as the "Nancy B." case of the winter of '91- '92. A
quadriplegic from the neck down and requiring complete life
support, she petitioned the court for the right to have her
life support disconnected. What may have been supportive of
her in eliminating her own personal misery was not so clear
ly good for society in that it belittles the value of the
unproductive citizen. The precedent which has been rein
forced in this particular case is that the will of individu
al is of foremost importance, regardless of the cumulative
effect of such a decision on society.
A concept which has arisen already and will continue to
do so throughout this segment is that of "the unknown." Ex
ploring new frontiers in genetics is far different than
Graydon F. Snyder, "Theological Reflections on
Genetic Engineering," Brethren Life and Thought, 31, no. 4
(Autumn 1986) : 210.
'" Snyder, 210.
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exploring uncharted space. Space is for the most part,
discovery through travel. Genetics is discovery through
actions and the effects of those actions, even individually
much less compounded, could have dramatic effects beyond our
broadest imaginations.
The unknown aspects of genetics has already been exam
ined, but in virgin territory there are competing claims and
counter-claims. "As is true with all other new procedures
in medicine, therapeutic studies of gene therapy in human
patients will be performed with imperfect knowledge when
technical uncertainties and imperfections are outweighed by
clinical needs.""' The picture becomes even more complex
when another geneticist is added. There are almost always
two views to every opinion or story and this is no less the
case with scientists and their resulting "competent" views
of the dangers or lack thereof of rDNA.
Scientists contribute to the public's
confusion by failing to recognize the mixture
of fact and value in their own opinions.
When an expert calls a risk "over-blown" or
"terrifying, " he is combining his estimate of
probability with his values toward risk-tak
ing. Philosophers tell us we can never com
pletely unravel the interwoven threads of
fact and value; but in practice we can and
must make distinctions."�
Studies in the past have shown that familiarity limits fear
and unfamiliar ity increases fear. The gap between the
public's understanding and contact with genetics first hand
and the scientists understanding and constant handling of
data and material is wide enough. It is going to be magni
fied by the scientists own confusion, counter claims and
T. Freidman, "Progress Toward Human Gene Therapy,"
Science 244 (16 June 1989): 1280.
"� Key Dismukes, "Recombinant DNA: A Proposal for
Regulation," The Hastings Center Report, 7, no. 2 (April
1977): 25-
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modifications of studies. The conflicting messages that the
public may or may not hear are going to make risk/benefit
analysis in the microethics situation that much more diffi
cult. Verhey comments further that "the conflicting claims
of the scientist are fascinating. . . . The scientists do
not have different information or different scientific
methods; they have different perspectives, different dispo
sitions, different convictions.""' In other words, it
should be remembered that scientists have differing personal
beliefs and agendas the same as all other individuals.
These differing convictions and ambitions cause them to
arrive at contrasting and possibly even contradictory posi
tions regarding the use of and profit from mapping and
understanding the human genome.
One of the consequences of this unknown is the necessi
ty of doing safety research, that is
since we do not know enough about recombinant
processes to make reliable estimates about
their danger, we must do safety research
which, ironically, involves doing hazardous
experiments. A reasonable approach might be
to construct a few special laboratories
where, under extremely cautious controls,
safety question would be pursued. This sug
gestion has a subtle difficulty: programmed
research tends to lose the power to ferret
out the unexpected, and as DeWitt Stetten,
the deputy director of NIH pointed out, the
biggest dangers of recombinant DNA are those
we have not yet thought of. Science is not a
linear process; its power to clarify and weed
out depends on a pluralistic, cyclic approach
in which competing hypotheses are debated,
refined, and tested.""
"' Allen Verhey, "The Morality of Genetic Engineering,"
Christian Scholar's Review 14, no. 2 (1985) 132.
Dismukes, 25.
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Thus, while the competition, complexity and counter claims
may confuse the public, it does serve to elucidate and
eliminate the incongruities that arise.
Another piece of the puzzle that serves to make
risk/benefit analysis more difficult is the lure of profits.
Much has been stated elsewhere"' concerning the recently
new found compatibility between the academic institutions
involved in genetic research and the industrial /manufactur
ing sector involved in the same endeavours.
If the issue of aggression control appears
too complex or politically difficult, one
might substitute less inflammatory examples,
such as genetically engineering individuals
to be better adapted to asbestos, vinyl chlo
ride, and benzine in their environment. One
need only to see some allure of benefit in
order to engage earnestly in examining what
the possibilities of harms and benefits could
be."'
The scenario in focus here is that of a large company or
multinational corporation which may, for many reasons, find
it more economically feasible to change the employee rather
than to scale manufacturing processes for pollution preven
tion. It is obvious that the attraction of profits clouds
the risk/benefit analysis even more. The lure and greed
which profits produce should offer sufficient reason for
society to demand full disclosure on all genetic discover
ies .
"' James F. Danielli, "Industry, Society and Genetic
Engineering, " The Hastings Center Report, 2, no. 6 (December
1972): 5-7. George J. Annas, "Life Forms: The Law and the
Profits," The Hastings Center Report, 8, no. 5 (October
1978): 21-22. Lee Ehrman and Joe Grossfield, "What is
Natural, What is Not?", Key Dismukes, "Life is Patently Not
Human-Made," Harold P. Green, "Chakrabarty : Tempest in a
Test Tube, " in a section titled "The Supreme Court and
Patenting Life" The Hastings Center Report, 10, no. 5 (Octo
ber, 1980): 10-13.
"' Engelhardt, 284-285.
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The next obvious course of action would be the creation
of a governing body with wide ranging powers either from
within or without the scientific community. This governing
body would have to be able to suspend research pending proof
of safety, proof of benefit and proof of any number of a
list of criterion. Key Dismukes raises our critical aware
ness of any type of self-governing body.
However, it [legislation] leaves the director
of NIH with conflicting responsibilities: he
must both promote an area of research and
simultaneously regulate it. The Atomic Ener
gy Commission's performance should make us
aware of the difficulties inherent in this
kind of situation. Charged for thirty years
with both developing nuclear power and safe
guarding the public, the AEC failed to ade
quately explore possible hazards before com
mitting us to a major development pro-
133
gram .
The formation of some type of a governing body from within
the scientific community would put it in constant conflict
with itself. The pre-eminence of the scientist or the
policeperson would be in constant conflict.
This would leave one other major group available for
some type of involvement in the ongoing genetic project. If
a committee of interested individuals from various vocations
and professions was constantly and completely updated about
the imminent possibilities and capabilities, they may ade
quately serve such a post. This combination too would have
difficulties however.
The tensions between scientific freedom and
public involvement must be balanced. To
anticipate and delimit hazards requires the
best efforts of a vigorous scientific enter
prise. That in turn requires the freedom of
scientists to challenge the consensus, with
data and argument. We require not just the
scientist's data, but also his way of asking
questions. It is somehow both ironic and
Dismukes, 25.
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appropriate that the insight of science must
be one of our major tools for preventing
misapplication of its technologic off
spring."*
Perhaps a better risk/benefit analysis could be developed if
a better understanding of the result and consequences were
published. As was stated earlier this is part of the un
known .
Mapping and sequencing the human genome
could, of course, lead to screening on an
almost unimaginable scale�not only for cer
tain diseases and traits, but also for ten
dencies toward certain diseases, such as
cancer or manic depression. When all genetic
traits can be deciphered in a genetic code
(something that will require far more than a
simple map of location), we will enter a new
realm� taking not simply a quantitative step,
but a qualitative one. Exactly what the
consequences of such a step will be are not
entirely foreseeable.'"
And thus the discussion has come full circle. The unknown,
the source of our fears is holding the public's approval at bay."
"*
Dismukes, 30.
"^
George J. Annas, "Who's Afraid of the Human Genome?"
The Hastings Center Report 19. no. 4 (July/Aug 1989): 20.
"* From Footnote #4 in W. French Anderson's article,
"Human Gene Therapy: Why Draw a Line?
*'
I do not
believe that the widespread public uneasiness about human
genetic engineering that I have found in talking with di
verse groups throughout the country over the past 20 years
is founded solely in worries about cancer, toxic [690-691]
side effect, or random mutations. People smoke, drink,
overeat, use drugs, drive recklessly, pollute the environ
ment with mutagens, etc., with only moderate expressions of
concern. Anxiety about genetic engineering strikes deeper
than this. And even though individuals cannot usually
express in words why they are nervous, they know that they
are. An element here is that, as studies of risk perception
have shown (Fischhoff et al . , 1981), the public tends to
underestimate familiar risks and overestimate risks that are
unfamiliar, hard to understand, invisible, involuntary,
and/or potentially catastrophic. Recombinant DNA and gene
(continued. . . )
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Another aspect of the benefit side of this equation has
to do with the benefit of altering defective genes. There
IS relatively no question that identifying and correcting a
defective gene for Tay-Sachs or Lou Gehrig's or Alzheimer's
is a laudable activity."' However, suppose in doing a
gene probe of an individual, the probe shows deleterious
genes for Alzheimer's, heart disease and an immunity weak
ness. Do all of the identified defects need to be 'correct
ed' before the person can be considered healthy? If the
answer is affirmative, then it must also be assumed that no
individual can be considered perfectly healthy.
It is in any case an established fact that
every human being is the carrier of geneti
cally determined defects. Respect for dam
aged life in the serene relationship between
parents and the expected child should then
perhaps best be able to be supported by a
true fundamental attitude of solidarity in
responsibility: 'We are all fellow mutants.'
With this we find ourselves in the midst of
ethical evaluation."�
Thus, without an absolute definition of humanity, the un
healthy, the defective, and the unproductive categorizations
of people will continue to grow ad infinitum. And with only
"*(... continued)
therapy fall into this latter category. Nonetheless, as
stated above, even some of us who are highly knowledgeable
and enthusiastic about genetic engineering are uneasy about
it." W. French Anderson, "Human Gene Therapy: Why Draw a
Line?" Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14:6 (Dec. 1989):
690-691 .
"' David Suzuki, et al . , have raised the issue that
there are no guarantees that altering one specified gene
will not somehow affect another gene, either positively or
negatively, at another point on the genome. We find our
selves again in the midst of the unknown yet having to
proceed.
"� Paul Schotsmans, "Brave New World within Reach? The
Genetic Challenge to Ethics," in Ethics in the Natural
Sciences , ed. Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Pohier (Edinburgh:
Stichting Concilium and T. & T. Clark Ltd, 1989): 101.
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constantly shifting social mores to provide the guidelines,
a utilitarian view of human individuals will be the only and
inevitable result. The individualism of the modern world
will continue to grow. Future generations will continue to
foster a love of self without any regard for the next door
neighbour. In reviewing Paul Ramsey's book Ethics at the
Edges of Life: Medical and Legal Intersections, Hauerwas
states the following:
He [Paul Ramsey] argues that if we are to
value as God values, then care is required
since otherwise we sunder the relation be
tween love to God and love to neighbor. Thus
from a religious perspective there is no
reason to say that the six months of life of
a victim of Tay-Sachs disease is of less
worth to God than the seventy years before
the onset of degeneration in a healthy per-
� �� 139son .
While Hauerwas' evaluation may raise other questions which
are not of particular concern here, it does show that,
awareness of denigrative views of humanity need to be point
ed out and the elimination of such views must be attempted.
With differing views of hiimanity in mind, evaluations
need to be made in regards to risk/benefit equations. The
bottom line questions in all of this are, "Who is really at
risk?" and "Who really stands to benefit?" Daniel Callahan
makes the following observations.
There is the principle of risk-benefit
analysis: in matters of uncertainty, risks
and benefits are to be compared and moral
action determined by the outcome of the equa
tion. (Technically, of course, risk-benefit
analysis is supposed to be only a methodolo
gy; but at times it appears to have the sta
tus of a moral principle.) It is this prin
ciple that has dominated the recombinant DNA
"' Stanley Hauerwas, "Can Ethics Be Theological?" The
Hastings Center Report, 8 no. 5, (October 1978): 47.
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debate, and its application which has led to
a relaxing of the earlier guidelines.'"
At the end of this listing, Callahan is able to note that
virtually nothing has stopped research in genetic engineer
ing. However the same can be said for most of the scientif
ic endeavour during the twentieth century. Since its incep
tion with the likes of Bacon, et al . , science has seldom
been dissuaded from the agenda that scientists have set for
themselves .
The logical next step in this process of risk/benefit
analysis is the formulation of probability statements based
on the experts understandings at the time. Probability
statements are the only perceivable way of applying the
risk/benefits factors as determined by genetic scientists.
However, this too has its limits as the Presidential Commis
sion on genetic engineering points out.
Yet it is important to understand the un
avoidable limitations of technical expertise.
On the one hand, there are the limitations of
the experts' knowledge; on the other, there
are the limitations of technical knowledge
itself, no matter how thorough. Experts in
genetic engineering can provide the most
accurate available data, from which probabil
ity statements can be formulated. But nei
ther geneticists nor scientists experienced
in risk assessment have any special expertise
about evaluative and conceptual uncertain
ties. An expert might conclude that there is
a 5% probability that a certain harmful out
come will occur, but that knowledge is not
sufficient for deciding whether such a proba
bility is an acceptable degree of risk. Nor
can scientific expertise answer the question
of whether the burdens of risk would fall
disproportionately upon some people, for this
is a moral, not a scientific, question. This
is not to say, of course, that scientific
experts should not make moral judgments or
Daniel Callahan, "The Moral Career of Genetic Engi
neering," The Hastings Center Report, 9 no. 2 (Apr. 1979):
9.
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that if they do they ought to be ignored.
But the limitations of expertise must be
clearly understood."'*'
But all of this still does not answer the bottom line ques
tions posed earlier, nor have the terms risk and benefit
been defined (by design) .
In most articles and books on risk/benefit analysis,
the philosophical basis is utilitarian based. In a majority
of macroethics discussions, the genetic plan and process
creates a difference of opinion as to who should have to
defend their respective position first, ie. those who en
dorse rDNA or those who oppose it. Regardless of where this
burden finally lands, the arguments that are used on both
sides of the equation are typically utilitarian arguments
surrounding the supposed risks and benefits of genetic
technology. However, such arguments involve vast territo
ries of ambiguities precisely because the results of any
given genetic procedure are unknown and as a consequence,
the usefulness of a particular argument is limited. Allen
Verhey again provides direction.
"First, utility calculations or assessments
of risks and benefit often ignore a basic
moral question, the question of distributive
justice. . . . Second, the terms "risk" and
"benefit" are not parallel. Risks compare
with hopes. Benefits compare with harms.
Risks and hopes deal with uncertainties and
probabilities. Harms and benefits deal with
assured results. . . . Third, the uncertainty
of some risks and some benefits must be ac
knowledged. We may not know the risks until
we have taken them. The issue then is not
just whether certain well-defined risks are
worth taking but whether we can get to know
what the risks really are morally. ... Or
to put it more elegantly, the probability of
harm may turn out to be small, but the magni-
'*' The Presidential Commission, "Social and Ethical
Issues, " in Bioethics: Basic Writings on the Key Ethical
Questions that Surround the Major, Modern Biological Possi
bilities and Problems (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987), 416.
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tude of the possible harm is very great. In
the face of the sort of uncertainty we face
with recombinant DNA, I suggest that with
respect to weighing costs versus benefits the
burden of proof should be borne by the genet
ic engineers. If we cannot know the risks
until we do genetic engineering, and if we
may not do genetic engineering until we know
that it is safe, then the pace of the biolog
ical revolution ought to be slowed.'*'
Verhey covers a substantial amount of territory in this
quote, and it would be helpful to explore his declarations
in more detail.
His first assertion suggesting some model of distribu
tive justice would go a long way in assisting with the
provision of answers for our bottom line. "The final prin
ciple is that of justice. Putting it in its clearest form,
the resources of health care ought to be equally available
to all persons in the society. As John Rawls has put it,
when that is not true, the inequity must be shown to be for
the benefit of those who have the least command over the
resources available."'*'
Verhey 's second assertion has to do with the actual
definitions of the terms risk and benefit. Few have real
ized that they are not perfectly co-opposite terms. The
very way that the terms "risk/benefit" are used tip the
scales in favour of genetic engineering. Discussion is
predisposed to talk of "cures" as factual in reference to
benefits and to talk about the harms of genetic technology
as though they were only risks.'**
The third contention speaks for itself. These declara
tions help to provide substantial balance in the face-off
'*' Verhey, 130-131.
'*' Graydon F. Snyder, "Theological Reflections on
Genetic Engineering", Brethren Life and Thought, 31, no. 4
(Autumn, 1986): 210.
'** Verhey, 130-31.
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between the individual and the progress of genetic engineer
ing. The dignity of the individual is maintained without
completely disavowing the use of genetic technology. The
by-words are caution and assurance.
The Moral Views of Parent /Chi Id Relationships
Another area that requires our attention and exami
nation is that of the relationship of the parent to the
child and vice versa, as well as other aspects and people
which become involved in the genetic reproductive process.
However cursory it may be, it would first be judicious to
examine the effects and possibilities of genetic technology
on the reproductive process. There are also some other
aspects and attitudes which should be observed as well. In
an ever increasing way there are also other people involved
in the life-creating process that were never dreamed of in
previous times. How these people talk and act in the very
important and difficult decision to have children requires
serious examination. Of final and probably ultimate impor
tance in this specific area are the views on parenting and
children which western societies hold.
In the area of parenting and children, it would be
reasonable to peruse the probabilities and possibilities
that genetic engineering may or may not have on the repro
ductive process. If this statement sounds somewhat indeci
sive, it is due to the fact that, at this point in time and
probably for a few years to come, it is difficult to deter
mine the extent and reliability of genetic technology in the
reproductive process.
In some of the literature relating to this reproductive
genetics, there has been some obvious antagonism towards the
standard process of creating new life.'*^ The Presidential
Probably most notorious in this regard are the terms
of Joseph Fletcher, "Indicators of Humanhood:" op cit 3
"...sexual roulette...", et al ; H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.
(continued. . . )
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Commission offers its modern interpretation of sexual repro
duction in the following, which includes the phrases 'stark
alternatives' and "natural lottery'.
If gene therapy or gene surgery becomes
available, parents could have more control
over their children's characteristics. They
will no longer face the stark alternatives of
either playing the hand their child has been
dealt by the "natural lottery" or avoiding
birth or conception. Instead, they could
prevent some genetic defects through gene
surgery on the zygote and remedy others
through gene therapy before the genetic de
fect produces irreversible changes in the
child.'"
The current process of ordering a new car may be quite
similar to the future process of producing life. When
looking for a new automobile, there are pages of options
which may be considered in order to tailor one's purchase to
one's budget, driving styles, and taste. If rDNA develops
to the point where individual genes can be addressed and
manipulated, the "production" of a child may come about as a
result of a "sales order". Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that the process is ever going to be this simple since
the same gene that contributes to your hooked
nose may reduce your chances of tooth decay,
for all we know, or even limit your fluency
in foreign languages. So you can't order
everything from the trait menu, and you some
times can't order even one item without wor
rying about a bunch of others. Now the ques
tion is, do you care more about your kid's
nose or her linguistic facility? And if
'*^( . . .continued)
"Persons and Humans:", op cit, 282 "...blind deliverances of
evolution..."; Marc Lappe, "Genetic Knowledge" op cit 1
"
. . . "backwoods licentiousness" . . .
"
; and other phrasings
including one that stands out, "cottage industry of repro-
duct i on .
"
The Presidential Commission, "Social and Ethical
Issues," 409- Emphasis mine.
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there's any downside at all, should society
let you choose?'*'
We have to ask ourselves what this says about how we view
our children; as commodities to be modified like a stock
portfolio, or as images of God, valuable in and of their own
existence and how they were naturally created.'",'*'
While it is true that "natural" creation provides its
own set of defects in any human being'^� there is no guar
antee that the correction of one specifically identified
gene is not going to affect numerous other genes.
It seems safe to say that one important duty
of a parent is to prevent or ameliorate seri
ous defects (if it can be done safely) and
that the duty to enhance favorable character
istics is less stringent and clear. Yet the
new technological capabilities may change
people's view of what counts as a defect.
For example, if what is now regarded as the
normal development of important cognitive
skills could be significantly augmented by
genetic engineering,- then today's "normal"
'*'
William Saletan, "Genes 'R' Us," The New Republic
(July 17 & 24, 1989): 20.
'*� This term has in focus the sexual reproduction of an
individual without any intervention in the genetic makeup of
that individual.
'*' "This issue and the rapidly approaching ability to
accomplish such tasks could very easily result in the fol
lowing scenario.
"As one example, the ability to completely screen embryos
could lead to a market in "high grade embryos" that could be
bought and sold. They could also be gestated by contract or
surrogate mothers, and the resulting child delivered to the
purchaser of the embryo. This could lead not only to putt
ing specific price on all human characteristics (such as
height, intelligence, race, eye color, etc.), but also to
viewing children as commodities that have no rights or
interests of their own, but that exist to further the inter
ests of parents and future societies." George J. Annas,
"Who's Afraid of the Human Genome?" The Hastings Center
Report 19, no. 4 (July/Aug 1989): 20.
Cf. The Limits of the Good above.
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level might be considered deficient tomorrow.
Thus ethical uncertainty about the scope of a
parent's obligation is linked to conceptual
uncertainty about what counts as a de
fect."'
Once again an anthropocentric viewpoint creates the "concep
tual uncertainty" in the Commission statement simply because
they realize that there is no single human person or commit
tee which possesses the right or the ability to "draw the
line" between what is defective and what isn't.
A further aspect in this whole area of rDNA development
has to do with speculating about how far rDNA technology may
be able to take humanity in light of the amount of knowledge
that has been obtained in such a short period of time.
If the frontiers of genetic engineering can
advance from one-gene to three-gene traits
within a few years, what stands in the way of
discovering the larger gene combinations that
influence height, weight, and skin color?
For that matter, won't we eventually be able
to identify the genetic roots of intelli
gence, ambition, courage, and altruism? And
if so, whose children will be permitted to
benefit?'"
Yet again there is another facet of this speculation
that deserves attention. It has to do with the ability to
identify deleterious genes in children and the limits of
those identifiers. A thermometer informs one of the temper
ature, but it does not give satisfactory information regard
ing sunshine, clouds, humidity, precipitation or the like.
An rDNA gene probe will identify the existence of the dele
terious gene that it has been coded for, but it will not
provide information on the degree of manifestation of said
disease and neither will it provide for identification of
any other deleterious gene.
The Presidential Commission, ed. Thomas A. Shannon,
409 .
"' Saletan, "Genes 'R' Us," 19-
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Moreover, despite our advances a vast
impenetrability cloaks almost all prognosti
cation about human traits and conditions. In
fact, the language of "contingency" itself
reveals a wobble in the lofty trajectory of
the new human molecular genetics: for diseas
es of low or uncertain penetrance or for
which expression is determined in part by
other factors, genetic forecasts remain sta
tistical predictions not predeterminations.
Peering into a given individual's future to
predict the development of some currently
undetectable condition presents a heretofore
unheard-of capability, but the power of
probes to forecast the future is forever
limited by the power of genes to cause
it.'"
In other words, if there is even the slightest variation in
the actual sequence, the probe will not be able to identify
the gene sequence."*
While it is true that there may yet be many reasons for
carefully questioning the use of rDNA on a fetus or infant,
there are also some quite compelling reasons for approaching
'" Nolan and Swenson, "New Tools, New Dilemmas: Genetic
Frontiers," 45.
"* Indeed, this precision itself presents a dilemma.
As indicators of the presence of gene sequences, DNA probes
appear to offer a virtually failsafe diagnosis. In fact,
they can only reveal the presence of what is being sought--
usually a known gene sequence. All probes will fail to
correctly identify other defective variants of the gene, or
a de novo mutation that differs in as little as one base
pair from the DNA being sought." Marc Lappe, "The Limits of
Genetic Inquiry," The Hastings Center Report 17, no. 4
(August 1987): 10.
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the use of gametic gene therapy.'" However, these too
need to be weighed very carefully for benefits and dangers.
There are usually two reasons given for performing
gametic therapy. The first is that someone who has received
somatic gene therapy for a disease will, in all likelihood,
pass the genetic disease on to their offspring. In other
words, why do a genetic operation over and over in succeed
ing generations, when doing it once at the gametic level
would cure the disease once and for all.
And secondly,
some genetic diseases may be treatable only
by this method. For example, because of the
blood-brain barrier, the brain cells involved
in hereditary central nervous system disor
ders may be inaccessible to somatic-cell gene
therapy. Early intervention that affects all
the cells of the future organism, including
the germ cells, may be the only means avail
able for treating cells or tissues which are
not amenable to genetic repair after
birth.'"
It is lesser known facts such as the last that provide
difficulties in legislating against the use of gametic gene
therapy.
'^^ There are two classes of gene therapy that can then
be divided by purpose. The first is often referred to as
somatic gene therapy, taken for the Greek word for body.
This entails the performance of gene therapy on an already
existent body to alleviate some genetically apparent dis
ease. The second is usually referred to as gametic (from
gamete) gene therapy. This is the process of performing
gene therapy on the sperm and/or ovum used to form the
initial united cell of a new embryo again to eliminate some
genetically caused disease. Both of these treatments (so
matic and gametic) can be further sub-divided along lines of
purpose. In this new division the purpose has changed from
that of therapy treatment for genetic diseases to design
treatment which is the changing of some aspect of the indi
vidual which is not considered to be a disease, eg. hair
color, height, etc.
'" Walters, "The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy," 220.
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In examining the parent/child relationship, there are
still other aspects of genetically assisted reproduction
that should be looked at. The final point of the previous
section posed gametic therapy as a laudable endeavour in the
treatment of certain central nervous diseases. However,
what is seen as beneficial and propitious on the one hand
has its detriments on the other hand. Deciding whether to
engineer a profound change in an expected or newborn child
is difficult enough, but when it is remembered that the
effects of a couple's actions in the genetic manipulation of
the reproductive cells will be evident not only in their
immediate offspring but also in all future descendants, the
burden of responsibility could be truly awesome."' When
one considers the speed and the quantity of the change
combined with the spread of an inherited mistake after two
or three generations of offspring, reversing a genetic
mistake could be cost prohibitive, not to mention, difficult
or even impossible.
There are also psychological considerations which need
to be taken into account. Psychologists and counselors are
only now beginning to decipher the importance of family
relationships and what happens to individuals when these
external relationships are severed through separation and
divorce. They can only speculate about what types of diffi
culties may be encountered if society begins severing the
biological family connections.
Gene splicing technology may also change
people's sense of family and kinship. On the
one hand, the possibility of promoting sig
nificant inheritable changes through gene
surgery may encourage people to think of
their family as extending further into the
future than they now do. On the other hand,
knowing that future generations may employ an
even more advanced technology to alter or
"' The Presidential Commission, "Social and Ethical Is
sues,
" ed. Thomas A. Shannon, 409.
87
replace the characteristics passed on to them
may weaken people's sense of genetic continu
ity.'"
This quote assumes a viewpoint taken purely from this age
and people; it makes no attempt to imagine how the geneti
cally altered offspring may feel. Since time and changes in
technology itself has provided what are known as vast gener
ation gaps, it would not be inconceivable for these off
spring to feel that they have no connections with previous
generations since they are so different from their parents
and ancestors in their fundamental physical make-up. The
Presidential Commission speculates on the feelings of these
offspring as follows.
Whether or not they are accurate, people's
beliefs that they are linked to other members
of their family by constitutional similari
ties may play an important role in a family's
sense of solidarity and group identity.
Knowledge that the genetic link between par
ents and children is only partial or nonexis
tent could attenuate these feelings of kin
ship and family and the sense of continuity
and support that they foster. Experience
with adoption illustrates successful integra
tion of family members who are not biologi
cally linked, but also demonstrates the im
portance some individuals place on an associ
ation with biological parents. Here, too,
there may be as much uncertainty about wheth
er such changes would be beneficial or harm
ful as there is about whether they are likely
to occur.'"
Additional considerations include normal health and
rights and duties. The first is an extension of the paren
tal duty and the child's right to possess normal health.
Most civilized (and wealthy) societies provide legal support
in favour of children to sustain their health. While this
'" The Presidential Commission, "Social and Ethical
Issues,", ed. Thomas A. Shannon, 409-410.
'^' The Presidential Commission, "Social and Ethical
Issues," ed. Thomas A. Shannon, 410.
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is too often violated even in the wealthiest countries for
various reasons and/or excuses, the precedent exists.
Certain ethicists and lawyers have taken this right of the
child into the realm of fetal existence.
This argument maintains, in fact, that the
duty to provide normal health for one's chil
dren should take precedence over the desire
to reproduce in these kinds of cases. Ac
cording to the argument, this is because if
one's desires will cause serious harm to
others, they are illegitimate desires and
should not be satisfied. This same argument
could be applied to the case of any terribly
debilitating disease which cannot be detected
pre-symptomatically or prenatal ly."�
With apparently twisted logic, Gauthier argues that just as
the child has a right to proper health care, so too does the
fetus. While she states that the parent's are not required
to abort, there is good reasoning to do so. If genetic
screening determines that a particular fetus will be the
possessor of a genetic disease, the fetus' right to a nor
mal, healthy existence free of suffering demands that the
parents abort. "To conceive a child or to allow a pregnancy
with known genetic defects to go to term harms the future
person who will be born.""' However, the point that is
being missed by both Gauthier and Engelhardt is that the
fetus is already a possessor of life. They both assiime that
life doesn't begin until birth and this assumption makes
many things much easier. In other words, the defective
fetus' right to a normal, healthy existence free of suffer
ing overrides both the parent's desire to have and care for
"� Gauthier. "The Impact of Recombinant DNA Technology
on Genetic Screening," 35.
'" Engelhardt, Jr. "Persons and Humans:" 286.
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a defective infant and the fetus' right to existence post-
conception.'"
Involved in the above argumentation are the
rights/duties of both the mother and the fetus. These
deserve close examination. Gauthier sides with the mother
and her rights when she states that "the duties she may have
toward the fetus which arise from its rights as a potential
person will not be strong enough to override her right to
make the choice for an abortion. Thus, again, abortion for
genetic indications will still be morally acceptable."'"
The number of reasons grow for permanently silencing those
who can not speak for themselves.
Perhaps one of the best commentaries on how we view our
children has been offered by Outler in the summary paragraph
of an article he wrote as a logical defense against abor
tion. Although a somewhat lengthy quote, the argument is
easily transferred to the issue of genetic reproduction. He
states :
Our best recourse, in such a situation, is
to look to the practical consequences of the
two contrary perspectives, each taken in turn
as if it were true. If fetal life is regard
ed as if it were human and sacred and poten
tially personal in some truly important
sense�as if its values were rooted in its
transcendental origins and ends� then it must
not readily be violated by others on grounds
of disparate self-interests. If, on the
contrary, fetal life is viewed as if it were
sub-human, as if its values were conferred on
it, or denied it, by other human beings, in
terms of self-interest or social sentiment,
then abortion is a legitimate failsafe
against defective births and beyond that,
euthanasia an acceptable failsafe against
lives no longer useful. By then, of course.
"' Here the assumption is that the "defect" is not life
threatening.
'" Gauthier, "The Impact of Recombinant DNA Technology
on Genetic Screening," 32.
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abortion would have ceased to be the central
issue, but rather human life itself. But
that, precisely, is what this debate has been
all about, all along!'"
It is always wise to keep the whole picture in mind
when trying to evaluate details. We have been examining the
detail of genetic manipulation at the beginning of human
life and what effects, psychological and otherwise, this
might have on the parent-child relationship.
In a very interesting article, Michael Ruse asks a very
pertinent question which backs us up and forces us to look
at the larger picture. After examining a number of differ
ent angles, he queries, "What could really be any better
than where we are genetically?" While Ruse's confessed
amazement is somewhat surprising in itself, his conclusion
bears much truth. "So having run through my six categories,
here you have my conclusion--a conclusion which, I must
confess, somewhat surprised me at first--that God did not do
such a bad job after all! Before we plunge headlong into
massive programs of genetic redesign, perhaps we should
consider where we stand today. It may just be that it is
not such a bad place to stand. ""^
There are very likely many more factors which could be
considered under the heading of other aspects of genetic
reproduction in addition to those listed, however this
should suffice to give some forewarning to the complexities
and danger inherent in the processes of genetic reproduc
tion.
In looking at genetic reproduction from as many angles
as possible, attention should also be given to those in-
"* Albert C. Outler, "The Beginnings of Personhood:
Theological Considerations," in On Moral Medicine: Theo
logical Perspectives in Medical Ethics. eds. Stephen
Lammers and Allen Verhey.
Michael Ruse, "Genesis Revisited: Can We Do Better
than God?" Zvgon 19, no. 3 (Sept. 1984): 312.
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volved in the actual process of decision-making in genetic
reproduction. Genetic reproduction can involve three or
more parties in the process. What was previously a con
sented to action by two people is now a full-blown labo
ratory procedure, where little is left to simply occur.
This third party is usually a genetic counselor and how s/he
reacts and speaks can have varying degrees of influence over
the couple in crisis. "Genetic counseling is a new frontier
which passionately needs sound thinking and solid develop
ment.""* It must be realized by all involved that the ge
netic counseling process is more complex than the simple
transfer of scientific, biological, genetic knowledge from
the counselor to the prospective parents.
Again there are varying views on the activities and
responsibilities of the genetic counselor. Marc Lappe holds
the genetic counselor to a very limited sphere of operation,
this being not much more than simply a dispenser of informa
tion. "Basically, I think that genetic counselors may be
misguided if they feel that their ethical obligation is in
any way to future generations.""' While it is true that
the prospective parents make the ultimate decisions, the
genetic counselor must be held accountable to some degree
for the decision which is ultimately arrived at. Lappe
continues that in the simplest of terms, all a genetic
counselor can properly do is to minimize the "bad" which may
be a result of human reproduction."� Loading a public
good or a conscientious genetic guidance and screening
"* Paul W. Hoffman, "The Brethren Discuss Genetic Engi
neering," Brethren Life and Thought, 31, no. 4 (Autumn
1986): 207.
"' Marc Lappe, "The Genetic Counselor: Responsible to
Whom?" The Hastings Center Report, vol. 1, no. 2 (Sept.
1971): 6.
"� Lappe, "The Genetic Counselor: " 6.
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program on the back of the genetic counselor may be falla
cious and ethically dangerous. He also states that "the
genetic counselor's obligation never should extend beyond
the family within his purview. . . . Properly, a genetic
counselor's job should not, in any way, be construed as
eugenic in practice.""'
Lappe 's basic position for the ethical view of a genet
ic counselor is the following, "The best that one can do in
the role of genetic counselor (as that role is currently
construed) in the face of the inevitability of genetic
defects is to minimize the impact (not necessarily the
occurrence) of these defects. This impact is measured by
the amount of human suffering coincident to the defect."""
This whole tone is also echoed by Candace Gauthier in her
article on rDNA technology and screening. She states that
"the ethical dilemmas confronted by couples at risk for
debilitating or lethal genetic disorders are difficult ones
and are dilemmas that most agree must be resolved by the
individuals themselves. Neither the scientists nor the
genetic counselors can resolve them. . . . It is up to the
individual and the society to decide how to use it [technol
ogy].""' What is being stated here both by Lappe and
Gauthier is that the genetic counselor is a value-neutral
information dispenser; that the genetic counselor is no
different than a computer printout.
The definition of a counselor excludes this type of
belief regarding the genetic counselor's actions and mes
sage. Invariably, the prospective parents are going to ask
something like, "What would you do if you were in our posi-
"'
Lappe, "The Genetic Counselor:" 6.
"" Lappe, "The Genetic Counselor:" 7.
"' Gauthier, "The Impact of Recombinant DNA Technology
on Genetic Screening," 35.
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tion?" or "What do you think the chances are of...?" The
genetic counselor has to make some type of response or
evaluation or appear incompetent and uncaring to the par
ents."','" If this is all that society is going to re
quire of a genetic counselor, then a questionnaire and a
printout would be a more responsible process.
In addition, the issue of privacy versus publicity is
another issue which bristles with thorny questions. The
parents facing these types of agonizing decisions are under
enough pressure without having to face "inquiring minds".
The difficulty is that the public at large has a right to
know what the medical world is capable of performing.
With gene therapy, one hopes for a reasonable
balance between familial privacy and the
desire of the public and the media to know.
'"
It is the opinion of the author that value-neutral
genetic counseling is an impossibility. It is a formidable
task for a human being to be simply a dispenser of informa
tion. Whether it is body movement, inflection, intonation,
or words used, the genetic counselor will in some way (pos
sibly even unconsciously) affect the decision of the pro
spective parents. It would seem inhumane to load a genetic
counselor with the responsibility of dispensing information
only in such an intensely personal situation. In the past,
the scientific and medical worlds have believed that the
dispensing of raw information without regard for the emo
tional impact or consequences was sufficient for their part.
This view has been changing in the recent past, especially
in the area of psychology where the spiritual and emotional
aspects of the person and their decisions are more easily
acknowledged .
'" This is supported by the following, "Guidelines for
genetic screening rely on "nondirective counseling," where
an individual or family determines the level of burden
associated with a given condition, based on information
conveyed in as nearly "value-neutral" a fashion as possible.
However well this framework may have functioned when the
occurrence of serious disease propelled an individual or
family into genetic counseling, it is inadequate alone to
handle questions about appropriate applications of newly
developed genetic diagnostic tests in general medical prac
tice." Nolan and Swenson, "New Tools, New Dilemmas:" 44.
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Researchers will bear the primary responsi
bility for informing patients and their fami
lies of the public interest in gene therapy
and for shielding patients from excessive
media exposure. If as seems likely, the
earliest patients are infants or young chil
dren who are incapable of expressing their
own views regarding publicity, they will
deserve special protection."*
It would seem that this should not pose too great a diffi
culty if the parents would compromise and consent to the
dissemination of information as long as no actual legal
names were used. However, this quote points up a another
and somewhat less obvious point and that is that the most
likely candidates for gene therapy will be infants or young
children. The question then follows, "Can decision making
by proxy, even parents, really be fair in such far reaching
issues of this magnitude?"
There is one possibility that seems to be rarely con
sidered in genetic reproduction scenarios, and that is
limiting conception where there is a high probability of
serious genetic disease or defect. Snyder includes as part
of his view of genetic counseling this concept of limiting
conception.
"^
Many people seem to have a misunderstanding of Chris
tian ethics and their proper operation. These misunder
standings are not limited to the average public, but are
also assumed by many with more education and experience.
Marc Lappe, an ethicist at The Hastings Center, is one such
individual. He compares his version of Christian love and
benevolence to Indian ahimsa and finds the Christian ideal
wanting in the face of far eastern options.
Acting out of compassion does not always
mean, for example, that detection of a Mon-
"* Walters, "The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy," 217.
'" Snyder, "Theological Reflections on Genetic Engi
neering," 212.
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goloid chromosomal constitution automatically
leads to abortion: Indian ahimsa holds that
if this child's birth brings no additional
suffering into the world (as it would not if
parents are warm and loving; Mongoloid chil
dren can live happily and respond to human
warmth), it must be allowed to pass."*
On the other hand, Lappe seems to have a very black and
white concept of Christian ethics.
(b) Acceptance of Christian benevolence, by
contrast, leads to an obligation to act when
and only when one can perceive that his ac
tions will lead to a tangible improvement in
or avoid an impairment of someone's life or
well-being. ... In the latter instance [(b)
above], I'm afraid the counselor would almost
always find his hands tied - being able to
give only statistical assessments of the
greater or lesser good implicit in a particu
lar mating. Only rarely, (as in the case of
amniocentesis-proven Tay-Sachs disease), will
he be able to act forthrightly to abort the
fetus in the face of evident potential im
pairment . "
"'
This is not a proper definition of the Christian view
of life or its required actions. Christians are called to
act benevolently at all times toward their neighbours and
those entrusted to their care. Lappe makes an additional
assumptive equation between suffering and evil ("reducing
the operation of evil [i.e. suffering] through reducing the
number of individuals born with major defects.") which needs
to be evaluated.
Daniel Callahan, in a following, evaluative response to
Lappe 's article, correctly calls this equation into ques
tion. Callahan's first point is that reducing the suffering
of one individual increases the suffering of another indi-
vidual(s). Secondly, suffering comes in many forms and is
not necessarily always to be avoided. "There is physical
"* Lappe, "The Genetic Counselor:" 8.
"' Lappe, "The Genetic Counselor:" 7.
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pain, emotional stress, bereavement, fear, and so on.
Suffering can be meaningful . . . and meaningless, . . .
ennobling . . , and degrading, . . . useful to others . . .
and destructive.""�
It is obvious then that any difficulties which are
encountered by prospective parents vault them into a com
pletely different scenario. No longer is it simply a couple
and their baby. Those difficulties bring them into endless
laboratories, testing and drugs with numerous people in
volved where before it was only themselves. It is contended
here that all of these external intrusions have to have some
effect, either positive or negative. The people and the
testing can not be completely and totally neutral.
While this is not an examination of parenting, parent
ing styles, views of parenting or being parents, this new
technology will affect all of these. Commonly held concep
tions of parenting and what it means to be a parent are
being and will continue to be forever changed.
Current attitudes toward human reproductive
activity are founded, in part, on several
important assiimptions , among them that becom
ing a parent requires a willingness, within
very broad limits, to accept the child a
woman gives birth to, that parents' basic
duties to children are more or less clear and
settled, and that reproduction and parenting
are and should remain largely private and
autonomous spheres of people's lives. The
doors that genetic engineering can open chal
lenge all three of these assumptions."'
When genetic engineering becomes available, parents will no
longer have to accept what the natural genetic lottery has
dealt them, nor will the duties remain consistent, nor will
'" From Daniel Callahan's letter in response to Marc
Lappe, "The Genetic Counselor: Responsible to Whom?" The
Hastings Center Report, vol. 1, no. 2 (Sept. 1971): 10.
The Presidential Commission, "Social and Ethical
Issues," ed. Thomas A. Shannon, 409.
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it remain a private decision completely within the parents
own personal control .
In an article entitled "The Brink: The Parent-Child
Bond in the Genetic Revolution, " John Fletcher discovers
the following stunning reality after several
...interviews with a number of parents before
and after amniocentesis contemplating abor
tion. He declares that even a responsible
decision to undergo amniocentesis and to
contemplate abortion "permanently altered"
the relation of a parent with that child or
another child even though it "does not lessen
the affection they have for their chil
dren. ""�
If abortion is the final end of the test, regardless of how
the ensuing action is explained or covered up by the par
ents, the fact that the mother was going to have a baby and
is no longer going to, severely alters "...the relationship
of uncalculating nurturance and basic trust...""' which
the other children have in their parents. This would infuse
other threatening questions into the minds of the children,
such as "What if I get sick?" and "Do I measure up?" The
observation of one of the discussions below shows up here.
A misplaced faith in the ability of technology to cure all
problems results in a desire for the perfect child. The
belief is fostered that technology can give the perfect,
happy child. At a time when our confusion concerning the
activity of parenting continues to grow, we gain access to a
knowledge base that gives more control . Or forget the
"Why's" of having children. Parents want their children to
be perfect, and all children have experienced the pains of
those types of desires.'"
" Verhey, 136.
' Verhey, 136.
' Verhey, "The Morality of Genetic Engineering," 136.
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Not only are the pressures on parents growing from the
inside, that is from both their own expectations and those
of extended family members, but the pressures are multi
plying externally as well to have perfect children (much
less children who simply do well). While other aspects of
Nolan and Swenson 's article are less desirable, they make
this point exceptionally clear.
A central question therefore concerns how
we are to assess the benefits of intervention
for contingent disorders. Unfortunately,
"diagnosis" (through identification of an
underlying genetic substrate) often tends to
legitimize interventions prior to rigorous
evaluation of their potential benefits and
harms. Yet most currently available thera
pies for genetically based conditions require
long-term lifestyle changes. These may be
highly burdensome but have little effect on
ultimate morbidity and mortality, or they may
reduce life's overall benefits as perceived
by the individuals being treated. . . . Since
markers exist to detect genes predisposing
familial hypercholesterolemia and other lipid
disorders, a zealous clinician might be temp
ted to argue that failure to maintain an
identified child on a low cholesterol diet
constitutes a new category for parental medi
cal neglect."'
As was mentioned earlier, this is not an investigation into
the task of parenting, but what has been done is sufficient
to display the added pressures which prospective parents are
going to be asked to undergo if they are detected as being a
carrier of deleterious genes.
This draws under the examination light perhaps the most
important element of this entire section, that is the chil
dren themselves. In all reproductive rDNA, there is a lot
of work and speculation that will be done on children,
infants, fetuses, and prospective embryos who will have very
little if any input regarding their own desires. It will be
^ Nolan and Swenson, "New Tools, New Dilemmas:," 43.
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discerning to investigate an alternate form of the issue
which Leroy Walters has raised above, that being, "If as
seems likely, the earliest patients are infants or young
children who are incapable of expressing their own views
regarding any of this treatment [publicity], they will
deserve special attention.""* How such children will be
regarded is a matter that cannot be taken too seriously.
Discussion of this nature took place during a retrospective
discussion among experts regarding what came to be known as
the Boston XYY Case. In this situation, a geneticist made
correlations between the existence of XYY chromosomes and
aggressive behavior in males. This correlation was later
disproved, but not before a substantial prenatal screening
program had been instituted. Part of that retrospective
discussion follows and it highlights the effects of identi
fying individuals with deleterious genes.
The decision to identify XYY individuals at
birth and inform their parents may cause the
children so identified to be at some in
creased risk of parental and social stigma-
tization. Although this risk is impossible
to estimate precisely and will probably vary
from family to family, even Dr. Walzer feels
there is some risk. "...I agree with
Beckwith that there is a risk to labeling
kids, but I think we have to take it.""'
How we view our children is very possibly influenced by what
science and scientific reports have to say about them rather
than a proper understanding or proper application of our
understanding of the Image of God in our children.
A second evidence of this inadequacy is the assumption
of genetics and those involved that elimination of deleteri
ous genes is automatically and necessarily a bettering of
the children and consequently, of the human race. "The
Walters, "The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy," 217.
Richard Roblin, "The Boston XYY Case," The Hastings
r.P.nter Report, vol. 5, no. 4 (August 1975): 6.
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second order of issues relates to what is generally termed
'eugenics,' the improvement of the species, either by weed
ing out genetic 'undesirables' or by actually using genetic
techniques (breeding or genetic engineering) to increase the
number of desirable traits in offspring.""* The author of
this quote goes on to provide some stipulations which shall
be raised below.
Construction of a more correct view of children could
quite easily be started with a quote from Paul Schotsmans'
article "Brave New World Within Reach?" He states in a
somewhat lengthy but otherwise excellent paragraph that,
ethical orientations make a possible linking
of science and ethics more real and actual.
It is to be hoped that they do not function
on their own but according to the facts, and
that they also provide guidance for the de
velopment of biotechnology and genetics. In
all this thought needs above all to be given
to the image assigned to the child in our
culture. Is it not the situation that the
child must respond to its parent's most ex
treme expectations? Never has the pressure
for the perfect child been so great. What is
termed the medical indication for genetic
reasons seems rather to be a euphemism that
conceals the lack of consideration for the
fundamental values that are at stake here.
The idea that human beings are only healthy
if they can function normally in society
points to the exaggerated expectations that
people currently have of medicine. At the
same time one can rightly question whether
this will offer sufficient guarantees for the
viability of our society."'
"* George J. Annas, "Who's Afraid of the Human Genome?"
The Hastings Center Report 19, no. 4 (July/Aug 1989): 20.
"' Paul Schotsmans, "Brave New World within Reach?" in
Ethics in the Natural Sciences, ed. Dietmar Mieth and
Jacques Pohier, English ed. Philip Hi 1 Iyer, (Edinburgh:
Stichting Conciliiim and T. & T. Clark Ltd., 1989), 102-103.
Emphasis mine.
101
He goes on to draw some parallel connections between how we
view the beginning of life and how we view the end of life.
The implication is that "life is life is life", regardless
of how societal definitions of quality measure the life in
question. And it is not just the beginning and end of life
that can be compared, but also on equal grounds in the
equation are those lives that are not capable of operating
at full capacity due to a health impairment.
However, more to the point of this discussion is the
view of children that Schotsmans upholds. The following is
a list of principles which should be the constant basis of
how society views children. 1) It is not the primary re
sponsibility of children to fulfill parents' dreams. 2)
Levels of functional capabilities are not to be used to
grade a child's worth. 3) How we view and pressure children
is a "limited release" view of how we anticipate society to
unfold. Obviously, there is much more at stake in the
genetic designing of children than the children themselves,
but they should be the ultimate focus. Part of this focus
should be a determination (as near as possible) of what
their own feelings may be with the knowledge that they were
designed regardless of the reasoning used to initiate the
rDNA design process.
If we conclude that the project of designing
our descendants would, if successful, result
in descendants who would reject that project,
then it would clearly be better never to
embark on our project at all. Otherwise we
shall risk producing descendants who will be
deeply ungrateful and aghast at the people�
ourselves--who brought them into exis
tence. "'"
We should be grateful to Schotsmans for pointing us in
the right direction, however, Stanley Hauerwas gives the
picture of how we should view children with much more clari-
Maclntyre, "Seven Traits for the Future," The
Hastings Center Report 9, no. 1 (February 1979): 7.
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ty. While this author would paint the picture using such
cliches as "Children are a gift from God," (which is true),
Hauerwas gives the portrait much more verbal brilliance.
Now children are the basic and, perhaps, the
most essential gifts we have because they
teach us how to be. That is, they create in
us the proper need to want to love and regard
another. For love born of need is always
manipulative love unless it is based on the
regard of the other as an entity who is not
in my control but who is all the more valu
able because I do not control him. Children
are gifts exactly because they draw our love
to themselves while refusing to be as we wish
them to be."'
What is illuminated here in the microcosm is a reflection of
what God sees and desires of His own children as believers.
Again, due to lack of eloquence on the part of this author,
Hauerwas will be quoted to conclude this examination of the
effect of rDNA on our views of children and parenting. He
does an admirable job of injecting a theology of love into
the day-to-day world of raising children.
For our having children draws on our deepest
convictions that God is the Lord of this
world� that in spite of all the evidence of
misery in this world, it is a world and an
existence that we can affirm as good as long
as we have the assurance that He is its cre
ator and redeemer. Even though we know that
this is an existence racked with sin and
disobedience, our Lord has provided us with
skills to deal with sin, in ourselves and
others, in a manner that will not destroy us
or them. Children are, thus, our promissory
note, our sign to present and future genera
tions, that we Christians trust the Lord who
has called us together to be His people.
(This is the basis of our conviction about
abortion, not that life is sacred, but that
Stanley Hauerwas, "Having and Learning How to Care
for Retarded Children: Some Reflections," Ethics in Medi-
f^^rtt^. Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns, ed.
Stanley Joel Reiser, Arthur J. Dyck and William J. Curran
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, na), 634.
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this is the way we should regard chil
dren.
The Moral Vif^ws of Others/Society
Much of what was said about the family in the previous
section could be expanded and enlarged to apply to the
prevailing and growing views of society. Much of what was
said regarding our changing views of children and parental
activities can be applied to other people and particularly
the weak, the helpless and the unproductive which can be
found in every society and community. "If the family is a
microcosm of society, then the biological revolution also
confronts us with the question about what kind of society we
would be and become. Our dispositions toward each other
will affect and be affected by genetic engineering.""' It
is these dispositions which shall be the focus of this
section .
It has been stated numerous times that rDNA technology
is going to change how we think. There are many who fully
understand the implications and possibilities of rDNA tech
nology who are strong proponents of pursuing and using all
technology available. The Congress of the United States,
Office of Technology Assessment has produced a publication
entitled Mapping Our Genes: Genome Projects: How Big. How
Fast?"' Chapter four is entitled, "Social and Ethical
Considerations," and under a section titled "Attitudes,"
this question is asked: "How will a complete map and se
quence of the human genome transform attitudes and percep
tions of ourselves and others?" The reply begins.
"� Hauerwas, "Having and Learning How to Care for
Retarded Children:" 633.
"' Verhey, "The Morality of Genetic Engineering," 136.
Congress of the United States, Office of Technology
Assessment, Mapping Our Genes: Genome Projects: How Big, How
Fast? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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One of the strongest argxoments for supporting
human genome projects is that they will pro
vide knowledge about the determinants of the
human condition. One group of scientists has
urged support of human genome projects be
cause sequencing the human genome will pro
vide one of the most powerful tools humankind
has ever had for deciphering the mysteries of
its own existence.'"
The rest of the section follows in the same tenor and ends
with the following paragraph.
Many individuals have general beliefs about
their genetic potential for achievement in
certain spheres of activity, about the limits
of possible improvement through effort or
environmental change. These intuitive be
liefs are often vague and inaccurate. Often,
it is only in regard to a few skills or char
acteristics that individuals have pushed
against the limits of their potential. When
science makes it possible to trace the actual
limits of individuals, intuitive perceptions
may turn out to be wrong. This has the po
tential of both enhancing and limiting per
sonal liberty."*
Throughout, there is no adequate presentation of the "nega
tive" or "critical" attitudes that exist from those who are
not quite so enamoured with Human Genome projects.
Contentment is a very difficult thing for humans to
come to grips with, and this is doubly so in the area of
scientific technology. The same forces that drive any
acquisition also drive the desire to know more about rDNA.
There is a certain ambition or even lust which fuels the
rDNA process; an ambition to be first. There is also a
pride of ownership which goes along with being the first to
discover something, which in itself is not wrong, but has in
the past, been the cause of forgetting to use common sense.
The point is rather that unless our dispo
sitions toward power are worthy ones, and un-
^ Congress, O.T.A., "Mapping Our Genes:," 85-86.
Congress, O.T.A., "Mapping Our Genes:". 85-86.
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less the needs to limit and to distribute
power are clear, the new technologies will be
fueled by the lust for power and then fuel
the pride of power, until the biological
revolution has quietly and unwittingly caused
a political revolution without a bullet being
fired- The issue is what kind of society do
we want to be and to become .
While Verhey may have worded this a bit harshly, the politi
cal revolution to which he refers is very probable and in
some senses, is the point of this section.
As with everything in which they are involved, comput
ers make many tasks much easier and quicker to perform.
Such is also the case in rDNA. However, the speed and
complexity which computers provide, and the number of people
and research centers which are involved in the whole rDNA
process will provide many problems. "The complexity of the
new genetic technology, the magnitude of its implications,
and the pace of its development combine to make a thorough
societal understanding seem almost unattainable.""* The
speed with which all of this information is being discovered
and the way that the information is being discovered, not in
cohesive, contiguous wholes, but rather bit by bit makes any
complete assimilation and understanding of the information
most difficult.
There are several consequences of this new information
that are going to pose ominous question which will demand
almost immediate answers, not the least of which is the
creation of new life forms. This problems ties very closely
with the problem of lust and pride identified earlier. "It
raises the specter, not of destroying life for technological
advance or profit, but of controlling life for personal or
Verhey, "The Morality of Genetic Engineering," 138.
Nolan and Swenson, "New Tools, New Dilemmas:" 45.
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corporate gain.""' While control of other people is not a
new game, the control of other people designed for no other
purpose is.
While creating new life forms may be an example of the
extremes of pride to which the human can extend, patenting
of new life forms would seem to be the ultimate hubris.
"One assumes that we would not permit the patenting of a
human clone, even if this meant patenting at the one-cell
level, because of the potential. . , . Unfortunately, short-
term profits rather than well-thought-out philosophical
principles are likely to dictate federal policy.""� The
U.S. Supreme Court has already been asked by the U.S. Patent
Office to rule on a patent application for a biological life
form."' "The long-range consequences of the Supreme
Court's decision are hard to foresee. Since the decision
was not based on biological features unique to bacteria, I
suppose that, as genetic engineering technology advances,
patents will be sought for higher forms of life-"'�� Then
it becomes very easy to progress from here into definite
blurring of the lines between class distinctions. The basic
question then becomes, "What is human and what is not hu-
"'
George J. Annas, "Life Forms: The Law and the Prof
its," The Hastings Center Report 8, no. 5 (October 1978):
22.
"�
Annas, "Life Forms:" 22.
"' "On June 16, 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in a
five-to-four decision, that "a live human-made micro-organ
ism is patentable subject matter" under �101 of Title 35 of
the United States Code, the patent law. . . .
In the majority decision, delivered by Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, the Court emphasized that it saw its task
as the "narrow one of determining what Congress meant by the
words it used in the statute; once that is done our powers
are exhausted." Taken from The Hastings Center Report, 10
no. 5 (October 1980) 10.
Key Dismukes, "Life is Patently Not Human-Made,
"
TY>o westings Center Report 10, no. 5 (October 1980): 12.
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man?" The logical end of this is that most likely, at some
point in the future, there is going to be a court case
asking for patent rights on a life form that is, for all
intents and purposes, human.
There are other smaller areas too numerous to mention
in which rDNA technology is going to change organisms and
people, both in their manner of existence, appearance and
function. This section is more concerned with people as a
whole and the projected ways in which rDNA is going to
change them.
It was noted in the first chapter that humanity was
created by God to be uniquely and qualitatively different
from the rest of created nature. The possibility exists
that this differentiation is going to be tested and possibly
threatened by rDNA technology. "Part of what is at stake in
the biological revolution is our image of ourselves in
relation to nature. One perspective sets us over against
nature, controlling and possessing it for the sake of human
well-being. Another perspective would set us in nature,
exercising stewardship over it for the sake of the well-
being of the whole creation. What sort of persons are we
meant to be and to become?"'*" If and when genetic tech
nology and techniques become standard procedure and the
similarity between organic DNA patterns and human DNA pat
terns are viewed, it is going to be much more difficult for
humanity to see itself as unique from the rest of the cre
ation.
Current discoveries in gene splicing--like
the new knowledge associated with Copernicus
and Darwin--further dethrone human beings as
the unique center of the universe. By iden
tifying DNA and learning how to manipulate
it, science seems to have reduced people to a
set of malleable molecules that can be inter
changed with those of species that people
2" Verhey, "The Morality of Genetic Engineering," 136.
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regard as inferior. Yet unlike the earlier
revolutionary discoveries, those in molecular
biology are not merely descriptions; they
give scientists vast powers for action.""
As is obvious, there are already a small camp of individuals
who are thinking very specifically in these terms, ie. that
humanity is not so different from the rest of creation.
"The genetic material of mice and men is so similar -- more
than 90 percent of it identical � that scientists in search
of human disease genes often find them first by looking in
laboratory mice. . . . It's healthy for human beings to know
that we aren't somehow different and apart and special," Dr.
Roderick said."'"' In some senses this might be healthy,
but in other senses it is definitely not healthy- If we see
ourselves as a small part of the whole, maybe we will begin
to look after each other and the planet in a more steward
like manner. On the other hand, if we don't foster a view
of ourselves as intrinsically different, we will have few
qualms about treating each other the same way in which we
treat mice.
The comparison is not limited to mice. For decades,
the idea of evolution has attempted to link humanity with
the primates in some type of ancestral bond. Present esti
mates rate the total percentage difference between human DNA
and primate DNA at around five percent. In other words,
when the DNA of humans and primates is compared, ninety-five
percent of the base pairs would appear to be the same.
What should be coming clear in this is the power of
genetic technology to change the thinking of mankind.
"There is the fact that powerful technologies do not just
Shannon, Bioethics: 401.
'" J. E. Ferrel, "From Mice to Men," [Atlanta 1 Journal-
Constitution, 22 Jan. 1991, n.a.
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change what human beings can do, they change the very way we
think�especially about ourselves."'"*
In times past, humankind thought of itself as in some
way nobler than the rest of creation. At times this think
ing has progressed into an arrogance of attitude that has
been a disservice to everyone and everything concerned.
However, this current trend will contribute to a decline in
people's considerations of themselves.
We have paid some high prices for the tech
nological conquest of nature, but none per
haps so high as the intellectual and spiritu
al costs of seeing nature as mere material
for our manipulation, exploitation and trans
formation. With the powers for biological
engineering now gathering, there will be
splendid new opportunities for a similar
degradation of our view of man. Indeed, we
are already witnessing the erosion of our
idea of man as something splendid or divine,
as a creature with freedom and dignity. And
clearly, if we come to see ourselves as meat,
then meat we shall become.'"'
What may have gone unrealized to this point in time is the
fact that by engineering future offspring, in some measure,
their sense of freedom is razed, for how could they be
expected to return to a pre-engineered state. While it is
unlikely that future societies will take offense at attempts
to alleviate the suffering caused by genetic diseases, any
rDNA which goes beyond therapeutic use can only be deemed a
limitation of future society's options.
If in designing our descendants we succeeded
in designing people who possessed just those
traits that I have described, we should have
contrived for ourselves descendants who would
be unable, by virtue of those very traits, to
adopt manipulative, bureaucratic modes of
'�* Annas, "Who's Afraid of the Human Genome?" 20.
'�^ Leon R. Kass, "Making Babies� the New Biology and
the 'Old' Morality," The Public Interest, (Winter, 1972):
53-54.
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planning. What we would have done is to
design descendants whose virtues would be
such that they would be quite unwilling in
turn to design their descendants. We should
in fact have brought our own project of de
signing descendants to an end.'�*
There is one piece of knowledge that will stem the
downward spiral of mankind's denigration of itself, and that
would be a proper understanding of image of God in humanity.
What can not be lost sight of is both the individuality and
the oneness contained within the human race. To reduce an
individual's identity to her/his genetic code is a grave
injustice to the uniqueness of the individual . To continue
to do so would erect an ominous barrier to the progression
of humanity and would also do severe damage to the dignity
of humankind.'"' Ultimately, the identification of this
uniqueness and individuality will continue to be displayed
in society's willingness to continue looking after the
defenseless and the infirmed.
Some would attempt to argue that perhaps the better
part of valour would be to simply walk away from genetic
engineering all together and avoid the ensuing problems.
There may be many even within the faith community who would
feel this way. One of the most often repeated commands in
the New Testament is to look after the widows and the or
phans. It must then be asked, "Is it so different to allow
the curing of some disease through the insertion of a
healthy chromosome?"
So Christians are rightly noted for their
care of persons whose quality of life pre
vents them from participating in the main
stream of society. . . . If it were possible
to alter the present condition of persons by
inserting into their bodies an enzyme bearing
Alasdair Maclntyre, "Seven Traits for the Future, "
The Hastings Center Report 9, no. 1 (February 1979): 7.
'"^ Schotsmans, "Brave New World within Reach?" 102.
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a healthy chromosome, should the faith commu
nity oppose such a hope for life restored to
its true intention? Presumably not.'"�
While quality of life is a relative and subjective categori
zation of human activity, there is a point at which Chris
tianity should allow rDNA in order to effect a cure.
As attention turns from how to care for people at the
macro level, the feelings and desires of societies begin to
enter the discussion. There are several scenarios, some of
which are more popular than others, that have arisen and
been discussed in several different forums which will be
used here as a type of guide by which to measure the way
society is viewing individuals.
The first scenario was the earliest and perhaps the
most outlandish. Perhaps it more than any other served to
frighten people away from wanting anything to do with rDNA.
That is the possibility of hybrids, both human and non-
human. That is the recombining of human DNA with that of
some other species; ie. perhaps a muscle hormone from chee
tahs in order to produce endurance. Some of the awful
feelings that one feels at this thought may be due to the
Old Testament prohibition against bestiality, but the revul
sion is much deeper than simply sexual prohibitions. This
could relate back to the degradation of humanity which was
spoken of earlier. In all probability, because of this Old
Testament command, humanity has always considered itself to
be somewhat higher than any other created being or sub
stance. The question then becomes,
could genetic engineering be used to develop
a group of virtual slaves--partly human,
partly lower animal--to do people's bidding?
Paradoxically, the very characteristics that
would make such creatures more valuable than
any existing animals (that is, their height
ened cognitive powers and sensibilities)
'"^ Snyder, "Theological Reflections on Genetic Engi
neering,
" 213 .
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would also make the moral propriety of their
subservient role more problematic. Dispas
sionate appraisal of the long history of
gratuitous destruction and suffering that
humanity has visited upon the other inhabit
ants of the earth indicates that such con
cerns should not be dismissed as fanci
ful.""
Another way in which rDNA has affected society and
people has to do with what has come to be known as voluntary
screening. This is also a big part of the next issue that
will be raised, but should be dealt with separately.
Screening for any single disease, or combination of diseas
es, both prenatally and otherwise, is going to be a growing
issue as DNA probes and tests for more diseases increase.
Candace Gauthier notes that "a screening program may be
mandatory in regard to provision, but still be voluntary in
regard to participation."'" While her statement is true
enough, nevertheless, in a health care economy such as is
developing in the United States and Canada, there is no
guarantee that mandatory testing would not become a prereq
uisite for reception of welfare support or ability (regard
less of ability to pay) to purchase health insurance. The
place that this testing may enter into its greatest contro
versy is in the workplace.
Screening in the workplace involves many peripheral
issues that hammer at some long held fundamental beliefs
about the way in which western society was founded and has
operated for a few hundred years.
In particular, current pressures to cur
tail spiraling employee healthcare costs
could tempt employers to rely on genetic
'predictors' to guide hiring decisions.
Legislation designed to protect the handi
capped may discourage such abuses, but it is
"" Shannon, Bioethics: 403.
'" Gauthier, "The Impact of Recombinant DNA Technology
on Genetic Screening," 39.
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less certain how courts (and others) would
respond to discrimination claims if screening
led not to exclusion from employment, but to
coercion of affected workers into 'wellness
plans' or the establishment of sliding-scale
contributions to insurance pools.'"
Obviously, issues of privacy, coercion, possibly even black
mail and fraud will be focal points, all of which could be
used by companies as defenses against high reimbursement
costs and legal action by former employees.
Almost inseparably bound up in this is third party
interest in the results of such screening. Insurance compa
nies are the most obviously interested in the outcome of
such testing, but they should not over-shadow other family
members and employers. The most likely reason for both
insurance companies and employers wanting such information
is, as mentioned above, in order to adjust premium sched
ules. While these types of decisions may be somewhat easier
to make, it is not this easy when it comes to the desires of
other family members. It will be more difficult to turn
away a son or a daughter who is inquiring about the future
well-being of the parent who has been genetically probed and
tested positive for Huntington's disease. However, in all
of these cases, the needs of the patient could, but should
not be subordinated to the desires of the company, family,
or possibly even society.'"
A sidebar to this that continues to reflect on the
changes wrought on society by genetic technology, is the
question of prior knowledge versus chronic costs. In other
words, if a genetic probe provides a positive result for the
existence of some genetic disease, should the state be
required to provide care for free or nominal cost, or should
211 Nolan and Swenson, "New Tools, New Dilemmas:" 44
'" Lappe, "The Predictive Power of the New Genetics,"
18-19.
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the state be able to charge a pre-payment or some type of
tax? To do so would appear to be a regressive move, but the
state of the nation is that no one can afford to pay for
ongoing chronic illnesses.'"
To get a little closer to the heart of the matter, but
from a different angle, there are the effects of genetic
probes in the first place.
A 'positive' gene test, say, for manic de
pressive illness, provides an ineradicable
marker of deviance with potentially lifelong
social consequences to the affected individu
al .
From a societal perspective, a gene probe
for manic depression may be seen as akin to
AIDS antibody testing: in both instances,
testing leads to the uncovering of a marker
of varying prognostic value but substantial
risk of social stigmatization.
This whole scenario was played out in an earlier decade in
what came to be known as "The Boston XYY Case."'" In the
cases and hearings subsequent to the testing, evidence was
offered of exclusion, ridicule, and antagonism against not
only the individual in question but also the family-
Voluntarism was spoken of early in connection with
genetic screening, which is admirable, but the possibility
stands that if genetic testing becomes as reliable as its
proponents believe it will, it may not continue to be an
option. "If genetic engineering and related reproductive
technologies enable a marked reduction of genetic defects
and the burden they impose on their victims and on societal
'" Lappe, "The Predictive Power of the New Genetics,"
18-19.
'" Lappe, "The Limits of Genetic Inquiry," 7.
'" Cf. fn. 91 above.
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resources . . . mandatory genetic treatments may be advocat
ed.
An evaluation of the effects of rDNA on people and
society becomes the bottom line in an enquiry of this na
ture. Two possibly unanswerable questions in relation to
rDNA are the following: 1) Is it possible that the potential
harms exceed the potential benefits? 2) Does society really
possess the moral depth to provide answers to questions
which need to be answered immediately? Further, any type of
gene therapy be it somatic or gametic, invokes the following
trio of questions: 1) Who decides 2) Who receives 3) What
genes?'"
This bottom line also needs to be asked in a broader
context which Allen Verhey does repeatedly in his article.
He states.
The point is that if our confusion about the
appropriate dispositions toward our own chil
dren can [137-138] fuel the use and abuse of
genetic engineering, then I suggest that our
confusion about the appropriate dispositions
toward the retarded and weak and stigmatized
children can further fuel the use and abuse
of such engineering. . . . The issue is what
kind of society we want to be and to become,
a society which cares for and nurtures its
so-called "defective" children or a society
which cannot tolerate them or allow them
existence.'"
Paul Schotsmans provides a picture of hope which the faith
community is called to provide to a lost and hurting world.
He speaks of the ability to suffer that many Christians
through the ages have demonstrated. However, the suffering
'" Shannon, Bioethics : , 411.
'" Anderson, "Human Gene Therapy:" 686-687.
Verhey, "The Morality of Genetic Engineering," 137-
8.
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that will be introduced into this world through genetics is
a suffering of a different sort.
Finally it remains a powerful challenge to a
society inspired by Christianity to teach
people how to cope with suffering and handi
cap. Up till now this question has above all
been referred to one's own suffering and
one's own handicap. Without falling into the
excesses of a mystique of suffering, Chris
tianity has always tried to be present to and
with the person who is suffering. Now genet
ics puts before us a different experience of
suffering and one apparently much more diffi
cult to bear: Can I impose this on my
child?'""
In conclusion and from a book with a very providential
title, C. S. Lewis states that at some point man's powers
and capabilities will reach a zenith, after which they will
be such no more. He states, "What we call Man's power over
nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over
others with Nature as its instrument.""" He continues a
couple of pages later.
If any one age really attains, by eugenics
and scientific education, the power to make
its descendants what it pleases, all men who
live after it are patients of that power.
They are weaker, not stronger: for though we
may have put wonderful machines in their
hands we have pre-ordained how they are to
use them .... The real picture is that of
one dominant age . . . which resists all
previous ages most successfully and dominates
all subsequent ages most irresistibly, and
thus is the real master of the human species.
But even within this master generation (it
self an infinitesimal minority of the spe
cies) the power will be exercised by a minor
ity smaller still. Man's conquest of Nature,
if the dreams of the scientific planners are
'" Schotsmans, "Brave New World within Reach?", 102.
C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Collier
Books, 1962), 69.
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realized, means the rule of a few hundreds of
men over billions upon billions of men,""'
Obviously, people as a whole and society will be deeply
affected by the genetic technology and rDNA. The potential
power which rDNA engineering will possess will make all
previous scientific discoveries weak by comparison. The
effects which rDNA will have on how humanity views itself,
how individuals view other people, and on the relationships
in the workplace will be changed forever. It appears that
rDNA is going to accentuate the class differences in societ
ies around the globe like no other previous scientific
discovery. It is only common sense to implore those doing
the work to use diligent caution. They are working with
human constitutional matters.
Moral Views of the Future
This rally cry to caution has been echoed over and over
during the past fifteen to twenty years. Almost every
article that is written from any point of view ends by
imploring those in control of the research, ie, the budget
people and those doing the actual research, to be extremely
careful about what projects are undertaken. Western society
is deluding itself if it believes that the National Insti
tutes of Health and/or the Department Of Energy wield abso
lute power and control over rDNA research. There are cer
tain levels of anxiety raised by these possibilities. A
certain measure of comfort could be felt if it could be
absolutely guaranteed that all rDNA research would remain
within the confines of NIH/DOE research centers. Guarantees
are not in the realm of possibility when it comes to these
types of matters. Nuclear and biological weapons have
proven this. RDNA research is going to have profound ef
fects on humanity and the ways in which it thinks about and
faces the future.
Lewis, 70-71,
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Clearly, in many of the scenarios of ge
netic engineering, various forms of gene
therapy, and birth technologies that are
being proposed and developed, there is a
vision of a particular future. This future,
obviously, is based on certain values, pref
erences, and choices. At some point we need
to ask ourselves whether this is the future
that we want and is this a future that will
respect and enhance the rights of those who
live in that future,'"
Of all of the questions which may need to be asked on an
ongoing, evaluative basis, this is one of the most impor
tant. This is in no way similar to the building of a space
station, wherein, if something goes wrong, regrettably, a
few astronauts may lose their lives, but the project can
still be walked away from without further damage. Unlike
other so-called mega-projects, an rDNA experiment is com
pleted and instantly active. The effects will most likely
be permanent, and worse, may not manifest themselves for
years or perhaps decades.
The difficult question then becomes, "Who should be
held accountable now for the future?" Obviously, no person
or group of persons can be expected to predict how certain
discoveries are going to affect days yet to come. However,
the scientists and others involved in the actual processes
need to be reminded of the seriousness of their activities.
Scientists cannot utterly ignore the likely
uses of their discoveries. Since the mar
riage of science and technology in the mid-
1800 's, we have understood that knowledge
equals power. But we have not always admit
ted that power can be used for evil as well
as good. Social scientific work on attitude
change and persuasion has been used more for
commercial and political manipulation of
public opinion than for any morally sound
purpose. We cannot reasonably require scien
tists to anticipate all likely consequences
'" Thomas A, Shannon, What Are Thev Saying About Genet
ic Engineering? (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 7,
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of their work. That would be impossible.
But scientists and society at large are well
advised to try to anticipate the most likely
uses of new developments, and to judge the
desirability of their impact.'"
In too many instances, the greed or the pride mentioned
earlier takes over and the process is developed regardless
of how compelling the arguments "against proceeding really
are. In a newspaper article, the reporter quotes a hospital
official from Cincinnati's Good Samaritan Hospital as saying
that before the hospital decided to establish
the facility, officials thought about the
ethical concerns -- questions about the pos
sibility of altering genetic makeup or wheth
er tests so conclusive could lead to selec
tive abortions if parents-to-be don't like
their fetus' genetic profile.
But this is the future of diagnostic medi
cine," he said. "We just had to go with the
idea that we need this knowledge."*
This is not to say that genetic engineering should be re
sisted in totality, but rather that the hard questions need
to be asked and adequately answered without undue economic,
political or commercial influence. The Presidential Commis
sion "...also emphasized that human beings have not merely
the right but the duty to employ their God-given powers to
harness nature for human benefit. To turn away from gene
splicing, which may provide a means of curing hereditary
diseases, would itself raise serious ethical problems.""'
There is much more that needs to be discussed in the
specific areas differing views of nature, the development
and use of technology, and the views and hopes of the fu
ture. They have been touched on here in an effort to try
Murray, "The Social Context of Workplace Screening,"
23.
Jane Prendergast, "Diagnosis faster with DNA,"
Cincinnati (Ohio) Enquirer, 7 Jan. 1991, n.a.
'" Shannon, Bioethics : , 401-402.
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and show the accumulated effect which they all have on
humanity's view of itself.
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CHAPTER 4
Contemporary Views of the Image
It is finally necessary to draw the two, seemingly non-
convergent lines of this discussion together. Part One was
an examination of a Biblical view of the image and two
related commands. It was discovered that the image of God
is inherent in simply being a human being. It could not
have occurred to the Biblical writer that much later readers
may have benefitted from a more detailed description of what
is contained in the phrase "image of God in man". This of
course assumes that a more detailed description would really
be of benefit. In the day that the first Biblical accounts
of hxomankind were made verbal, there was no existing concep
tion that mankind could be reduced to less than the whole.
The second line of discussion has proven to be a very
reductionistic view of humankind. Both the scientific and
medical views of humanity, have in the past, operated in an
isolationist, piecemeal manner. The technology that has
been the focus of this chapter is capable of serving either
the Biblical model or the reductionist style of thinking.
There arises, in other words, a mutually
critical juxtaposition of tradition and con
temporary experience. It is in the middle of
this critical juxtaposition that really cre
ative theology occurs. And because contempo
rary experience continues to unfold with
time, theology always has new reflective
tasks and potential for significant new in
sight."*
Tradition on the side of theology and contemporary experi
ence are often at fundamental odds over each others views of
the world and humanity. It is at this critical juxtaposi
tion that the focus of this thesis has placed us. Theology
has to be able to intersect with the new technology and
provide a unified concept of the image of God in man which
Cole-Turner, "Genetic Engineering:," 69.
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will satisfy both theological and scientific definitions, or
risk losing its credibility as the valid worldview.
This may make it sound like theology and the contempo
rary world always collide at right angles, which is not
necessarily the case. There are occasions when Biblical and
non-Biblical definitions and understandings will coincide.
In other words, utilitarian and consequent ial ist thought
patterns may invoke exactly the same processes and desired
outcomes as will Biblically oriented thinking. Concerns
have been voiced "...over unintended effects, over the
morality of genetic manipulation in all its forms, and over
the social and political conseguences of new technologies by
both religious and secular commentators.""' It is the
fact that these concerns are being voiced from a variety of
philosophically and theologically based camps that should
serve to emphasize the seriousness of these concerns.
The most popular phrase in the attack against gene
manipulators by anti-genetic lobbies has been the accusation
that they are "playing God." In reference to the phrase,
"playing God", the Presidential Commission makes the follow
ing statement: "At its heart, the term represents a reac
tion to the realization that human beings are on the thresh
old of understanding how the fundamental machinery of life
works. ... In this view, playing God is not actually an
objection to the research but an expression of a sense of
awe�and concern.""� Due to the opening phrase, the com
mission statement is true, however, the majority of times
that the phrase is invoked, it possesses an accusative tone
towards the people and processes involved.
Among theologians, there are as many differing views on
the field of genetic engineering as there are basic theolog-
'" Shannon, ed., Bioethics, 400.
Shannon, ed., Bioethics. 400-401.
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ical camps. Those with a more fundamental point of view
would strongly advise that genetic engineering of any type
should be left alone. "They regard any manipulation or
modification of the body and its natural functions as sin
ful. For some, this means no blood transfusions or surgical
interventions; for others, no deviation from normal conjugal
intercourse for procreation, no contraception, no modifica
tion of genes in human tissues.""' These hard-liners are
not necessarily confined to any one denomination and can be
found in both Roman Catholicism and biblical Protestantism.
There may be some correlation between this "hard-line"
view and the writings and views of the rabbis. Benjamin
Freedman has written an article comparing the rabbinic
commentaries on the Levitical passages forbidding inter
species reproduction and the new rDNA technology. In con
cluding this article, which is an over-view of the Rabbinic
interpretations of Leviticus 19:19, Freedman summarizes
Rabbi Halevy's position.
Recombinant DNA research which is thera
peutically directed--as in its recent success
in manufacturing human insulin, or in those
attempts to prevent genetic disease through
genetic manipulat ion--is permitted, as being
considered 'healing'. But attempts to im
prove the species through this technique--
which clearly could not be considered 'heal
ing' --or other instances of research motivat
ed by pure curiosity, are forbidden.
"�
In continuing to summarize Halevy, Freedman notes that the
realm of science very often professes to use a unique lan
guage and is indeed working on understanding a new language
which may put them in another category in relation to the
229 J. Robert Nelson, "Genetics and Theology: A
Complementarity?" The Christian Century April 20 (1988):
388.
"� Benjamin Freedman, "Leviticus and DNA: A Very Old
Look at a Very New Problem" Journal of Religious Ethics 8,
no. 1, (1980): 112.
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rest of society. He notes from Gen. 11:6, "now nothing will
be withholden from them, which they purpose to do." This
line may hold more truth now than when it was first spoken.
There is another more liberal interpretation of the
uses and applications of science and the limits that should
be placed upon the scientific community- More permissive
theologians would embrace a more utilitarian or consequen-
tialist way of thinking.
They accept any application of genetic and
medical technology so long as desires are
fulfilled and the benefit outweighs the harm
to individuals, classes or society as a
whole. For some this stance can allow exter
nal methods of fertilization; for others ex
perimentation with embryos and still-living
aborted fetuses; for others, euthanasia for
genetically disabled infants, the comatose or
senile; and voluntary suicide. The hard
liners practice a deontological ethics--stre-
ssing deon, or duty. The soft-liners prac
tice libertarianism."'
Thus, while some people cannot see the use of trying to
make any connection between theology and science, others
will go to the opposite extreme. It is apparent that Ronald
Cole-Turner should be placed in this latter category.
If we believe, as many contemporary Chris
tians do, that God has used these same natu
ral processes over billions of years of evo
lution, and that through these processes God
has created, then we must ask what, theologi
cally speaking, we are doing. As creatures
of evolution itself, we now direct a tiny
fragment of evolution's processes toward our
own purposes or intent. If God indeed has
created through these very processes, and if
divine intent has been working itself out
through them and continues (creatio continua)
J. Robert Nelson, "Genetics and Theology: A
Complementarity?" The Christian Century April 20 (1988):
388-389 .
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even now, then how are we to understand our
role?""'
It should be obvious that the hard-liners would prefer
to read only the Bible while the libertarians would prefer
to read primarily contemporary journals and magazines. The
most probable course left is one of correlation, "...not a
correlation by deduction from a divine edict but a corre
lation between religious teaching and the empirical data;
for example, between books on genetics and the Book of
Genesis. "'"
It is at precisely this point that this thesis has
attempted to intervene. It seems apparent that beginning
with and coming to a more Biblical understanding of the
image of God in humanity would serve to provide a more
unified approach and interpretation by theologians as to the
uses and abuses of genetic technology and engineering.
Though some religious people may believe that theology
and genetics are contradictory, that belief is neither
"necessary" nor true. We must recognize instead that genet
ics and theology provide different kinds of data, in differ
ent dimensions of cognition, which are ultimately complemen
tary. Genetic science is opening new vistas for understand
ing, but it will remain insufficient without the insights of
faith and theology.""*
It is at this point that the National Council of
Churches has published a belief statement in relation to
creation. It is a good beginning statement for a Christian
view of genetic engineering. It was adopted by the Govern
ing Board in May, 1986, and affirms some fundamental tenets.
"' Ronald Cole-Turner, "Genetic Engineering: Our Role
in Creation," The New Faith-Science Debate, ed. John M.
Mangum (Minneapolis: Augsburg-Fortress, 1989), 71.
"' Nelson, "Genetics and Theology:," 388-89.
"* Nelson, "Genetics and Theology:," 389.
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"Creation by divine power is not static but dynamic and
ongoing. As creatures uniquely made in God's image and with
purpose, humans participate in the creative process through
the continuing quest for knowledge, which now includes
unraveling and learning to control the intricate powers
compressed in genes of DNA molecules.""' This statement
seems to place some limits on the power of evolution which
Cole-Turner so willingly accepts.
There are two major issues that are going to run
throughout this section. They are aspects of the central
issue of the redesigning of humanity. They concern some of
the fundamental truths of the Christian tradition which
would appear to be under attack by genetic research and
discoveries. The first of these has to do with the concept
of the uniqueness of the human being.
It was revealed above that genetic discoveries have
shown that all DNA material contains about 90% of the same
information, and in the comparative case of primates and
humans, this factor rises to about 95%. Many Christians
immediately assume that either something is wrong with the
figures or the uniqueness of God's ultimate creation has
been empirically disproved. "But the discovery of genetic
identities between human cells and those of most other
organisms does not negate the distinctiveness of human
beings. Rather, it shows how the infinite creative power
has used these marvelous mechanisms to fashion us as we
are.""* Such information, rather than proving dishearten
ing, should serve to remind us of the infinite creative
powers that designed this creation in the first place and
can create as much difference as there is between humans and
primates using only five percent of the given DNA material.
"^ Cole-Turner, "Genetic Engineering:," 71.
"* Nelson, "Genetics and Theology:," 389.
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In a series of articles over a period of several years,
Joseph Fletcher, a theologian/philosopher from the Universi
ty of Virginia describes and later debates with others on a
definition of humanhood, as he labeled it. In the prelimi
nary article he outlines fifteen positive and five negative
criteria that he presupposes as a start to the discussion on
the "Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of
Man. "'^' As Fletcher anticipates, the discussion carries
on for several years through different issues of The
Hastings Center Report before it was finally suspended in
the final issue of 1974. In the end, out of a total list of
twenty criteria, Fletcher defends neo-cortical function as
the fundamental sign of humanness. After affirming the need
for self -awareness and socially interactive capabilities, he
states,
I still want to reason that their key indi
cators are only factors at all because of my
key criterion--cerebral function. Is this
not an issue to be carefully weighed. . . .
To Professor Tooley and Father McCormick I
would say, 'Neocortical death means that both
self -consciousness and other-orientedness are
gone, whereas neither non-self -consciousness
nor inability to relate to others means the
end of neocortical activity.'"�
In the same article, he clarifies further.
As far as I can yet see, I will stand by
my own thesis or hypothesis that neocortical
function is the key to humanness, the essen
tial trait, the human sine qua non. . . .
Only this trait or capability is necessary to
all of the other traits which go into the
fullness of humanness. Therefore this indi
cator, neocortical function, is the first-
"' Joseph Fletcher, "Indicators of Humanhood: A Tenta
tive Profile of Man", The Hastings Center Report, 2, no. 5,
(November, 1972): 1-4.
"^ Joseph Fletcher, "Four Indicators of Humanhood - The
Enquiry Matures", The Hastings Center Report, 4, no. 6,
(December, 1974): 7.
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order requirement and the key to the defini
tion of a human being."'
While obvious arguments could be raised against many of
the twenty criteria that Fletcher lists, space will afford
dealing only with neocortical function. It must be noted
that Fletcher does not stipulate that neocortical function
is the sum total of humanhood, only that it is the first and
minimal requirement for any other indicators of personhood
to exist. However, neocortical function is a fairly high
function level of the brain activity and consequently rules
out many individuals who suffer from encephalitis and other
diseases which leave an individual in a "vegetative state" .
Thus, these individuals are no longer considered fully human
by Fletcher's definition.
The second issue which confronts any theologian facing
the technology of rDNA is that of free will. If the genetic
code of an individual is so predictive of disease, is the
free will of the individual hampered or undermined? Some
geneticists are positing the notion that an individual's
genetic endowment may predispose them to manic depression,
schizophrenia and possibly even morally disapproved behav
iour such as indecent exposure. If geneticists should
actually be able to prove a link between DNA and behavioural
actions, then theological understandings of free will and
moral responsibility become an issue.'*"
The trends of modern life are working to
erode one of the glories of being human: free
will. "Free will is often inefficient, often
inconvenient, and always undependable . That
is the character of freedom. We value it in
men. We disparage it in machines and domes
tic animals. Our technology has given us
dependable machines and livestock. We shall
'" Fletcher, "Four Indicators," 6.
J. Robert Nelson, "Genetics and Theology: A
Complementarity?" The Christian Century April 20 (1988):
389-
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now have to choose whether to turn it to
giving us more reliable, efficient, and
convenient men, at the cost of our freedom.
We had better decide now for we are already
not as free as we once were, and we can
lose piecemeal from within what we would be
quick to defend in a frank attack from with
out."'*'
It is becoming increasingly apparent that human actions
are not as isolated as was once believed. This is probably
most obvious in the connections which are now being made
between previously unquestioned waste disposal and current,
more obvious links with environmental problems. It is also
evidenced in the scientific connections which have been made
between such factors as the mother's actions and habits
during pregnancy, long term environmental exposure, sensory
and educational input, and individual personal development
which are all proving to have a great deal more to do with
the manifestation of disease and the degree of its severity
than was previously expected. Thus, because of these proven
environmental factors, "...it is possible to maintain a
biblical view of human freedom and responsibility while
acknowledging the power and significance of genetic cod
ing."'*'
There is a finer point that should be illuminated
having to do with the human capacity for objectivity. This
ability to objectify one's self and one's goals is used as a
starting point for endorsing the re-design of the human
genome. "If there is anything natural about us, it is the
ability we have as persons to objectify our characteristics
as human and to inventory their benefits and drawbacks. Far
from human nature being sacrosanct, this ability would
'*' Caryl Rivers, "Genetic Engineering Portends a Grave
New World,
" In Human Genetics: Readings on the Implications
of Genetic Engineering, ed. Thomas R. Mertens, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, (1975): 14.
'^' Nelson, "Genetics and Theology:," 389.
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appear to call us to reflect regarding revising and remaking
ourselves.'"" This statement stands parallel with the
general western consensus regarding our role in nature as
overlords rather than stewards. "In seeing ourselves as
objects, we then raise for ourselves the moral problem of
all creators, namely, to create prudently and respons
ibly. "'**
This ability to see ourselves as objects is evidence of
the degree to which humankind possesses its true identity as
image bearers of God. This objectifying ability makes it
possible to reflect on our shortcomings providing sufficient
reasons for re-creation. While the truth of this object
ifying capability is not to be denied since it is part of
the image of God in humanity, it is being turned to a new
use, that of eliminating any external needs, infringements
on freedom and impairment of abilities, and positioning
hiimanity at the ultimate pinnacle of creation.
Furthermore, the complication again arises as to whose
prudence and responsibility is to be trusted in a matter of
the magnitude of the redesigning of the human genome. "The
possibility of genetic engineering recalls to our attention
the inescapable fact that in being self -reflective individu
als, we are always potentially recreators of ourselves.
Genetic engineering opens up in physical reality possibili
ties that were always available in reflection."'*' In the
same section of the article that these last quotes are taken
from, Engelhardt refers to the "possibility of persons
remaking their bodies in the image and likeness of their
goals."'** The implication of such a possibility is that
'*^ Engelhardt, Jr. "Persons and Humans:," 286.
'** Engelhardt, Jr. "Persons and Humans:," 293.
'*' Engelhardt, Jr. "Persons and Humans:," 293.
'** Engelhardt, Jr., "Persons and Humans:," 293.
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one's personal goals are of absolute and primary importance.
Consequently, he calls on "the canons of prudence and care,
since there is nothing sacrosanct about the particular
deliverances of evolution, which we find currently in human
nature," to guide the re-creation process.'*'
From his argioment, it is possible to decipher that: 1)
nothing is more valuable than one's own goals; 2) one's only
responsibility in this task is prudence and care; and 3)
there is nothing particularly special about the human indi
vidual as s/he presently exists. The discussion and conclu
sions of our first chapter must be recalled here.
Engelhardt assumes that the gift/ability of creativity has
unlimited bounds; anything is open for re-creation through
the creative capabilities of humankind. The questions that
must now be asked are: 1) whose goals become the ultimate
goals and take precedence in the design process? and 2) Does
individual prudence and care provide enough responsibility
in tasks of this size?
As the final and most difficult question comes into
view, the acknowledgement must be made that a clear and
concise answer is likely not possible in this composition.
In its simplest form, the question may be asked thus, "When
is an engineered human no longer a human in the image of
God?" In ages past, the task of differentiating a human
being from any other species was quite simple and easy.
Technology is blurring these once clear distinctions.
While Joseph Fletcher, et al , raise arguments for the
disbarring of certain less than functional individuals,
there are arguments being raised at the bacterial end of the
biological spectrum for the existence of new forms of life.
The possibility is very real that this is the tip of the
iceberg or the "slippery slope" on the way to creating
human- like life forms.
Engelhardt, Jr. "Persons and Humans:," 293.
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Ananda Chakrabarty is the biogeneticist who created a
bacteriological organism that exists by consuming crude oil.
Such an organism would prove invaluable in the clean-up of
tanker oil spills at sea and elsewhere, assuming that the
organism doesn't prove harmful to the environment either
prior to or subseguent to its intended usage. The storm
arose when he applied to the U.S. Customs and Patent Office
for patent rights over this new life form. The Patent
Office Court of Appeals denied the application, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court awarded the patent on the basis of its
technical reading of the patent act.
Some have since argued that "new life form" is a falla
cious identification of the entire situation.
Ananda Chakrabarty did not create a new form
of life; he merely intervened in the normal
processes by which strains of bacteria ex
change genetic information, to produce a new
strain with an altered metabolic pattern.
"His" bacterium lives and reproduces itself
under the forces that guide all cellular
life. We are incalculably far away from
being able to create life de novo, and for
that I am profoundly grateful . The argument
that the bacterium is Chakrabarty ' s handiwork
and not nature's wildly exaggerates human
power and displays the same hubris and igno
rance of biology that have had such devastat
ing impact on the ecology of our planet.'*�
It seems obvious that this whole scenario is the result of
the familiar/unfamiliar dialectic that was spoken of earli
er. Those who are familiar with the processes have less
fear of the result than those who are unfamiliar.
To some, the thought of patent ing- -that is,
giving the patent owner a monopoly over--life
forms seems inherently repugnant. Such re
pugnance seems to be based in part on amor
phous ethical considerations and in part on
qualms about giving anyone a monopoly over a
living organism. A short answer to this is
'*� Key Dismukes, "Life is Patently Not Human-Made," The
Hastings Center Report. 10, no. 5 (Oct. 1980): 11.
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that we now, as a result of purposeful legis
lation, permit the granting of patents on
some (botanical) forms of life.'"
There are likely very few who would oppose the verification
of the quantifiable difference between botanical forms of
life and biological "life forms." However, is the precedent
of the Supreme Court ruling in the Chakrabarty case going to
make it permissible to grant patents for genetically altered
organisms? If this is taken to the logical extreme, then
who is going to be the rightful patent holder of an "organ
ism" which is the result of one woman's egg, another man's
sperm and the geneticist's "handi-work" in the whole pro
cess? Granted that this final scenario may be many years
down the road, it is not inconceivable that Chakrabarty is
the crown of the "slippery slope".
The possibilities become endless with the advent of
rDNA, and each "break-through" creates whole classes of new
ethical dilemmas which were heretofore undreamt of. For
instance, who will have the patent right on an "organism"
whose intelligence quotient has been sufficiently lowered
(but in all other respects is "human") to the point where
unquestioning subservience is the end result? What will the
"human value" be of such an "organism"? When the task for
which the "organism" was designed is either completed or can
be accomplished by other means, how will the "organism" be
disposed of?
In light of the foregoing, it becomes more obvious that
the inroads which have been made by rDNA have come with a
speed that neither geneticists, economists, politicians, or
the public had expected.
The powerful new methods, expansive scope,
and accelerated pace of human molecular ge
netics combine to catapult us into ethically
'" Harold P. Green, "Chakrabarty: Tempest in a Test
Tube," The Hastings Center Report, 10, no. 5 (Oct. 1980):
13.
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unfamiliar territory. The molecular method
generates not simply diagnoses but presympto-
matic and contingent diagnoses. Its scope
potentially includes not only serious genetic
disease but also mild conditions and bother
some or unusual traits and characteristics.
And its pace threatens to outstrip our capac
ity to react sensibly to its implica
tions.""
The Chakrabarty case came before the public was ready to
debate such issues. It is likely that a "scratch human
being" will arrive on the scene before the public is again
ready to make ethical decisions about such processes and
existences .
The Genesis 1 account of the image makes it quite clear
that a major marker of humanity is free will, and that
humanity derives a certain measure of dignity from possess
ing free will. When any portion of that free will is in
fringed upon, then also a certain portion of the dignity is
diminished. Consequently, if the genetic code of an indi
vidual is 'adjusted' toward some specified end result, for
example, a decreased susceptibility to lung cancer so that
that individual might work in a situation where asbestos is
present, then that individual's free will and dignity is
being infringed upon through the limiting of their choices.
This limiting of choices is also a limitation of the indi
vidual to less than their original potential.
While this type of limitation may be no worse than the
limitations of parental pressure, educational choices, or
any of several other factors, it is not better and is still
to be regarded as an infringement of rights since it is not
necessarily in the persons best interests. If the example
offered is continued, it is not inconceivable that society
would then demand the choice limitations of this individual
to this specific position since s/he had already undergone
"� Nolan and Swenson, "New Tools, New Dilemmas:," 40.
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the procedure, in order not to waste the effort and expense
by a change of position or vocation in the future. The
ethical question which must be asked is, "Is it not better
ethically, economically and ecologically to eliminate the
necessity of the need for exposure to asbestos, in other
words, to adjust the situation, rather than adjusting the
individual, especially in light of the number of unknowns
associated with adjusting the individual in this manner?
What made the Gal li lean [Galilean] and the
other major scientific revolutions disturbing
is the reductionism, that we become less than
what we are. That is what is so uncertain
about gene therapy, because it gets back to a
very fundamental question. .." Is there any
thing unique about humans?""'
On the one hand, it is unlikely that parental pressures,
lack of educational choices, and other such factors will
invade the uniqueness of the individual . On the other hand
it is highly likely that costly and invasive rDNA procedures
will be used to coerce or even force an individual into a
limited set of circumstances. Just as there are positive
and negative forms of parental pressure and educational
opportunities, so there are going to be good and bad reasons
for performing rDNA procedures on an individual.
There are no single, discrete genes that code
the complex arrangements of proteins that
produce given human traits; and to manipulate
one is to change the original, fragile con
figuration in unforeseeable ways. But even
if such Promethean methods were developed in
the distant future, who would decide what
traits should be preferred? Who would decide
what makes a person a more fit specimen, and
under what idealized plan for human harmony
and well-being? What would be the criteria
for choosing alternatives that seem to some a
Shannon, Bioethics: . 421, note 11.
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social boon, to others a form of dehumaniza-
tion?'"
As has come up in countless other documents and arti
cles, the main by-word is caution in all aspects of rDNA
research and technology. Somatic gene therapy is laudable,
but still requires caution until the connection between
genes is more concretely deciphered. Gametic gene therapy
may also be laudable, but future generations need to be the
primary focus. They will be inheriting any changes which
are performed at this date. And there are strong possibili
ties that changes which are made now may not manifest any
side effects, either negative or positive for several gener
ations, at which point the problem may be magnified by
several thousand individuals. Design of any type, whether
somatic or gametic needs to be held up for cross examination
from all angles and by more than just the parties involved.
Implicated in gene design are not just the individual and
family in the immediate picture, but national, international
and societal concerns must also be taken into account.
And if there isn't anything unique about
humans, there's nothing wrong with doing gene
manipulation. But if there is something
unique about humans, then it is wrong to pass
over the barrier, wherever the barrier is--
but we don't know where the barrier is.'"
'" Boone, "Bad Axioms," 13.
'" Shannon, Bioethics: , 421, note 11.
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CONCLUSION
This study opened with an exegetical and theological
study focusing on Genesis 1:26, specifically focusing on the
meaning of the phrase "Let Us make man in Our image." With
the help of textual criticism and other exegetical methodol
ogy, the examination of this and other relevant Old and New
Testament passages revealed the fact that the "Image of God
in man" is not and cannot be limited to any one aspect or
attribute within the human design. It was also noted that
the manner of interpretation with respect to the way the
first eleven chapters of Genesis were written, does not make
any significant difference in the general understanding of
the phrase.
Upon examining several commentators and theologians on
this particular passage, it was discovered that most inter
pretations fall into either one of two camps. On the one
hand is the structural or substantive interpretation of the
image. This view sees the image as being represented in the
very nature of humanity; something that s/he is rather than
something s/he has or does.
On the other hand is found the functional/relational
view of the image in mankind. In this view, humanity does
not reach its full human potential until it is involved in
some type of relationship and cannot reach its ultimate
potential without a relationship with God. It seems that
the logical implication is that a believer possessing a
personal relationship with God would be more human than an
individual who is not in relationship with God. Brunner
notes, and conseguently seems to avoid any difficulty by
saying that this would still be a relationship: just not a
right relationship. Also often included in the functional
image is the concept of dominion over the creation, ie. it
is only as mankind functions in the proper role of over-seer
or steward over the rest of creation that mankind enters the
full potential of hximanhood.
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In the second chapter, which was split into two parts,
the decision was made to look at two different parts of the
creational command. Freedom is an inference or implication
of the creation mandate which God places on humanity. This
whole aspect of freedom has been distorted in the modern
world to mean an absence of limits. It is often couched in
the phrase, "Anything is permissible as long as it doesn't
hurt anyone else." It was shown that a Biblical understand
ing of this freedom was a freedom of action within specified
limits or guidelines. In any realm of activity, there are
boundaries which are not to be overstepped without incurring
dire consequences.
The creational command to subdue possesses a more
concrete origin. In Genesis 1:28 is found God's command to
hvimanity to rule over the earth and to subdue it. It was
shown in the second section of the second chapter that a
more correct interpretation of this concept has to do with
the idea of stewardship. This requires hiimanity to operate
in this world with the understanding that it does not belong
to humanity to do with as we please. Part of the purpose of
humanity on the earth is to be caretakers of that which is
not owned by humankind. This forces an acknowledgement by
humankind of God as the sole owner of all that is seen and
even not seen in this world.
The third chapter opened with some needed examination
of the whole recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid process. It
was the primary focus of this chapter to determine if the
rDNA process possessed the power to invade and possibly even
alter the essential nature of humanity. After preliminary
examinations of what is often meant by "the good" and
"risk/benefit analysis" in many of the written articles
relating to this whole procedure, investigation was made of
the impact that this technology would have first on the
nuclear family unit, secondly on others and society as a
whole including the workplace, and very briefly on the way
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in which technology is developing our concepts of the fu
ture .
It appears that this technology may indeed have the
power to alter the basic makeup of the human genome and
thereby develop something that is not really human (but may
indeed look human). The close of the chapter showed that
changing any part of the genome that would predispose an
individual to even a certain area of occupation is limiting
his/her freedom and thereby altering the dignity which was
to be found in the original genome of that individual. This
is not to forbid the therapy of disease and malfunction
through the use of genetic technology. What was emphasized
was the call to caution that is voiced by almost everyone
concerned with the scope and potential of this technology.
Daniel Callahan makes eloquent note of a concern that
has been growing in the mind of the present author as this
discussion draws to a close. This concern has to do with
the predictability of the outcome of any ethical discussion
regarding rDNA."* He notes three moral principles that
are culturally persuasive in our society. They have to do
with individual liberty (freedom) if there is no demonstra
ble harm to others; risk-benefit analysis; and the fact that
it is always better to attempt to do good than to avoid
harm. He confesses that while these three seem to constant
ly produce the same outcome, and that bothers him, he can
think of nothing better with which to substitute them. He
says that these three principles
do not allow us in any fashion to pose larger
questions about the nature of human happi
ness, the most appropriate and valuable di
rection which science as a whole should take,
or to inquire about the best ends to which
human freedom should be directed. . . . It is
precisely the sameness of the outcome of the
"* Callahan, "The Moral Career of Genetic Engineering,"
9. 21.
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application of the three principles noted
above which renders them suspect.'"
It is the feeling of the present author that it is precisely
the starting point of this discussion which opens up some of
these larger questions and issues regarding genetic engi
neering for a more comprehensive discussion. Risk-benefit
analysis and the good are side issues when the focal point
of the operation is the changing of an individual's genes,
and thereby, his or her identity- And a change of identity
can only be properly evaluated when there is a proper and
unified starting point: a Genesis 1 understanding of the
concept of the Image of God in humanity.
It must be acknowledge that this discussion raises many
more questions than it could possibly answer. However, the
central question regarding the ability of rDNA being able to
touch the essential nature of humanity has been addressed.
If rDNA is used to heal some serious genetic defect or
disease, such a procedure will not change or alter an indi
vidual's humanity- If it did, then we would have to call
into guest ion such healing procedures as eye glasses, heart
transplants and drugs. The fact that genetic engineering is
at a much more sub-atomic level than the wearing of eye
glasses is of little, if any, consequence. Therapy versus
design does not form the crux of the issue. Neither does
the issue lie in the internal versus the external applica
tion or procedure. Rather the difference exists in the fact
that the correcting of vision has little if anything to do
with altering the unigueness of the individual, while alter
ing the rDNA of an individual comes much closer to striking
at the heart of what makes an individual human that particu
lar individual. The fact that deleterious genes predispos
ing for genetic disease and physical design of the individu-
'" Callahan, "The Moral Career of Genetic Engineering,"
21 .
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al are both encoded in DNA makes involvement in altering the
DNA a much more delicate procedure, not just technically,
but emotionally, mentally, and most of all ethically.
The entire game changes, however, when rDNA is per
formed for design reasons. While the procedure for avoiding
Tay-Sachs disease is no different than the procedure for
changing black hair to blonde, the reasons for performing
these two procedures does change their inherent nature. The
former operation is to avoid disease and suffering in the
future life of the individual; the latter is to satisfy the
desires of the parent, regardless of the rationalizations
that may be produced in support of such a change. Any such
change is an infringement on the future of the receiving
individual which is in turn an infringement on their identi
ty as a free human being of divine design. As humans, we
have been given the obligation to protect other human be
ings, but we have not been given the right of creation or
design of other human beings. This holds true regardless of
familial relationships.
An argument could be built around the fact that design
ing for good looks, intelligence, or athletic ability, which
are traits desired by most normal people, is actually an
increasing of the individual's option and as a direct conse
quence, an increase of freedom. While this may be true
on
the micro or individual level, it will not likely stay true
on a macro or societal level. For the foreseeable future,
rDNA is going to be a very costly and delicate (with no
guarantees) procedure limiting its availability to the rich
and influential. Short term desires are not adequate for
addressing procedures and consequences of these magnitudes.
Long term consequences have to be faced in regard to these
types of procedures by asking questions such as, "By whose
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standards will what designs be performed?" and "How many of
the same design should be allowed?"'"
There are obvious realms of unexplored territory when
it comes to the combining of theology and genetic research
and technology. An issue that came to light but which may
have already been examined in detail elsewhere, is that of
the relationship in the Old Testament between God's oft
repeated commands to the people to "remember" and the pro
cess of healing, both spiritually and physically and possi
ble connections with gene therapy.
The focus of this thesis could also be attempted using
the humanity of Christ as the starting point. Both the Old
and New Testaments have much to say regarding the life and
humanity of Christ. How the life and body of Jesus Christ
were viewed and referred to both prior to his coming to
earth, during his ministry on earth, and subsequent to his
resurrection may have much to say regarding our use and the
possible abuses of rDNA technology.
As genetic technology comes closer and closer to com
plete performance, the questions of free will and predesti
nation will require investigation. The coding in DNA is
going to have substantial effect on previously held concepts
of free will, predestination, human behaviour and its modi
fication, as well as the effects of environment and manner
of upbringing. In other words, DNA coding is going to add
another very complex variable to the already complicated
fields of sociology and human behaviour.
In spite of Marc Lappe 's insistences, the availability
of genetic engineering will require both genetic counselors
and parents to evaluate much more closely the legacy of
their actions in the lives of both their immediate offspring
and the lives of all future descendants. Consequently, how
'" Cf. Michael Ruse, "Genesis Revisited: Can We Do
Better Than God?" Zyqon 19, no. 3 (Sept 1984): 279-316.
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genetic counseling is performed with specific interest in
the ability to counsel in a value-neutral manner needs to be
examined .
These and other concepts and ideas will require careful
scrutiny by all concerned with genetic engineering and its
effects, and especially by Christians concerned with how
society continues to view and value mankind.
144
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, W.French. "Hxaman Gene Therapy: why draw a line?"
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14, no. 6 (Dec
1989): 681-693.
Annas, George J. "Life Forms: The Law and the Profits."
The Hastings Center Report 8, no. 5 (Oct 1978): 21-22.
"Who's Afraid of the Human Genome?" The Hastings
Center Report 19, no. 4 (July/Aug 1989): 19-21.
Barth, Karl . Church Dogmatics. Volume Three. The
Doctrine of Creation. Part Two. G.W. Bromiley and
T.F. Torrance, eds. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1960.
Brown, Colin. General Editor. The New International Dic
tionary of New Testament Theology. Volumes 1-3. Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, Regency. 1975.
Brown, Francis; S. R. Driver, and Charles Briggs. A Hebrew
and English Lexicon of the Old Testament. Clarendon
Press: Oxford, 19
Brunk, Conrad G. "In the Image of God". In Medical Ethics,
Human Choices: A Christian Perspective. John Rogers,
ed. Kitchener: Herald Press, 1988.
Callahan, Daniel. "Recombinant DNA: Science and the Pub
lic," The Hastings Center Report 7, no. 2 (Apr 1977):
21 .
"Science: Limits and Prohibitions," The Hastings
Center Report 3, no. 5 (Nov 1973): 5-6.
145
"The Moral Career of Genetic Engineering." The
Hastings Center Report 9, no. 2 (Apr 1979): 9 & 21.
Candlish, Robert S. Studies in Genesis. Grand Rapids:
Kregel, 1868, 1982. 16-17.
Carter, Charles W., Gen Ed. A Contemporary Weslevan Theol-
ogy. Two Volumes. Grand Rapids: Francis Asbury Press,
1983.
Cassuto, Umberto. From Adam to Noah: A Commentary on the
First Chapters of Genesis I. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1944.
Cavalieri, Liebe F. The Double-Edged Helix: Science in the
Real World. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981,
Chafer, Lewis Sperry, Systematic Theology. Volume 2,
Dallas: Dallas Seminary Press, 1947.
Clines, D. J. A. "The Image of God in Man." Tyndale Bulle
tin 19 (1968) : 53-103.
Cole-Turner, Ronald. "Genetic Engineering: Our Role in
Creation." From The New Faith-Science Debate. John M.
Mangum, ed. Minneapolis: Augsburg-Fortress, 1989.
Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assess
ment . Mapping Our Genes: Genome Projects: How Big, How
Fast? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1990(?) .
Daube, David. The Duty of Procreation. Edinburgh: Edin
burgh University Press, 1982.
Dismukes, Key. "Recombinant DNA: A Proposal for Regula
tion." The Hastings Center Report 7, no. 2 (Apr 1977):
25-30.
. "Life is Patently Not Human-Made." The Hastings Center
Report 10, no. 5 (Oct 1980): 11-12.
Einspahr, Bruce. Compiler. Index to Brovm. Driver &
Briggs Hebrew Lexicon. Chicago: Moody, 1976.
Elwell, Walter A. Evangelical Dictionary of Theology.
Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984.
Engelhardt, Jr., H. Tristram. "Persons and Humans: Refash
ioning Ourselves in a Better Image and Likeness."
Zygon 19, no. 3 (Sept 1984): 288.
Erickson, Millard J. Christian Theology. Three Volumes.
Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984.
Ferguson, Sinclair B., and David F. Wright. New Dictionary
of Theology. J. I. Packer, Consulting Editor. Downers
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1988.
Fitzpatrick, Tim. "Mapping Genetic Code Uncovers Technolo
gy, Says Project Scientist." Salt Lake City (Utah)
Tribune, 27 January 1991, n.pg.
Fletcher, Joseph. "Four Indicators of Humanhood - The
Enguiry Matures." The Hastings Center Report 4, no. 6,
(Dec 1974): 4-7.
"Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man."
The Hastings Center Report 2, no. 5, (November, 1972):
1-4.
Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics. Buffalo:
Prometheus Books, 1979.
Friedmann, Theodore. "Progress Toward Human Gene Therapy."
Science 244, no. 4910 (16 June 1989): 1275-1281.
Gauthier, Candace C. "The Impact of Recombinant DNA tech
nology on Genetic Screening." Public Affairs Quarterly
3, no. 1, (Jan 1989): 25-48.
Gesenius' Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Qld Testament
Scriptures . Samuel Prideaux Tregelles, tr. Grand
Rapids: Baker, 1979.
Goodfield, June. Playing God: Genetic Engineering and The
Manipulation of Life. New York: Random House, 1977.
Goodman, Madeleine J., and Lenn E. Goodman. "The Oversell
ing of Genetic Anxiety." The Hastings Center Report
12, no. 5 (Oct 1982): 20-27
Gustafson, James M. Theology and Ethics. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1981.
. The Contributions of Theology to Medical Ethics.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1975.
. Can Ethics Be Christian? Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1975.
Hamilton, Victor P. The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17.
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990.
Harris, R. Laird, Ed. Gleason L. Archer, and Bruce K.
Waltke, Assoc Eds. Theological Wordbook of the Old
Testament. Volumes 1 and 2. Chicago: Moody, 1980.
148
Hauerwas, Stanley. "Can Ethics Be Theological?" The
Hastings Center Report 8 no. 5 (Oct 1978): 47-49.
"Having and Learning How to Care for Retarded Chil
dren: Some Reflections." In Ethics in Medicine: His
torical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns. Stan
ley Joel Reiser, Arthur J. Dyck and William J. Curran,
eds. Cambridge: The MIT Press, n.d.
Hoekema, Anthony A. Created in God's Image. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1986.
Hoffman, Paul W. "Genetic Engineering". In Medical Ethics,
Human Choices: A Christian Perspective. John Rogers,
ed. Kitchener: Herald Press, 1988.
Holtzman, Neil A. Proceed With Caution: Predicting Genetic
Risks in the Recombinant DNA Era. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989.
Keil, C. F., and F. Delitzsch. Commentary on the Old Testa
ment in Ten Volumes. Volume 1: The Pentateuch. Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983.
Kikawada, Isaac M. , and Arthur Quinn. Before Abraham Was:
The Unity of Genesis 1-11. Nashville: Abingdon, 1985.
Kohlenberger , John R., III. The New International
Version Interlinear Hebrew-English Old Testament, Four
Volumes in One: Genesis-Malachi . Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, Regency, 1987.
Koshland, Daniel E. "The Engineering of Species." [Edito
rial]. Science 244, no. 4910 (16 June 1989): 1233.
149
Krabill, Willard S. "Medical Ethics: Facing Difficult
Questions." In Medical Ethics. Human Choices: A Chris
tian Perspective. John Rogers, ed. Kitchener: Herald,
1988.
Lappe, Marc. Broken Code: The Exploitation of DNA. San
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1984.
"The Genetic Counselor: Responsible to Whom?" The
Hastings Center Report 1, no. 2 (September 1971): 6-11.
"Genetic Knowledge and the Concept of Health," The
Hastings Center Report 3, no. 4 (Sep 1973): 2.
"The Limits of Genetic Inquiry." The Hastings Center
Report 17, no. 4 (Aug 1987): 5-10.
"Moral Obligations and the Fallacies of Genetic
Control." Theological Studies 33, no. 3 (Sep 1972):
422.
"The Predictive Power of the New Genetics." The
Hastings Center Report 14, no. 5 (October 1984): 18-19.
Leupold, H. C. Exposition of Genesis. Volume 1: Chapters
1-19. Grand Rapids: Baker, n.d.
Luther, Martin. Luther's Works: Lectures on Genesis,
Chapters 1-5. Jaroslav Pelikan, ed. St. Louis:
Concordia, 1958.
Mertens, Thomas R. Human Genetics: Readings on The Implica
tions of Genetic Engineering. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1975.
150
Maclntyre, Alasdair. "Seven Traits for the Future." The
Hastings Center Report 9, no. 1 (Feb 1979): 5-7
Mieth, Dietmar, and Pohier, Jacgues. Ethics in the Natural
Sciences . Philip Hillyer, English language Editor.
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989.
Muller, Richard A. Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theologi
cal Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic
Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985.
Murray, Thomas H. "In Whose Image? Ethical Issues in
Genetic Engineering." In Winslade, J., ed. Personal
Choices and Public Commitments: Perspectives on the
Medical Humanities. Galveston: Institute for the
Medical Humanities, and Austin: Texas Committee for the
Humanities, 1988: 101-113.
"The Social Context of Workplace Screening." The
Hastings Center Report 14, no. 5 (Oct 1984): 23.
Nelson, J. Robert. Human Life: A Biblical Perspective for
Bioethics . Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984.
"The human problem of human genetic engineering". In
Milunsky, Aubrey, and George J. Annas, eds. Genetics
and the Law III. New York: Plenum Press, 1985: 81-87.
"Genetics and Theology: a complementarity?" [Editori
al]. Christian Century 105, no. 13 (Apr 20 1988):
388-389 .
151
Nolan, Kathleen, and Sara Swenson. "New Tools, New Dilem
mas: Genetic Frontiers." The Hastings Center Report
18, no. 5 (Oct/Nov 1988): 40-46.
Noth, Martin. A History of Pentateuchal Traditions. Trans
lated with an Introduction by Bernhard W. Anderson.
N.p.: n.p., 1972.
Orr, James. God's Image In Man and Its Defacement in the
Light of Modern Denials. London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1905.
Outler, Albert C. "The Beginnings of Personhood: Theologi
cal Considerations." In On Moral Medicine: Theological
Perspectives in Medical Ethics. Lammers, Stephen, and
Allen Verhey, eds. N.p.: n.p., n.d.
Powledge, Tabitha M. "You Shall Be As Gods." Worldview
(Sept. 1977): 45-47.
Prendergast, Jane. "Diagnosis faster with DNA." Cincinnati
(Ohio) Enguirer, 7 Jan. 1991, n.pg.
von Rad, Gerhard. Old Testament Theology, Volume 1: The
Theology of Israel's Historical Traditions. D. M. G.
Stalker, tr. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
Ramsey, Paul . Ethics at the Edges of Life: Medical and
Legal Intersections. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1978.
Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control . New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970-
Robin, Stanley S., et al . "Let No One Split Asunder: Contro
versy in human genetic engineering." [Article and
commentaries]. Politics and the Life Sciences 6, no. 1
(Aug 1987): 3-26.
Roblin, Richard. "The Boston XYY Case." The Hastings
Center Report 5, no. 4 (Aug 1975): 5-8.
Ruse, Michael. "Genesis Revisited: Can We Do Better Than
God?" Zygon 19, no. 3 (Sep 1984): 297-316.
Saletan, William. "Genes 'r' Us." New Republic 201, nos. 3
& 4 (Jul 17, 24 1989): 18-20.
Schaeffer, Francis A. The Complete Works of Francis A.
Schaeffer: A Christian Worldview. Volume Two: A Chris
tian View of the Bible as Truth. Westchester: Crossway
Books, 1982.
Schotsmans, Paul. "Brave New World within Reach? The Genet
ic Challenge to Ethics." In Ethics in the Natural
Sciences. Mieth, Dietmar, and Jacques Pohier, eds.
Edinburgh: Stichting Concilium and T. & T. Clark Ltd,
1989.
Scully, Thomas, and Celia Scully. Playing God: The New
World of Medical Choices. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1987.
Shannon, Thomas A., ed. Bioethics: Basic Writings on the
Key Ethical Questions that Surround the Major, Modern
Riological Possibilities and Problems. Third Edition.
Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987.
Shannon, Thomas A. What Are Thev Saving About Genetic
Engineering? New York: Paulist Press, 1985.
Shelp, Earl E., ed. Theology and Bioethics: Exploring the
Foundations and Frontiers. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub
lishing Company, 1985.
Sinsheimer, Robert L. "Science and the Quest for Human
Values." Science and Human Values in the 21st Century.
Ralph Wendell Burhoe, ed. Philadelphia: The Westmin
ster Press, 1971.
Smith, George P. "Biotechnology and the Law: Social Respon
sibility or Freedom of Scientific Inguiry?" Mercer Law
Review 39. no. 2 (Winter 1988): 437-460.
Stableford, Brian. Future Man: Brave New World or Genetic
Nightmare? New York: Crown, 1984.
Tendler, Moshe D. "Genetic Engineering: a composite of
ethical problems." In his Pardes Rimonim: A Marriage
Manual for the Jewish Family. New York: Judaica Press,
1979: 77-84.
Teresi, Dick, and Patrice G. Adcroft, eds. Qmni
'
s Future
Medical Almanac. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987.
Varga, Andrew C. "'Playing God': the Ethics of Biotechnical
Intervention." Thought 60, no. 237 (Jun 1985):
181-195.
Wade, Nicholas. The Ultimate Experiment. New York: Walker
& Co. , 1977.
154
Verhey, Allen. "The Morality of Genetic Engineering."
Christian Scholar's Review 14, no. 2 (1985): 124-139-
Walsh, Brian J-, j. Richard Middleton. The Transforming
Vision: Shaping a Christian World View. Downers Grove:
IVP, 1984.
Westermann, Claus. Genesis: A Practical Commentary. Text
and Interpretation. David E. Green, tr. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1987.
Wethers, Doris L.; and Ranjeet Grover. "Screening the new
born for sickle cell disease: is it worth the effort?"
In Carter, Thomas P., and Ann M. Willey, eds. Genetic
Disease: Screening and Management- -Proceedings of the
1985 Albany Birth Defects Symposium- New York: Alan R.
Liss, 1986: 123-136.
Wilson, William. New Wilson's Old Testament Word Studies.
Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1987.
Wolpert, Lewis. "The Social Responsibility of Scientists:
moonshine and morals." British Medical Journal 298,
no. 6678 (Apr 8 1989): 941-943.
World Council Of Churches. Manipulating Life: Ethical
Issues in Genetic Engineering- Geneva: The Council,
1982.
Zoler, Mitchel L. "Genetic tests creating a deluge of dilem
mas". Medical World News 27, no. 18 (Sep 22 1986):
